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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is an analysis of the nature and characteristics of French and 
English "thought styles" - named rationalism and empiricism respectively. 
Although the term is reminiscent of one used by the German sociologist of 
knowledge, Mannheim, the thesis develops a model of the styles with the 
help of Moscovici 's <1985) idea of social representation and Bourdieu 's 
<1979) idea of the internalization of social structure. Thought styles thus 
emerge not as sui generis phenomena, but as distilled from culturally 
specific thought-environment complexes. The thesis argues that contrasting 
socio-political substructures are crucial to the genesis of the different 
thought-environment complexes and thus of the distinct thought-styles. The 
two thought styles are isolated in their ideal typical form <Weber 1949), 
and the point is made that they are most commonly encountered as basic 
designs or "motifs". 
The nature and characteristics of the rationalist and empiricist thought-
styles are seen through a series of examples drawn from the Arts, the 
Sciences and the Human Sciences. The model of the two distinct thought 
styles thus developed is applied to recent socio-historical literature on 
madness. More specifically, the model is useful to the understanding of how 
the writings of theorists as such as Sartre and Foucault have been 
assimilated into the Anglo-Saxon tradition. A series of preliminary 
interviews with French and English students suggests that the model of 
thought styles may be applicable to the spoken explanations used by 
members of the two academic communities, as well as written academic texts. 
The final chapter shows how the differences in thought and expression, 
attributed to the French and English thought-styles, are perpetuated by 
educational systems which are the product of different socio-political 
contexts. 
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organization and presentation of the text. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In anticipation of 1992 and the proposed unification of 
Europe, philosophical speculations as to the nature of 
European identity and it's origins have multiplied. A recent 
series of programmes broadcast by the BBC, chose to 
introduce the idea of "Europe" by stressing the unity 
between the member countries, in terms of a host of factors 
ranging from climate to political attitudes. Roger Scruton, 
speaking on the serious intellectual chat-show hosted by 
Clive James, voiced opinions on the European merger which 
were, perhaps, more typical of the staunch independence that 
has characterized the British in their discussions about the 
dissolving of national boundaries. Britain, he argued, has 
always distanced herself from her Continental neighbours and 
should continue to do so. His argument revolved around the 
incompatibility of her institutions which Scruton failed to 
see as part of a broader cultural phenomenon or cultural 
"complex",., distinguishing her politically, artistically and 
intellectually. 
The thesis involves my understanding of the intellectual 
differences between France and England. My research 
indicates that they have a long history, with perhaps the 
most obvious example being the centuries old debate between 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental thinkers, advocating opposing 
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empirical and rational solutions to philosophical issues. 
The problem is framed as one of different ways of thinking, 
or different "thought styles", leading to different ways of 
looking at the world. That these differences are 
inextricably linked to underlying socio-political factors is 
another point that the thesis makes, accounting for the'ir 
strength and persistence. 
The study of how mentali te - ways of thinking or mental 
character - relates to societal structures, is a field of 
inquiry which dates back 
knowledge, 
study of 
Montesquieu, and 
the English, 
individualism and love of 
constitution. As the laws 
to the first sociologist of 
is still alive today. In his 
Montesquieu associated 
ci vi 1 freedom with the 
of the constitution 
their 
English 
applied 
equally to all citizens, none would fear another, making the 
nation as a whole "proud" and "arrogant" as "pride of kings 
is only founded on their independence" <Montesquieu page 169 
1973). Montesquieu seemed aware that the English State was 
Lockean in nature, that it was "contractual" as opposed to 
"organic" as the French State was to be. The individualism 
that this generated made for uneasy social relations, with 
the result that Englishmen lived solitary existences. 
Investigations into the link between the social and the 
psychological have been continued into the twentieth century 
in the work of the neo-Durkheimians. The concept of social 
representation, described by Moscovici <1985). a French 
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representative oi the tradition, proved useiul in speciiying 
what exactly was meant by the concept oi thought style. 
The thesis is particularly pertinent at a time when French 
theorists such as Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari are 
ofiering an English audience their thoughts on madness. They 
present novel perspectives on a subject which has, until 
recently been dominated by the writings of American 
psychoanalysts and sociologists. The latter have been more 
popular than their academic British colleagues. The works of 
the Americans are more accessible than those of their French 
counterparts because of the shared language, as well as, to 
be argued later, a similar "thought style". The usual result 
oi reviewing the works of the Frenchmen is a qualified 
praise, a recognition oi valuable ideas, despite diiferent 
methodologies and terminologies. For example, historians oi 
science and sociologists acknowledge that a great debt is 
owed to Foucault Ior his revolutionary approach to the 
history of the Human Sciences, yet extensive criticism has 
been made of the style and content of his work <Couzens-Hoy 
1986, Bynum et al 1985). Similar, perhaps even stronger 
criticism has been made of the other writers mentioned. The 
conclusion to be drawn from the thesis is that these do not 
stem from any fault inherent in the works themselves, rather 
a failure to recognize that the authors on difierent sides 
oi the channel are working within diiferent traditions oi 
thought, 
diiferent 
each possessing 
characteristics. 
distinct goals 
These traditions 
and 
and 
valuing 
their 
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thought styles provide a framework within which to think 
about certain issues in contrasting ways. Here, the specific 
example considered is madness. 
A reading of popular writings on madness, in the anti-
psychiatric literature of the nineteen fifties and sixties, 
as well as more recent historical works, reveals different 
ontological and methodological approaches which can be 
described as macro-social in the case of the French, micro-
social in the case of the English. The English writings tend 
towards methodological localism. A discussion of the anti-
psychiatric literature of the period demonstrates how this 
micro-social approach is sui ted to a focus on the 
individual, experiential component of madness. Conversely, 
the French work within a tradition which tries to get away 
from the individual, conducting their large scale analyses 
in terms of a priori forces and strategies. Their macro-
social approach is appropriate to their different aim: 
outlining the socio-political function of madness as part of 
a large-scale analysis of power. It is in this context that 
criticisms of the French perspective should be understood. 
Following a suggestion by Quinton <1982), the link has been 
made between ontological/methodological individualism and 
empiricism and ontological/methodological collectivism and 
rationalism. Thus the contrasting social perspectives become 
1~nifestations of the fundamental difference in thought 
styles. 
Page 5 
My concern in this thesis is to demonstrate the existence of 
the thought styles and to characterize them. I have chosen 
to name the thought styles rationalism and empiricism after 
the philosophical traditions which have predominated in the 
countries of interest here: France and England. In an 
introductory chapter, I shall specify what I am trying to 
capture by the term "thought style", as well as the kind of 
theory I am developing, 
conceptual 
ideal types. 
tools: social 
Furthermore, 
and the differences which 
with the help of well known 
representations, epistemes and 
using the example of phi 1 osophy 
have persisted in this area, I 
shall 1) suggest that these intellectual differences have 
been long-standing 2> specify precisely what I mean by the 
terms empiricism and rationalism and 3) outline what is 
meant by a 11 tradition of thought 11 , an expression of the 
historical continuity of thought styles. 
The second and third chapter have been conceived with the 
dual aim of 1 > isolating the core characteristics of the 
thought styles and 2> supporting the claim made in the 
opening chapter that the properties of the thought styles 
originate in socio-culturally2 specific thought-environment 
complexes. Chapter two focuses on national differences in 
art, music and literature. Chapter three is a historical 
chapter on the development of French and English science in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The idea of the 
"classical" versus the "intuitive" scientist <Crosland 1980) 
is related to the rational-empirical distinction and 
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examined in the context of the differing scientific 
communities of the two countries. The latter were the 
product of socio-political differences - the result of the 
existence of a strong interventionist state in France and a 
weaker, non-interventionist state in England. This 
disparity, responsible for shaping the communities, has been 
a stable point of contrast since the absolutist French 
monarchy. 
The fourth chapter deals with the presence of different 
thought styles in the Human Sciences, both diachronically, 
using historical examples, and synchronically, looking at 
their manifestation in twentieth century social psychology 
and psychoanalysis. In this chapter, the important 
manifestations of empiricism as individualism and 
rationalism as collectivism are highlighted. The argument is 
that the going beyond the evidence of the senses, advocated 
by rationalism, is necessary to conceptualize 
objects as entities in themselves. This is 
large social 
distinguished 
from a more empirical approach that considers social objects 
as logical constructions from individuals. The point to be 
made here is that the thought styles generate traditions of 
social discourse which capture the underlying political 
differences of which they are a product - outlined in the 
previous chapters - and which sustain them. 
In the following chapter, I look at the popular anti-
psychiatric and socio-historical literature on madness, to 
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see how it has been influenced by the "thought styles". Even 
in the most cosmopolitan English texts, such as those 
written by Laing and the Post-Modern English historians, a 
close reading indicates that the native "thought style" 
affects the way the problem has been dealt with. Showing the 
existence of two distinct "thought styles" helps explain the 
criticisms writers from the different traditions encounter. 
A possible reproach may be that the selection of popular 
literature may not be representative of differences in 
thinking about mental 
audiences' selective 
illness. However, it is a product of 
preference for that which is most 
consonant with the native styles. Furthermore, despite 
orthodox psychiatry's attempts to establish universal 
discourses/practices to enhance cross-cultural dialogue, 
evidence from the classification literature suggests that 
different traditions of thought exist here as well. In an 
article concerned with the conceptualization of the atypical 
psychosis, Manschreck and Petri <1978) distinguish between a 
Central European and an Anglo-Saxon tradition of thought. 
The former, strongly influenced by the German psychiatrists 
Jaspers and Kraepelin, recognizes categories of "reactive" 
and "cycloid" psychosis - the second of which is a category 
coined by a pupil of Kraepelin, Kleist. These, however, 
remain virtually 
literature on the 
undiagnosed in the Anglo-American 
subject. Moreover, a familiarity with 
psychiatric history indicates that 
conceptualizing disorders have been 
inextricably linked to socio-political 
different ways of 
long-standing and 
factors - and hence 
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to "thought styles". Twa examples of such instances are the 
popularity of the concept of moral contagion in France and 
of phrenology in Britain. The former was adapted by 
psychiatry as a strategy to foster links with a state which 
had a tradition of employing a "medical police" to cope with 
epidemics. The "epidemic paradigm" thus became the obvious 
method for the developing nineteenth century discipline of 
psychiatry to legitimize its utility <Goldstein in Geison 
1985). The success of phrenology in English psychiatry was 
partly due to the rudimentary state of pathological anatomy. 
The latter was the result of local, as apposed to state 
patronage having led to a bias against structural anatomy 
and an emphasis an superficial, appealing cures designed far 
a competitive market. To Sydenham, the doctor's only 
obligation was to "cure desease and to do naught else" (in 
Cooter 1981). These differences, past and present. are 
perhaps nat surprising as it is now widely acknowledged that 
bath scientific and medical practices are tied to culture 
<Crosland 1978, Lesch 1984, Geison 1985, Pastel and Quetel 
1985). 
In a final chapter, I have crystallized my awn experience of 
the educational systems of the twa countries, arguing that 
education is important in perpetuating the different thought 
styles. The chapter also returns to the theme of thought 
styles as generated by culturally specific thought-
environment complexes. The two educational systems are 
products of different socio-political substructures. The 
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French interventionist state practises what I have called a 
politic of intellectualism, which through its manifestations 
in the curriculum, cultivates the properties associated with 
the rationalist thought style by its emphasis on the powers 
of the mind. On the other hand, the English curriculum seems 
to perpetuate the empirical thought style. 
The point of the thesis is suggestive and can only claim to 
make a modest contribution to this area of intellectual 
history. The subject matter of such a project is potentially 
limitless <Hughes 1967).'3 The thesis revolves around 
selected examples which illustrate the nature of the 
different thought styles. The latter help explain how: 
All of us French and Anglo-Saxon pedants as well as 
peasants, operate within cultural constraints just as we 
share conventions of speech. So historians should be able to 
see how culture shapes ways of thinking, even for the 
greatest thinkers. (Darnton 1984 page 6) 
Following Darnton, the thesis tries to make explicit 
cultural constraints on thought, indicating their possible 
origins and reasons for their persistence. 
Finally, a reference should be made to a problem this study 
has repeatedly encountered when considering "English 
Thought". Unlike its French counterpart, which possesses a 
strong national identity, the English tradition of thought 
has been fertilized by related, but slightly different, 
outlooks. These include ones originating inside the British 
Isles and more recently from the U.S.A. This explains 
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necessary references to "British" empiricism and the need to 
discuss "American" social thought in a chapter dealing with 
English and French social discourse. This eclecticism can be 
attributed to an "empirical" attitude, prepared to adapt any 
theoretical outlook which agrees with its pragmatic, 
"commonsensical" approach to knowledge. On the ather hand, 
it can be explained by a weak nan-interventionist state, 
showing little interest in cultivating a national cultural 
identity. As will became clear, bath these explanations are 
consonant with the argument developed in the thesis. 
I, The idea of "complex" refers to a ~hole composed of many parts, which cannot be easily 
isolated or studied separately, 
2, Culture or civilization refers to a complicated pattern of socially transmitted 
thought, speech, beliefs and institutions, These issue from the cultural complex which is 
a product of a number of social and physical factors - for example political structure and 
climate, 
3, Hughes, looking at late nineteenth and early twentieth century European culture and 
consciousness, was aware that: 
History of this sort [intellectual history) deals ritlt t.he thoughts and 11110tions 
of •en, .. rith reasoned argu1ent and passionate outbursts alike, The 111toie range 
of hu11an expression as revealed in rriting, speech, pr"tice and tradition faJls 
rithin its orbit. (Hughes page 3 1967) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM: WORKING WITHIN A TRADITION 
~n.v s.vstem or body of beliefs is the expre11ion 1nd 
for11ulation of certain relations selected froa the 
ex,oerienced world in 8 definite intellectual 
language, ~itlt i vocabulir,V ind gra/Aibar of its o~n. 
The e.~pre11ion and for11ulition il~a.vs has a histor.v 
of development and modifi C~tion as flen Jearn to 
fare ne11 .oroblems and old ones in novel contexts. 
(Randell page 71 1963) 
A well worn discussion in philosophical circles is the 
contrasting approaches to philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon 
world and in Continental Europe. That the French philosopher 
Descombes (1980) wrote "Modern French Philosophy" 
specifically for an English readership, and more recently, 
Harland <1985), a similar work outlining the philosophy of 
the structuralists. testifies to the existence of a 
dichotomy. It seems as though one can either accept that 
there are genuine conceptual and methodological differences. 
leading to such articles as Jacques Bouvesse' s <1983) "Why I 
am so Unfrench". or one can argue, as Rorty (1982) did, that 
the differences are superficial, amounting to no more than 
different ways of formulating the same ideas. 
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This introductory chapter presents certain parameters. the 
first of which is an attempt to conceptualize a "thought 
style", using various social psychological ideas. This will 
be followed by a discussion of the philosophical differences 
which have existed between the countries, allowing 
definitions of the terms "empiricism" and "rationalism". 
used to name the "thought styles". The focus will then shift 
to the idea of a tradition of thought and the implications 
of working within one. 
THE CONCEPT OF A THOUGHT STYLE 
The concept of a "thought style" emerged out of my own 
experience of the different ways of thinking and 
articulating ideas/concepts present in the two cultures 
considered. The phenomenon governs the presentation of 
scientific ideas and artistic images, as well as the 
structuring of, and approaches adopted in, new academic 
fields. Several concepts were considered to help capture 
this complex phenomenon, presented here as different 
frameworks of thought or thought styles. 
A national episteme in the Foucauldian sense would imply the 
existence of an underlying system of rules, specific to the 
culture considered, constraining discourse and thought. 
By episteme, we mean the total set of relations that unite a 
given period, the discursive practices that give rise to 
epistemological figures, sciences and possibly formalized 
systeJIIS ... The episteme is not a form of knowledge 
(connaissance) or type of rationality, which crossing the 
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boundaries of the mast varied sciences, manifests the 
sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period, it is 
the totality of relations that can be discovered far a given 
period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the 
level of discursive regularity. <'Foucault page 191 1972) 
Epistemes are the crystallization of internal and external 
forces operating on discourses. Among the external 
constraints, Foucault includes <1972) avoiding mad 
discourse 2) institutions and their prohibitions on what can 
and cannot be said 3) the will to truth, especially 
characteristic of the sciences. The internal constraints 
include commentary 2) academic disciplines 3) 
qualifications of the speaker. Hence the possibility of 
national variants following national variations in these 
forces. However, the notion does not suit the idea of a 
thought style as epistemic constraints would, because of 
their absolute nature, preclude cross-cultural dialogue, 
which in practice does occur - this dialogue is discussed at 
various points in the thesis. This is not to say that there 
is no evidence for the epistemic nature of thought styles. 
For example, it could be argued that a strong Cartesian 
episteme in eighteenth and nineteenth century French science 
precluded scientists understanding the Newtonian basis of 
Dalton's atomic theory. 
Social representation as developed by the French neo-
Durkheimian Moscovici (1985), shares certain crucial common 
features with the idea of thought style. Moscovici stresses 
the idea of conditioning involved in social representation, 
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the unconscious acceptance of prior conventions. Social 
reality is predetermined in that: 
As 
Nobody's mind is free from the effects of the prior 
conditioning which is imposed by his representations 
language and culture. We think by .means of a language; we 
organise our thoughts, in accordance with a system which is 
conditioned, both by our representations and by our culture. 
We see only that which underlying conventions allow us to 
see, and we remain unaware of these conventions. (](oscovici 
in Farrand Hoscovici page 8 1985). 
such representations, like thought styles, are 
prescriptive, imposing themselves through cultural 
structures such as language, which are a "combination of a 
structure which is present before we have begun to think, 
and of a tradition which decrees what we should think" <page 
9 1985). The concept of a tradition will be dealt with later 
in the chapter because of its centrality to the idea of 
thought style. As will become clear, intellectual traditions 
do not merely bequeath certain concepts or even ways of 
thinking, but are complex sociological phenomena. This 
explains their prescriptive force: thinkers are not only 
constrained by intellectual tools such as language, but also 
institutions which embody value systems sustaining the 
thought styles. Representational thinking owes more to 
memory than to reason, more to traditional structures than 
to any intellectual fad. This implies a historical 
dimension, or cultural inheritance which epistemes do not 
possess and which thought styles do. This historical 
dimension is embodied in the idea of a "tradition of 
thought": 
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Social and intellectual activity is, after all, a rehearsal 
or recital . .. Our past experiences and ideas are not dead 
experiences or dead ideas. but continue to be active. to 
change and to infiltrate our present experience and ideas. 
In many respects the past is more real than the present. The 
peculiar power and clarity of representations - derives from 
the success with which they control the reality of today 
through that of yesterday and the continuity which this 
presupposes. (Xoscovici in Farr and Koscovici page 10 1985> 
Representations are a product of consensual universes - the 
consensual universe being Moscovici's equivalent to the 
Durkheimian collective "mind". Like thought styles, the 
representations which issue from them are culturally 
specific ways of thinking, and thus of understanding and 
communicating. Consequently, they pertain to a certain 
socio-cultural milieu. The link between the social and the 
psychological aspects of cultural representations, i.e. 
between the consensual universe and underlying societal 
structure, has been elaborated by Bourdieu <1986): 
The cognitive structures which social agents implement in 
their practical knowledge of the social world are 
internalized, 'embodied social structures' .... Being the 
product of the incorporation of the fundamental structures 
of a society, these principles of division are common to all 
the agents of society and make possible the production of a 
common, .meaningful world, a common-sense world. (Bourdieu 
page 468 1986) 
An important property of social representations is their 
fluid, changeable nature, another point of contrast with the 
episteme: 
Representations, obviously, are not created by individuals 
in isolation. Once created, however, they lead a life of 
their own, circulate, .merge attract and repel, and give 
birth to new representations, while old ones die out. 
(Noscovici page 13 1985> 
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With the help of the social representation analogy and 
Bourdieu's important point about the internalisation of 
"social structures", it is possible to see thought styles as 
culturally specific thought frameworks, enhancing 
understanding and communication in the cultural environment 
from which they originate. Following Bourdieu's 0979) link 
between the social 
how the different 
and psychological, 
thought styles 
this thesis explores 
are related to the 
contrasting political substructures of the two countries in 
question. These substructures are responsible for the 
differences between the thought-environment complexes which 
are used to explain the differing properties of the thought 
styles. These complexes are thus specific to contrasting 
socio-cultural milieus. Thus thought styles can be 
conceptualized as 
thought-environment 
distillations 
complexes, or 
of culturally 
"life styles" 
specific 
to which 
they are suited. Assuming an identity independent from the 
social reality of which they are born, thought styles are 
transmitted by cultural structures such as educational 
institutions. These, a product of the same socio-political 
milieu as the thought styles, embody the necessary 
prerogatives to perpetuate the thought styles. As a result 
of their long history, 
specific repertoires 
thought styles survive as nationally 
an idea to be elaborated in the 
section on tradition - upon which thinkers draw to a lesser 
or greater extent. The thought styles impose themselves 
unconditionally through language - as cu 1 tural constraints 
on thinking 
institutions. 
reflect the 
Page 18 
and expression and conditionally through 
Both institutional and linguistic constraints 
value systems of the different cultural 
universes which are also embodied in the thought styles. 
Belonging to different traditions of thought may entail 
differences in approach and emphasis when dealing with 
specific issues, leading to mutual criticism and even 
misunderstanding. Both the criticisms and misunderstandings 
can stem either from logical differences or rhetorical ones. 
Logical differences revolve around issues of precise meaning 
or conceptual 
consequence of 
differences, 
different sets 
whereas rhetorical are a 
of priori ties. Rorty <1982) 
judges the latter less important, dismissing them as 
differences of "expression". In fact, as this thesis 
demonstrates, they betray different value systems which can 
lead to contrasting perspectives on a problem such as 
madness. Most of the differences investigated, 
the exception of science, are rhetorical 
perhaps with 
in nature. 
Rhetorical differences are possible even when an 
understanding of the cultural representations or thought 
styles have been achieved, as will become evident in the 
study of Laing's writings and the two examples at the end of 
the chapter. This indicates that an awareness of foreign 
constraints does not mean that they are necessarily 
observed. Instead, ideas are often modified to suit the new 
thought style. This modification occurs both overtly to suit 
the expectations of the new audience and covertly by 
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translating ideas into a language which embodies another set 
of cultural constraints. It is important to remember 
Durkheim's remark concerning bodies of belief: 
It is not enough that they be true to be believed. If they 
are not in harmony with the other beliefs and opinions, or, 
in a word, with the roass of the other collective 
representations, they will be denied: minds will be closed 
to them; consequently it will be as though they did not 
e.xis:J;.. Wurlrheim page 318 1951) 
The thesis aims to make explicit certain features of the two 
"thought styles". The examples used to typify them are 
mostly cases which are nationally generated and where the 
thought styles are exhibited in idiosyncratic forms 
eighteenth century art of the two countries, British 
utilitarianism and French positivism. This has resulted in a 
characterization of two polar ideal types CWeber 1949). The 
purpose of ideal types here is to bring out certain 
characteristic features - which need not all occur in each 
example considered - and to illustrate where the strengths 
of each tradition lie: 
The goal of the ideal typical is always to make explicit not 
the class or average character but rather the unique 
individual character of the individual phenomena. (fleber 
page 101 1949). 
Only through ideal typical constructions do the viewpoints 
with which we are concerned in i ndi vi dual cases become 
explicit. Their peculiar character is brought about by the 
confrontation of empirical reality with the ideal typical. 
(fleber page 110 1949) 
The examples of possible modifications of the polar types -
the French interpretation of English Empiricism as 
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Ideology, 1 Impressionist painting, Laing's interpretation of 
Sartrian philosophy and post-modern English disciples of 
Foucauldian history - show how certain core characteristics 
of the national traditions are retained. They illustrate how 
the thought styles are usually encountered as recurring 
"designs" or "motifs" <Rayner page 10 1989) which can be 
understood in terms of the polar types isolated. 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES. 
Philosophical differences have been remarkably consistent 
throughout French and British history. In the seventeenth 
century, Locke was in no doubt as to his opinion of 
Continental rationalism. Of Malebranche, admittedly one of 
the more obscure members of the tradition, he says: 
Wberein, I confess, there are many expressions, which carry 
with them to my mind no clear idea, are like to remove but 
little of 1I1Y ignorance by their sound. Here again I must 
confess myself in the dark... and methinlrs if a man would 
have studied obscurity, he could not have w.rit more 
unintelligibly than this. Far be it from him to indulge in 
such obscurity. Ny appearing in print being on purpose to be 
as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have 
to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers as I 
can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted 
should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than 
anyone not accustomed to abstract speculation, or 
preposessed with different notions, should Illistake or not 
comprehend 1I1Y meaning. (in Hazard page 281 1964) 
Locke has set a precedent for this kind of criticism, as 
well as the emphasis on thinking in accessible, concrete 
terms. On the other hand, seventeenth century French writers 
Page 21 
were not complimentary of their English counterparts, as 
Coste demonstrates: 
The English writers were obscure,· they transgressed rules of 
logic, their ideas needed to be coordinated: they were 
diffuse and needed pruning; they were inelegant and in need 
of refining. (Coste in Hazard page 88 1954.> 
The idea of "transgressing the rules of logic" can be 
related to subsequent criticisms referring to the lack of 
structured, methodical and sytematic thinking in England. In 
the eighteenth century, adopting a more conciliatory 
attitude, Leclerc maintained: 
.. , I have never come across people better calculated to get 
on together than the French who give careful attention to 
the theory of what they are considering, and the English who 
avoid getting lost in the abstract by giving concrete 
expression to their ideas with an independence of mind we 
should do well to indtate. (in Hazard page 75 1954.> 
Leclerc pointed to features ~hich have become characteristic 
of the two different traditions of thought, empiricism and 
rationalism - although Rorty <1982) has replaced the latter 
by the term textualism, due to the recent directions taken 
by Continental philosophy. These features are the 
rationalist penchant for theory which is accompanied by a 
priori reasoning in terms of models/principles second 
order abstractions. This contrasts with empirical thinking, 
emphasizing the immediacy of experience, resisting 
speculation, appealing instead to "commonsense" . :;;~ The 
association that Leclerc made between English thinking and 
"concrete expression" and French thought and "abstract" 
theory recurs in the thesis. The "concrete" thinking of 
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empiricism relates to a commonsensical attitude. and is 
taken to refer to thinking in practical terms of what is 
immediately available to the senses. "Abstract" rationalist 
thinking, on the other hand, values theory over practice and 
is a way of thinking which relies little on pictorial 
representation. There are, however, problems with the use of 
blanket terms such as empiricism and rationalism. De 
Toqueville, a contemporary of Spencer, points to these when 
writing on the Americans in the nineteenth century: 
But I go t'urther and seek amon8' these characteristics the 
principle one, which includes all the rest, I discover that 
in most of the operations of the mind each American appeals 
only to the individual effort of his own understanding. 
America is therefore one of the countries where the precepts 
of Descartes are least studied and best applied. . . (in 
MacLuhan page 7 1962) 
This is similar to a description of the English given by 
Montesquieu two hundred years previously, and seems to be an 
Anglo-Saxon characteristic. The terms rationalism and 
empiricism have been used in several contexts, ranging from 
descriptions of styles of philosophical discourse, to 
references, such as Halls' (1965) in his treatise on French 
education, to rationalist French society. They are used here 
to describe different thought styles. In view of their 
philosophical origins, these terms are best understood from 
studying the work of the proponents of the two schools of 
thought. Descartes states in his meditations: 
I find I have insensibly reverted to the point I desired; 
for since it is now :manifest to me that bodies themselves 
are not perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of 
imagination but by the intellect alone; and since they are 
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not perceived because they are seen and touched. but only 
because they are understood... (Meditation 2 page 119 1974) 
The emphasis on the mind and reason embodied in Cartesian 
philosophy is essential to the meaning of the term as it is 
used here. As Cottingham (1984) points out, what the three 
great rationalist philosophies - those of Descartes, Spinoza 
and Leibnitz - and the tradition they spawned have in common 
is the assumption "that thought is an independent source of 
knowledge, and is moreover a more trustworthy source of 
knowledge than experience" <Page 102 1984). 
Locke's reaction to Descartes was to base his whole 
philosophy on what Descartes refused to trust, experience: 
How, then comes the Bdnd to be furnished? Whence comes it by 
that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man 
has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has 
it all the :materials of reason and knowledge? To this I 
answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our 
knowledge is founded and from that it ul ti.mately derives 
itself. (Locke page 1 1690) 
Scruton <1984), whose praise of his philosophical 
inheritance is quite candid, maintains that empiricism is 
seeing human understanding as confined within the limits of 
human experience. Straying outside those limits is to fall 
victim to "scepticism or to lose itself in nonsense" 
<Scruton page 83 1984). Furthermore, although he does not 
see empiricism as predominant in England, it remains - which 
is more important - "more truly characteristic of the Anglo-
Saxon genius than any speci fie outlook to which it might 
lend its aid. II <Scruton page 83 1984). Scruton's point is 
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one this thesis emphasizes, especially in chapter five: 
empiricism is an Anglo-Saxon strength - just as rationalism 
is a French one - not that it is necessarily omnipresent. 
Descartes and Locke offered the possibility of juxtaposing a 
cult of reason with one of experience. Empiricism and 
rationalism, because of their different emphases, led to 
different ways of formulating ideas on the same issues. This 
explains Leclerc's remark concerning the relative strengths 
of French and English thinkers. In the nineteenth century, 
the empirical distrust of Cartesian philosophy spread to 
Hegelian collectivist rationalist metaphysics, an outgrowth 
of Spinoza's pantheism, and arguably the most influential 
post-Kantian philosophical doctrine in nineteenth century 
Continental Europe. Yet the Hegel ian tradition has never 
been understood, "let alone 
countries <Harland 1985). 
favoured" in 
Significantly, 
Anglo-Saxon 
Anglo-Saxon 
empiricists reacted against the Cartesian "I philosophy", 
taking this "other European tradition" as "a madder and more 
mystical development of the same thing" CHarland page 70 
1985). Hegel's philosophy, through the intermediary of Marx, 
is at the root of much European social philosophy. However, 
in England, it never became such an ideological force. 
Hegel's ontological and methodological collectivism is 
evidenced in references to "the self consciousness of 
nations" which he saw as the means of development of the 
collective spirit. These ideas were, and still are, at odds 
with the ontology and methodology of liberal,"' voluntaristic 
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Anglo-Saxon social thought. The emphasis on the individual 
and his rights, or individualism, which the latter generates 
contrasts with the collectivism and determinism of the 
French positivistic outlook. The opposition is restated as 
psychologism versus sociologism by Quinton (1982), and with 
it a link is suggested between the former and Anglo-Saxon 
empiricism, and the latter and Continental rationalism. That 
individualism stems from resisting the conceptualization of 
social objects - too large to be perceived or to be amenable 
to empirical investigation - as entities in themselves, to 
be understood without reference to individuals, 
corroborated by Harland's <1985) description of 
"paradoxical" philosophy of the structuralists: 
This is a paradoxical way of thinking and especially 
paradoxical in relation to Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking. For 
it is in Anglo-saxon countries that the assumed priority of 
the individual has past over into a kind of plain man's down 
to earth common sense. Anglo-Saxons have a feeling of having 
their feet firmly planted when they plant them upon the 
see:mi.ngly solid ground of individual tastes and opinions. or 
on the seemingly hard facts of roaterial nature. (Harland 
page 10 1985) 
is 
the 
Empiricism, with its focus on the immediacy of experience, 
does not lend itself to conceptualizing large a priori 
social constructions, and leads to reductionism. Social 
objects such as the "state" are not realities in themselves, 
but rather a collection of individuals. Ayer states quite 
fervently that "The English State is a logical construction 
out of individual people" CAyer in Quinton page 19 1982). 
The opportunity is then open to study these social entities 
through the intermediary of their constituent parts by 
empirical means such as surveys. 
empiricism is often criticized. It is, 
of the fundamental values which the 
state has fostered. At the 1988 
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The individualism of 
however, a reflection 
"liberal" Anglo-Saxon 
Conservative party 
conference, Mrs Thatcher captured over four hundred years of 
English social philosophy in her remark that there was no 
such thing as Society, only Individuals. On the other hand, 
the strong state in both France and Germany has been coupled 
with a collectivism ... · and a belief in the "social" as an 
independent realm. The ability to accept the existence of 
hypothetical social entities relies on the ability to go 
beyond the senses using thinking of the rationalist type, 
present in both countries. The proposition is that social 
and philosophical discourses reflect contrasting political 
substructures. As the discourses originate from specific 
thought styles, they are formulated in a manner that is a 
product of a specific cultural milieu and are suited to 
describe the milieu in question. 
TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT 
Moscovici <1985) stresses the importance of tradition in his 
discussion of social representations. A "tradition of 
thought", as it is described here, embodies his idea that 
thought styles, like representations, "control the reality 
of today through that of yesterday". Many authors recognize 
the dominance of a certain tradition of thought in different 
countries, particularly the pervasiveness of empiricism in 
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the Anglo-Saxon world and of rationalism on the Continent. 
Quinton C1982) summarizes the commonly accepted account of 
the development of British philosophy. After Hume - with the 
exception of Mill - British philosophy "closed down" until 
Bradley. It did not properly start up again until the 
Bradleyans Moore and Russell "broke out" of the wrappings of 
their philosophical education. Finally, "God said "Let there 
be Wittgenstein" and all was light." <Page 178 1982). At the 
end of the nineteenth century, Durkheim praised the 
rationalist heritage, testifying to a persistent faith in 
the French rationalist approach to knowledge: 
No doubt, Cartesianism is an archaic and narrow form of 
rationalism, and we must not rest content with it. But if it 
is necessary to transcend it, it is even more necessary to 
conserve its principle. We must fashion for ourselves more 
complex ways of thought, but must keep this cult of distinct 
ideas which is at the very root of the French spirit. 
(Durkheim page 651 1900) 
The significance of traditions is not to be underestimated, 
as Lamont <1987) argues in an article entitled "How to 
become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques 
Derrida": 
Heidegger, Husserl, Nietzsche, and Hegel are among the most 
prestigious philosophers in what is seen · in France as 
perhaps the most prestigious philosophical tradition 
Gerimn philosophy (Wahl 1962: Descombes 1980). By carrying 
on a dialogue with these classics Derrida acquires some of 
their prestige and positions himself in a theoretical 
tradition defined as important. Had he worked on Hume, 
Locke, or Kill, the story would have been rather different 
and for reasons relatively unconnected with the actual 
substance of his analysis. (Lamont page 593 1987) 
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It is difficult to formulate in precise terms what exactly 
constitutes the legacy of a tradition of thought. The 
definition most appropriate here is one suggested by 
Randell: 
A persistent body of ideas tied together by subtle 
associations as well as by logical relations, which persists 
over the generations and dominates and colours the thinking 
of those who for one reason or another have been brought up 
in it. A philosophical tradition is that type of historical 
continuity which enjoys a career, in the sense that its 
course - its 'life' one is tempted to say - can be traced 
from the beginning, through the various vicissitudes it has 
undergone as men have turned to it facing and trying to deal 
with their specific problems of adjustment. CRandell page 48 
1969) 
Cases of philosophical/conceptual differences are even found 
in the Natural Sciences, negating the widely held assumption 
that scientific discourses are universal. As Randell points 
out, the difference between English and German scientists 
has been, that since Locke, the English have accorded 
priority to sense images and were best able to reason with 
the aid of visual models. The Germans, involved in 
constructing mathematical systems, preferred to think in 
terms of equations and formulae. Although Randell chooses 
the Germans, the same comparison could well have been made 
between the French scientist and his English counterpart as 
chapter three will demonstrate <see the comparisons which 
have been made between the mentalities of the French and the 
Germans by Tonnies <1974) and Markham <1952), outlined in 
footnotes to chapter four). Philosophical biases contribute 
towards explaining the contrasting ideas of Dalton and 
Berthollet on atomic matters, and the different ways of 
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reasoning about the same problem. Dalton reasoned in terms 
of Newtonian solid massy particles, using pictorial models 
to help him in his task. These particles were unacceptable 
to the French who insisted on thinking in terms of Cartesian 
forces CCardwell 1968). 
Randell's "body of ideas", which "dominates and colours our 
thinking", is reminiscent of Moscovici's cultural 
"conventions" which "constrain vision". Philosophical 
questions generated, for example, when fundamental 
beliefs/assumptions are confronted by socially or culturally 
significant conflicts are solved by using a culturally 
specific "t.oolbox", or set of intellectual instruments. 
These are products of the representational thought styles 
and are inherited to deal with the problems. Each tradition 
of thought has its own pitfalls and is better at dealing 
with some problems than others. The language used by the 
philosopher to formulate the solutions, part of the toolbox, 
selectively emphasizes features of the world judged to be 
the most central to the tradition <Randell 1969). This is 
pertinent to the discussions of chapters four and five which 
draw on the idea that traditions of social discourse 
favouring either collectivism or individualism reflect 
differences in political structure. The conclusion is thus 
that the language used has its own cluster of ideas which: 
.. . exhibit certain characteristics and persisting 
assumptions: each has its own starting-point, approach, 
method and concepts. Each has a type of problem it is best 
sui ted to deal with. and each con.t"ronts a set of 
Page 30 
intellectual difficulties peculiarly its own. (Randell page 
52 1969) 
Consequently, as was pointed out earlier, there is an 
immediate modification when ideas are ·translated into a 
different language. Language embodies the same set of 
cultural constraints as their thought styles, a reflection 
of the value systems of their cultural environments. 
Certainly, the rationalist thought style, as characterized 
in the thesis, is facilitated by the structured, logical 
nature of the French language with its abundance of abstract 
words and general terms. The strength of the English 
language lies in a rich, "concrete" vocabulary, suitable for 
vivid and imaginative description <see Taine in James 1872 
repr. 1987). 
Not only does a tradition confer or bequeath ideas, concepts 
and language, but also means of expression, reflecting the 
assumptions thinkers make about their position/role, 
assumptions generated by their social environment. Hence, 
the opposition of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical "journeyman" 
and the Continental "pontiff", so often used by Ayer. The 
concept of the philosophical under-labourer in English 
philosophy dates back to Locke, who thought it adequate that 
a philosopher should set himself the task of "removing some 
of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge" <in 
Natanson page 474 1963). The philosopher becomes an adjunct 
to the scientist, getting rid of metaphysical problems. 
Science was of supreme value to an empiricist like Locke, as 
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it dealt with observable, material reality, as opposed to 
the abstract problems of metaphysics. This assumption 
persists into the twentieth century with Ayer, who maintains 
that philosophy should not be brought into competition with 
the natural sciences: 
Believing as they do that the only way to discover what 
their world is really like is to form hypotheses and test 
them by observation which is in fact the method of science. 
They are content to leave the scientist in full possession 
of the field of speculative knowledge. Consequently they do 
not try to build syste!IJS. The taslr of the philosopher as 
they see it is rather to deal piecemeal with a special set 
of probleJBS. (Ayer page 471 in Natanson 1963) 
Much of Anglo-Saxon philosophy concentrates on mimicking the 
natural sciences, using tools such as logic, in the hope of 
of legitimizing its usefulness <Rorty 1982). The position of 
philosophers across the channel is different, as Foucault is 
aware. Talking of the impact of the philosopher-historian 
Cangu i 1 hem: 
Everyone knows that in France there are few logicians but 
many historians of science; and that in the 'philosophical 
establishment' - whether teaching or research orientated -
they have occupied a considerable position. But we[ French 
academic circles] know precisely the importance that, in the 
course of these past fifteen or twenty years, up to the very 
frontiers of the establishment a 'work' lilre that Georges 
Canguilhem can have had for those very people who were 
separated from or challenged the establishment? Yes, I lrnow 
there have been noisier theatres: psychoanalysis, Narxis:m, 
linguistics, ethnology. But let us not forget this fact, 
which depends, as you will, on the sociology of the French 
intellectual environment, the functioning of our university 
institutions or our system of cultural values: in all 
political or scientific discussion of these strange sixty 
years past, the role of the'philosopher' - I simply mean 
those who had received this university training in 
philosophy departments - has been important: perhaps too 
important for the liking of certain people. Un Canguilhem 
page ix 1970) 
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This is another reflection of the rationalist cult of ideas 
as opposed to the empiricist cult of sense experience, 
important in the light of the later link to be made between 
rationalism and the French politics of intellectualism. 
Institutions. embodying distinct social values, are 
responsible for perpetuating the traditions. In France, 
educational 
environment 
establishments present a remarkably stable 
for philosophy, providing continuity of 
philosophical outlook amidst change <Descombes 1980). '·'·' A 
review of the development of mainstream British philosophy, 
suggests that empiricism is similarly entrenched in academic 
institutions <Quinton 1982). These institutions, especially 
educational ones, are likely to perpetuate thought styles 
which embody the values and assumptions on which they are 
based, as both are the product of the same cultural milieu. 
These strongly institutionalized thought styles impose their 
"design" on ideas/methodologies which are a product of 
another tradition. Not only are they translated into another 
language - the source of unavoidable cultural constraints -
they are also moulded to suit new institutionalized 
restrictions. These ideas will be developed in selected 
sections throughout the thesis. The two examples considered 
here. 1) the transplanted form of English empiricism - the 
French philosophy of ideology 2) English Hegelianism 
nineteenth century British idealism, have been chosen to 
illustrate an additional point: how, adopting ideas from 
Page 33 
foreign traditions, stems from the need for a framework to 
criticize the establishment. 
The philosophy of Locke, with its accompanying value of 
1 i beral ism, was used in pre-revolutionary France to 
challenge the absolutist monarchy. Its emphasis on the 
senses and lack of system made it the antithesis of 
Cartesianism. Locke's doctrine was recast as "Ideology". 
Ideology is often considered as the philosophy of the French 
Revolution and responsible for many changes in post-
revolutionary scientific thought, not least those which 
initiated the clinical approach in psychiatry. One of the 
most famous proponents of Ideology was the Abbe Condi 11 ac 
who, together with Cabanis, is credited with laying its 
foundations. Despite his repudiation of rationalism, 
ways, Condillac remained within the tradition 
in many 
<Brehier 
1987). He used empiricism, and its methods of analysis. to 
discover how the mind obtains knowledge from sense-data, and 
to uncover the structure of reason. the same reason with 
which Descartes was obsessed. Furthermore, his method was 
more reminiscent of Descartes' than Locke's, when in "Logic 
I I", a logical mathematical sol uti on to the problem he is 
dealing with, is adopted. 6 Condillac thought that a treatise 
on sensation could be compared to "the solution of an 
equation which precedes from one entity to another in order 
to reveal the unknown ... " <Brehier page 81 1967). This is an 
example of what Randell identifies as rationalism's 
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obsession with abstract reasoning in terms of using formulae 
and equations. 
The brief success of idealism in the nineteenth century was 
due to the challenge it posed to the dominant 
individualistic, empirical utilitarianism. It fulfilled both 
a religious and a polit.ical requirement. Subsequent to 
Darwin's attack, religion had to protect itself against a 
certain amount of scepticism, and Hegelianism was to provide 
the means for doing so. Hegel had succeeded in preventing a 
collision between science and religion by reinterpreting 
elements of faith which scientific developments had 
destroyed and by postulating an abstract spirituality of the 
world. Further, Hegelianism could be interpreted in opposing 
evolutionary terms to Darwinism. Evolution was not the 
result of an accumulation of accidents select.ed for by 
environmental pressures, but a matter of rational necessity 
CQuinton page 196 1982). The political dimension advocated a 
policy of state responsibility, challenging the laissez-
faire ideology and criticizing the exploitation common in 
capitalist England. The idealist Green·" and his pupils came 
to regard themselves as political reformers. They created a 
philosophy which was geared towards the pragmatics of social 
reform. This strong pragmatism modified the academic German 
system. Furthermore, the extent of Hegel's influence on the 
idealists is a matter of dispute. Even Green's idealism, the 
most staunchly Hegelian of them all, is tinged with 
individualism: "The life of nations has no real exist.ence 
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except in terms of individuals" <page 193 1921). Hegel is 
open to this interpretation, as Copleston <1964> notes. 
However, an indication that a difference does exist between 
the German master and his English disciple, is the exalted 
terms in which the former speaks of the "State". Moreover. 
ideal ism in England suffered a strange fate, returning t.o 
utilitarian individualism under the guise of the personal 
idealism of MacTaggart: 
But if what I have said is true, it will t'ollow that. 
whatever activity it is desirable of the State to have, it 
will only be desirable as a means, and that the activity and 
the State itself, can have no value but as a .means. And a 
religion which fastens itself on a means has not risen above 
fetish-worship. Compared with the worship of the state, 
zoolatry is rational and dignified. A bull or a crocodile 
~y not have great intrinsic value, but has some for it is a 
conscious being. The state has none. It would be as 
reasonable to worship a sewage pipe, which also possesses 
considerable value as a means. (KacTaggart page 109 1934.> 
MacTaggart's emphasis was placed on developing personality 
as the key to a personal view of reality. 
CONCLUSION 
Having clarified what is to be understood by the term 
thought style, attention was drawn to the most important 
terms around which the discussion of thought styles will 
revolve. Rationalism and empiricism, the names chosen for 
the two styles, have philosophical origins relating to some 
of the properties to be explored in the subsequent chapters. 
A special manifestation of the thought styles in social 
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thought was considered, to be drawn upon extensively in the 
thesis the link between ontological/methodological 
individualism and empiricism and ontological/methodological 
collectivism and rationalism as was the idea of a 
tradition of thought, and the interchange which occurs when 
two traditions meet. 
l. Ideology was an Enlightenment philosophy emphasizing naturalism and materialism to 
overcome clericalism. The political ideology it favoured was that politics had to conform 
to the essence and aims of society and not to the whims of rulers. In this way, it 
modified Locke's emphasis on the individual. 
2. Commonsense refers to a resistance to unecessary speculation about, and questioning of, 
certain ideas which have been agreed by common consent. 
3. Liberal in this context refers to the Lockian idea of the emphasis on the individual 
and his liberties in society, It is interesting to note, as Sedgwick (1982) does, that the 
Anglo-Saxon concept of "libertarian" is different from that of Continental Europe. here it 
has a meaning bequeathed to it by ana1•chism, It is seen as an attempt to synthesize the 
demands of the individual with that of the collective by "collective and even communist 
forms of organizations" (Sedgwick 1982). In the Anglo_Saxon world, "libertarian is usually 
associated with hard headed laissez-faire ideology, 
4. French collectivism is found in both right wing and left ~ing political ideology, An 
instance of right wing collectivism is the post-revolutionary pro-monarchichal 
philosophies, The difference has been that right wing collectivism has been spiritual in 
nature, left wing collectivism, materialist. <see Copleston 1974) 
6. 
The university site of philosophy is 111rked by concentric highly centralized 
formation. The Lycees provide the universities t~ith the bulk of their audience 
in the form of future secondar.v teachers. These Lyrie teachers ue.. in theor.v 
recruited by competitive exatJination system. 6iven that the context of these 
exa11inations (aggregation r~pis.l is a function of the sixth form (rJasse de 
philosophy) syllabus, the te~rhing of philosophy in France is •ore of less 
determined by the nature and function of tltat s.vllabus. Officially, the 
Syllabus, this Masterpiece of rigor and coherence, is fi:<ed/unanimous consent. 
In reality, it is the outcome of a compromise bett~een the various prevailing 
tendencies, and this is the ray the !luch celebr~ted Hasterpiece is so frequently 
overhauled. Charged b.Y so/Je 111ith propagating a reactionary ideology,, by others 
with eliminating 111/latever still re11ained of authentic philosophy in the 
preceding s.rllabus, successive versions ref lett the mo11entary balance of 
pol i tie~l forces, not only 111i thin the teaching body itself, but also tile countrv 
at large. 
Fe111 people claiiJ to be satisfied rlith the :,yl/abus as it stands, and many call 
for its reform. Nobod,r, h0t1ever, questions the need for 1 Syllabus of sotJe sort. 
This cult of the S,Yllabus b.v the Fren,h, which, never fails to astonish 
foreigners, is explained by the French veneration for the institution of the 
barralauriat,. that incarnation of the egalit~rian ideal. roescombes Page 5 19811) 
This has implications for education as will be outlined in a later chapter. 
6, As Brehier points out Condillac was closer to Decartes that he thought. In the regulae 
Decartes also tried to explain combinations of "complex natures" through the properties of 
simple natures (8rehier page 76 1967l. Condillac's definition of simple natures was, 
however, different in that they were derived from the senses as opposed to the intellect. 
7. T, H. Green was influential in nineteenth century idealist liberalism, critical of 
utilitarianism which had been modified into hard headed Jaissez-fairisOJ. He was 
particularly critical of the empirical assumption governing utilitarianism, that feelings 
were the basis for action. To this he preferred the motives of a rational consciousness. 
CHAPTER TWO 
NATIONAL THOUGHT STYLES IN ART 
There is a spirit of an sge.. snd there is d 
national chartJcter. The existence of neither can be 
denied, ho~ever tJverse one 11a.r be to 
generalizations. The t11o can act in auordance rith 
one another until one seems to black out the other 
completely, (Pevsner page 21 19~ 
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An investigation into the manifestation of thought styles in 
the arts offers a quasi-empirical starting point in a thesis 
geared towards an academic analysis. This chapter develops 
the characteristics of the ideally typical empirical and 
rational thought styles, mentioned in the last chapter, 
using examples drawn from art, music and literature. In the 
sections on the visual arts and music, the claim that these 
characteristics originate in culturally specific thought-
environment complexes will be substantiated. The example of 
literature illustrates how different sets of priorities, 
implicit in the two languages, have generated two literary 
traditions. The assumption governing the chapter is that the 
way universal symbols are incorporated into national art is 
related to thought styles - hence the characteristics of the 
styles can be isolated using artistic examples. Thus they 
become sui ted to the "taste" <Bourdieu 1983) of members of 
the "consensual universe" CMoscovici 1985) of the society 
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considered. Artistic languages made up of these symbols are 
cultivated by institutional frameworks which embody value 
systems specific to the society in question. Moreover, the 
significance of artistic examples to a thesis of this kind 
is highlighted in the following quotation from Foucault's 
Archaeology of Knowledge: 
In analysing a painting, one can reconstitute the latent 
discourse of the painter: one can try to recapture the 
:murmur of his intentions, which are not transcribed into 
words, but into lines, surfaces, and colours: one can try to 
uncover the implicit philosophy that is supposed to form his 
view of the world. It is also possible to question science, 
or at least the opinions of the period, and to try to 
recognise to what extent they appear in the painter's work. 
(Foucault page 193 1972). 
The quotation at the beginning of this chapter is drawn from 
Pevsner' s C 1955) di scu ssi on of the "Englishness of English 
Art" a study in the so-called field of the "geography of 
art" .. , Pevsner's essay is valuable not least for its 
sensitivity to the problems facing the researcher embarking 
on an exploration into "the impermanent and ambiguous" of 
cultural specifics and national identity. He refers to the 
contradictions which occur in the basic design of national 
heritage/identity. After arguing that the English are not a 
sculptural nation, Pevsner accounts for the number of 
important English sculptors in the twentiet.h century, by 
saying that: 
National character is not a procrustian bed. There is 
nothing stagnant in national qualities. They are in 
perpetual flux. New possibilities may at any moment be 
thrown up and force us to revise our categories. <'Pevsner 
page 194 1955) 
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This is in agreement with what Moscovici <1985) sees as the 
fluid and changeable nature of cultural representations, and 
reinforces their appropriateness in helping to characterize 
nationally specific thought styles. Despite this, Pevsner 
argues for the importance of a certain cultural entity which 
he believed is stronger than race in determining the style 
of art. 
The chapter opens with a detailed comparison of two 
eighteenth century paintings. This comparison introduces 
certain themes which will be elaborated with other examples. 
The central point is that rationalist French art is 
concerned with the technical, structural and formal aspects 
of what is 
immediate, 
to be conveyed. This 
empirical approach 
is 
of 
opposed to 
depicting 
the 
what 
more 
is 
perceivable. In the visual 
has traditionally been 
arts, the emphasis on perception 
accompanied by a talent for 
observation and recording, resulting in an unstudied, 
spontaneous approach. Rationalist French artists go beyond 
what is perceived, using symbols and specific formulae to 
capture what they are trying to express. Their's is a 
theoretical, academic approach <Schneider 1925) where, for 
example, the "realistic'";" depiction of "life" - both natural 
and social - is secondary to the deployment of theoretical 
tools, philosophical and formal consideration, and a 
particular artistic language usually with political 
undertones <Coppleston 1983, Bryson 1980). Such an approach 
led to the Grand Manner in art which the English generally 
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avoided, giving as an excuse its pretension. Both in art and 
music England has been the home of the miniaturist. 
concerned with minute details as opposed to large scale 
planning. The same emphasis on form and theoretical 
concerns, such as isolating a new language of expression, is 
found in French music CLockspeiser 1974). In terms of 
structure. it is intimately related to language and 
contrasts with the freer English style. Similarly, two 
traditions of literature can be discerned. One is concerned 
with "realism", dramatic and psychological <see footnote 2). 
The other is more speculative and attributes greater 
importance to general issues, both philosophical and social. 
This together with the important structural role it 
fulfills, explains the importance of philosophy in French 
literature. Both the music and the literature sections cover 
a broader range of material than the fine arts section. The 
differences between the arts in England and France are 
eloquently, although contentiously, captured by the musician 
Gray in the following: 
The fineness of Peter Varlock's achievement is typically 
English; he was a superb .miniaturist, like his Elizabethan 
forbears and like .most English artists in other spheres. He 
realized and accepted the fact of his incapacity to create 
in the larger for.ms, and thereby accomplished .more work of 
lasting value than his more ambitious colleagues were able 
to do. 
Clifford Bax is absolutely right. A complete anaesthesia to 
formal considerations is the most conspicuous common factor 
exhibited by English artists in every age and in every 
medium, and one which is shared by the public for which they 
create. The greatest of all English artists. possibly the 
greatest poet and dramatist who ever lived, is so completely 
lacking in any sense of form and design that one cannot even 
say that it is a defect. Shakespeare just blandly ignored 
all formal considerations whatsoever, and all the probleiDS 
thereby involved ... This Anglican indifference to form. in 
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fact, is a positive quality in the hands of a master - it is 
perhaps the supremest manifestation of genius, this capacity 
to dispense with form. and simply to move as the spirit 
moves one, without preconceived destination or arriere 
pensee, living from moment to moment and trusting in divine 
providence, a deus ex machina, to bring things to a 
satisfying conclusion. And it may be a weakness in the Latin 
artist that he is too concerned wi tb formal considerations 
at the expense of the other qualities which are possibly 
more valuable. (Gray page 12 1948 ), 
STYLE IN THE ARTS <VISUAL AND SCULPTURAL> 
Bryson <1981) writes that Greuze was influenced by Hogarth. 
Taking this to be the case, whatever be drew from Hogarth 
was certainly modified in accordance with his national 
orientation. The difference in artistic styles become clear 
when two paintings such as "Marriage a la Mode: Shortly 
after the Marriage" <fig. 1) by Hogarth and "L'Accordee du 
Village 11 (fig. 2) by Greuze are compared. Hogarth's mastery 
of small conversation pieces - to which he returned after 
his attempts at the grand style had failed is clear in 
this painting. The piece has to be understood in terms of 
Hogarth's attempts to depict life in his morality painting, 
and testifies to his relaxed, unstudied brushwork, with its 
"sumptuous fluidity" <Pevsner 1955). This is suited to 
Hogarth's aims: to paint to tell a story and to portray life 
as it was lived. Hence his meticulous attention to mundane 
details. These abound in "Shortly after the Marriage", where 
a little dog plays with his master's coat, an open book and 
playing cards are strewn across the floor, and a frustrated 
servant exits with a host of unpaid bills. Clearly, 
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Hogarth's forte, or his weakness <Stinton 1969). is his 
descriptive ability which, coupled with his unstudied 
approach, brings the subject matter to life. 
Narrative of sorts is also present in Greuze' s painting 
"L'Accordee du Village", but as the stylized "drame 
bourgeois". Greuze' s priority is to depict the ideal of 
"happiness", and the story in "1' Accordee" is sacrificed to 
its depiction. A family gathering such as is presented here, 
"the body 
1981). is 
observed under genetic time" <Bryson page 127 
merely a vehicle to communicate Greuze's thoughts 
on the subject. This symbolic domestic 
to the Hogarthian 
scene conveys a 
narrative. The different 
deployment 
impression 
of formulae 
stereotypical characters. 
"ideal" , in the Weberian 
is betrayed by his use of 
His scenes and characters are 
( 1949) sense of never being 
exemplified in real life. In "l'Accordee", the prosperity 
and radiance of youth is almost out of place in the rustic 
poverty in which the scene is set. This is, however, of no 
importance to Greuze, providing the seminal concept of 
happiness is portrayed. The stereotypic characters together 
with the studied brushwork, lends an air of formal ism and 
academicism to the painting which contrasts with Hogarth's 
fluidity. Form, balance and structure feature prominently in 
the composition of this painting. The happy couple are 
without a doubt the central characters, not only placed in a 
prominent position on the canvas, but also the centre of 
attention: all body movements and gazes are directed towards 
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them. The composition is pyramidal, increasing the sense of 
order. Thus Greuze's work is essentially a static structure. 
This again contrasts with Hogarth's work, where the 
dispersal of the characters causes one's gaze to move around 
the canvas in a much more haphazard way, helping to generate 
the impression of activity. 
The characteristics of French and English painting which 
generated the above differences are tied to institutional 
practices Cor lack of them). The features contributing to 
the "Englishness" of English art include an "aversion to 
structure", 
expression" 
"amateurishness" 
<Pevsner 1955, 
and 
Stinton 
"single-minded 
1969, Burke 
self 
1976). 
Interestingly, they parallel those of early English science 
to be examined in the next chapter. "Single minded self 
expression" is another way of describing the sporadic 
development of English art, a contrast to the logical, 
continuous development of the French national school 
established in the seventeenth century <Schneider 1925). 
Both the characteristics of amateurishness and single-
mindedness can be attributed to a distrust of 
institutionalized academic practices. The official art of 
the Academy was scorned as a foreign import <Pevsner 1955, 
Bryson 1980). This scorn combined with the lack of state 
patronage which, among other things, resulted in badly 
administered academic institutions - transformed the visual 
arts into a gentlemanly pursuit. Consequently, a much weaker 
tradition of institutionalized academic art has been 
produced when compared to 
"Amateurishness" is in no 
its French 
sense to be 
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counterpart. 
interpreted 
pejoratively. In Gainsborough's art it was associated with a 
talent for creative, albeit, informal experimentation with 
the effects of 1 ight, different types of paper and other 
l~terials - another example is his use of broccoli to help 
him depict trees. This not only contributed to the 
"Englishness" of his painting, but made him one of the 
greatest "picturesque" English artists.'"' 
In England, the distaste for the Grand Manner was combined 
with the inability to imitate it. The Grand Manner was a 
style which predominated in France, Spain, Italy and Germany 
in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. and 
needed ordered planning. This weakness was coupled with the 
mastery of the miniature. In the visual arts, the English 
artist was more concerned with the art of portraying 
characters and stories which appealed to the observer's 
experience than with 
Gainsborough were masters 
<Stinton 1969, Burke 1976). 
the two men can perhaps 
structure. Both Hogarth and 
of small conversation pieces 
The stylistic difference between 
be best described in terms of 
Hogarth's Lockean realist empiricism and Gainsborough's 
Humian, phenomenalistic empiricism <Stinton 1969) (fig. 5). 
The attention to circumstantial evidence which storytelling 
entailed, made unity in composition 
undermined many attempts at structuring 
difficult, and 
structure being 
essential to the Grand Manner. The resulting lack of order 
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stems from weak technique and allowing the subject matter to 
reign supreme. Stinton <1969> sees these as failings common 
to Hogarth, Gainsborough and Reynolds. They are however 
advantages when trying to bring to life the narrative. The 
art of the narrative requires a talent for detailed 
observation and quick recording, found in the work of 
numerous English artists, including Constable (fig. 6). 
Gainsborough, Romney (fig. 4) and even Reynolds, whose 
artistic ideals were very different to those of Hogarth. 4 
In the twentieth century, English art has continued to 
follow a different path to that of its Continental 
neighbours. English art, playing a relatively minor role in 
the intellectual and overtly political modernist movements 
such as "Dadaism", "Futurism" and "Cubism" at the beginning 
of the century, was instead dominated by the influence of 
Impressionism and Post-Impressionism. It has thus not been 
committed to "abstraction", 
spontaneous brushwork and 
as Continental art has. The 
phenomenalistic approach was 
retained in the portraiture of Augustus and Gwen John <fig. 
8) and the landscapes of Graham Bell. English artists of 
this century have maintained their love of landscapes 
Bamberg's Spanish landscapes and their attention to 
detail, epitomized in the work of Lowry and Spencer. The 
best example of the perceptual dimension of English art of 
this century is the tactile sculpture of Moore and the 
visual painting of Bacon <fig. 9). Bacon's paintings deal 
with "man's predicament" and his paintings are an attempt 
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"to make a certain type of feeling visual ... Painting is the 
pattern of one's own nervous system being projected on the 
canvas" <Bacon page 28 1949>. Bacon's art is designed to be 
emotional and visceral not intellectual. 
French art is intellectual, "il pense plus qu'il n'observe" 
<Schneider page 1 1925). Although structured formalism is 
not a feature of English art, it is strongly felt in its 
French counterpart. This can partly be attributed to t.he 
internalization of classical ideals, particularly evident in 
paintings of the seventeeth, eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Formal consideration in the works of artists as 
diverse as Poussin. Le Brun <fig. 16), Delacroix, and David 
(fig. 14)' were all important to the communication of 
ideas/messages. Poussin devised theories of transmitting 
mood t.hrough gestures, pose and facial expression. These 
were codified into formulae of correct procedure by Le Brun, 
whose painting, as the director of the Royal Academy, was a 
form of pro-sovereign, or at least pro-state, propaganda 
<see Champaigne's portrait of Richelieu fig. 15). Everything 
for him had a meaning to be conveyed, to be read by his 
observers. His studies show him experimenting with how 
character traits associated with animals, e.g. slyness of a 
fox, could be conveyed through human faces. His ordered 
experimentation differed from Gainsborough's imaginative 
investigations, and culminated in the creation of a system 
of meanings. Le Brun was doing in the visual arts what La 
Fontaine was doing in poetry: creating certain codes6 for 
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his audience. The studied art of Le Brun contrasts with the 
spontaneity typical of English art <Pevsner 1955, Stinton 
1969). Indeed, the attention to form and studied elegance -
leading to the same lack of spontaneity - was present in the 
sensuous, dreamy paintings of the "rococo", typified by the 
work of Watteau and Boucher and conceived as a reaction 
against classical rationalism. 
associated with a neglect of 
Greuze, the depiction of 
They are properties which are 
the story or narrative. To 
life was secondary to the 
rhetorical function of his paintings, essays on domestic 
morality or pictorial dramas. The aim was not to provide an 
accurate portrait of eighteenth century society, but to 
convey eternal truths a bout "man's" existence. Hence, the 
importance of making his paintings legible and his use of 
stereotypes/formulae. Children bear exaggerated marks of 
childhood - faces that are too chubby, heads that are too 
big because "carrying" these marks further than nature 
guarantees "legibility of the stereotype" <Bryson page 127 
1981). 
Institutional practices explain the theoretical academicism 
of the French style, as well as its discursive. political 
nature. Art in France was intimately tied to the state, 
hence its discursive political nature. As such, and in 
contrast to its English counterpart, the French Academy 
exerted a monopoly over national art. Louis XIV's minister, 
Colbert's, policy of centralization towards the arts, 
bringing them into closer relation to the state, made the 
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Academy the centre of artistic activity. Both Colbert - the 
minister who contributed most to this policy of 
centralizatiion - and his King, Louis XIV believed that it 
was a wise investment to subsidize the arts. Whatever 
promoted the King's image "enhanced the prestige and 
strength of the nation" <Isherwood page 152 1973). Artists 
had originally been happy to submit to the authority of the 
Crown as a viable alternative to the domination of powerful 
guilds. Once within the institution. they were assured 
greater artistic freedom. Throughout history, membership of 
the Academy has remained an aspiration of most French 
artists as well as the condition for their success. Although 
consciously conceived of as a reaction against academic 
painting, Impressionism was quickly absorbed into the 
institutional structure, ensuring its public acceptance. 
That art could be, and at this stage was, used as a form of 
state propaganda gave rise to its highly discursive nature 
and the attention to the classical ideals of order, form, 
harmony and proportion, as opposed to the subject matt.er 
itself - Schneider C1925) refers to "Platonic" French art. 
During this phase of absolutism, classicism was coupled with 
authoritarianism. Identification with the glorious Greco-
Roman perioq emphasized France's classical heritage, a 
strategy to glorify the state. That French painting was both 
studied and lacking in spontaneity is understandable in the 
light of the academic environment of the state Academy. 
Students attended regular courses on subjects such as 
anatomy, perspective, geometry and other discourses held at 
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the academy.'"'· In addition to the rigorous artistic training, 
the established painters under Louix XIV were expected to 
publish long treatises on art analysis, using Le Brun' s 
categories of invention, proportion, colour, expression, and 
composition, transforming art into a quasi-scientific 
enterprise: 
These discourses attempted to establish precise rules for 
each category ... Believing that all proper paintings should 
be didactic the academicians stressed the analysis of 
historical and allegorical subjects and Felibien even 
established a value scale of subjects ranging fro.m still-
lifes at the bottom to historical scenes at the top. Under 
the category of expression Le Brun presented a precise 
discourse correlating different bodily .movements, especially 
facial expressions, with the entire panoply of human 
emotions. (Isherwood page 161 1973) 
Activity in the Academy was a highly structured affair, and 
in 1666 a list of priorities of the dominant artists of the 
time could be isolated. 
Le Brun 
disposition 
design + proportion 
expression of passion 
perspective 
Bourdon 
light 
composition 
proportions 
expression 
colour 
harmony 
de Champaigne 
grouping 
expression 
colour and chiaroscuro 
<Bryson 1981) 
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In eighteenth century France. art was obviously too 
important a weapon to be left unsupervised. Though no longer 
used as a source of state propaganda, art has kept its 
overtones and assured itself a source of political 
patronage. Thus it retains its concomitant theoretical 
academicism. Furthermore, although the subject matter may no 
longer be classical, attention to form and structure has 
remained with French art, as has its rhetorical nature. The 
emphasis on form and relationships, as opposed to objects, 
is a feature of the "Fauvists", "Cubists" and "Symbolists". 
While the Fauves continued to explore colour relationships, 
the cubist doctrine revolved around the assumption that only 
the most abstract geometrical relations were adequate to 
capture the patterns of thought and sensation (fig. 10) - a 
competent description of Braque's analytic Cubism is to be 
found in Coppleston <1983). From the seventeenth century -
during which the national school emerged - French artists 
have adopted an intellectual approach to art, transcending 
their subject matter to communicate ideas: "In perfect form. 
this painting would not be physical at all, but the 
communication of ideas from one consciousness to another 
across an image that is altogether transparent" <Bryson page 
61 1981). In conclusion, there is an opposition between a 
visual art that has to be read and one that can be more 
readily felt or perceived i.e. "experienced". This dichotomy 
is a function of the positions which art has occupied in the 
respective societies. It has been generated by thought 
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styles whose features originate in thought-environment. 
complexes specific to certain socio-polit.ical milieus. 
The visual arts offer examples of how thought styles are 
often encountered as basic designs or motifs. Both the art 
of the English eighteenth century painter Reynolds and that 
of the nineteenth century French Impressionist school 
demonstrate how inherited "tools" mould outside influences 
into a new forms which can be identified with the native 
thought styles. As with the philosophical examples covered 
in the last chapter. this appealing to outside influences 
can be related to the need to legitimize a reaction against 
native practices. 
Reynolds, unlike his contemporary Hogarth, was cosmopolitan 
in outlook, possessing knowledge of, and professing 
countries. admiration for, the art of Continental 
Furthermore, as head of the Royal Academy, he did not share 
Hogarth's distrust of academic institutions. The resulting 
stylistic differences are demonstrated in their self-
portraits. Reynolds' "Englishness" - some features of which 
have already been referred to was betrayed by the fact 
that he never painted poses that he had not observed <Burke 
1976). His art has to be understood as a modification of 
national style by the Continental classicism he so admired. 
This admiration is clear in the words of wisdom he imparted 
to his students which included. "study the great masters", 
"don't be a mere copier of nature", "don't amuse mankind 
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with the minute neatness of your imitations". "endeavour to 
impress them with the grandeur of your ideas" <in Pevsner 
page 58 1955), a conscious negation of the strengths of his 
fore:fathers and contemporaries. Despite his affinity with 
foreign art, Reynolds' art differs from it in fundamental 
ways. His weak technique and command of form <Stinton 1969) 
was accompanied by a superficial use of the classical idiom. 
Reynolds' art lacks the formal studied approach found in the 
French style. and some of his portraits are steeped in 
English sensuality and spontaneity <see fig. 3). Classicism 
was a device Reynolds' employed to raise the status of his 
sitters and took the form of depicting his sitters in 
classical dress with classical expressions i.e. subdued 
restraint. He also used classical allusions such as that in 
"Mrs Siddons as a Tragic Muse" to the Prophets of the 
Sistine Chapel. The alternative to this "mimicking" would 
have been to study, internalize and rework classical 
principles, so that they became incorporated into a personal 
style. Interestingly, Reynolds was also given to parodying 
the classical art he professed such admiration for in a 
similar manner to Hogarth. 
The intellectual academic approach in French art has 
survived throughout 
potentially the most 
art: Impressionism. 
the centuries, even in what was 
spontaneous of all periods of French 
Despite a recognized debt to the 
Englishman Turner (fig. 7), the Impressionists drew on the 
techniques of French masters such as Delacroix and Ingres 
Page 55 
with whom some had studied - Morisot with Ingres and Fantin-
Latour with Delacroix and others admired Renoir and 
Cezanne <£ig.13) pro£essed admiration o£ Delacroix, Pissaro 
o£ Ingres. Many also studied the work o£ £oreign masters --
Manet, the Spanish masters: Renoir, Veronese; Pissaro. 
Raphael incorporating elements o£ their techniques into 
the new artistic language. This was not merely a recording 
of the evidence of the senses, but encompassed a pseudo-
scientific study of the juxtaposition of tones and the 
effects of light - the former started by Delacroix - to help 
depict the outdoor. The study of the juxtapositions of 
colours was central to Manet's work and led him to simplify 
his palette. Following Delacroix' s idea that grey was the 
enemy of the artist, he tried to convey shadow by means of 
the colours themselves. Both became central areas of 
interest for the other impressionists. Experiments in colour 
juxtaposition continued into Post-Impressionism in the 
painting of Gauguin and then into Fauvism, a movement 
inspired by his work. Gauguin is famous for his synthetisme 
or simplification of forms, and clol.sonisme or search for 
pure tones. Of his art, he said: 
J'obtiens par des arrangements de lignes et de couleur, avec 
le pn?.texte d' un su._fet quelconque e.mprunte a la nature, des 
symphonies, des harmonies ne representant rien d'absolument 
~ au sens vulgaire du mot, n'exprimant directement aucune 
idee, mais qui doivent faire penser conune la musique fait 
penser, sans le secours des idees ou des images, simplement 
par les affinites mysterieuses qui sont entre nos cervaux et 
de tels arrangements de couleurs et de lignes. (Gauguin in 
Dayaz-Distel page 58 1979) 
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Gauguin was part of Post-Impressionism's attempt to 
intellectualize and systematize Impressionism (fig. 12). 
Monet, Pissaro and Renoir were particularly interested in 
the study of 1 ight and its effects. This led eventually to 
·the use of a fragmented brushstroke and a dissolution of 
form. Monet. a specialist in this area, became obsessed with 
light, painting the same image at different times of the 
day. Eventually, his feelings towards what he was depicting 
became more important than the recording of the image (fig. 
13): 
je pioche beaucoup. je m'ent~te a une serJ.e d'effet 
different . .. plus je vats, plus je vois qu 'il faut beaucoup. 
travailler pour arriver a rendre ce que .fe cherche 
'instantaneite', surtout l'enveloppe, la mme lumiere 
repandue partout. et plus que jamais les chases faciles 
venues d'un jet me degoutent. Enfin je suis de plus en plus 
enrage du besoin de rendre ce que .f 'eprouve. ()[onet in 
Dayaz-Distel page 78 1979) 
The fragmentation of the image was formalized in Seurat' s 
"Poi nti ll isme" . It was the result of his research into 
Delacroix's theory of harmony which led him. like Manet, to 
reduce his palette to four fundamental colours. This was 
combined with a reading of scientific theories of colour 
developed by men such as Chevreuil. The resorting to 
scientific abstraction brings to mind the earlier Bryson 
quotation concerning Le Brun. Of the Impressionists original 
aims i.e. to record sense "impressions", perhaps the best 
description was that given by Schneider <1930): "un beau 
mensonge". 
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STYLES IN MUSIC 
The language of music, like that of the visual arts, shows 
how features associated with national minds are intimately 
bound to socio-political factors. 
Classicism in French music, again tied to its function of 
glorification, meant that it was always part of a general 
spectacle, married to dance and opera. This led to 
restraining the horizontal (counterpoint) and to developing 
the vertical <harmony/colour) with a view to clarity and 
lightness of expression. Later French composers', such as 
Berlioz, Debussy and Messiaen, have all been noted for their 
unusual approach to colour and timbre. Clarity of expression 
is one of the features valued by the French, which is a 
point of contention between the philosophers of the two 
countries. Messiaen in particular has spent much time 
formally categorizing aspects of his musical language, 
ranging from the relationship of harmonic colour to visual 
colour, to the structure and representation of bird-sang. 
Unlike Schoenberg, another great figure in the development 
of twentieth century music, his techniques are juxtaposed 
and superimposed against one another in a collage, where the 
music develops as a series of 11 discussions" and 11 arguments" 
between different types of material, without any desire to 
delve deeper into the nature of the material itself. The 
effectiveness of the music must therefore rely on the art 
with which these predeveloped blocks are placed in relation 
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to each other - which we 1night understand as the rhetoric of 
the music -· and not on the organic growth of a single idea. 
A good example of this type of musical argument is found in 
the opening to the second piece in his large-scale piano 
work "Catalogue d'Oiseau::x": "Le Lariat". Here we see the 
clear opposition between two musical structures (labelled A 
and B in fig. A), contrasting both in colour and rhythmic 
vitality. Further, as the music develops over the course of 
the e::xample the content of B is gradually developed over 
successive appearances whereas that of A remains constant. 
with the only change occurring at 
before the introduction of new 
characteristic rising movement 
its fourth 
material, 
repetition 
where its 
is reversed thereby 
completing the movement's first musical sentence. A new 
birdsong that proceeds immediately after this e::xample is 
distinct from A and B in its harmonic content, but 
nevertheless shares something of its quirky rhythmic content 
with B. A hierarchy is therefore created between the various 
types of material presented, but one that owes nothing to 
traditional structures of tonality and rhythmic cohesion 
that usually bind together to determine the formal 
architecture of music. This example emphasizes the 
rhetorical nature of French music, language and rhetoric 
being two French concerns. It also betrays the attention to 
form and structure - structure i nvol vi ng the j u::xtaposi ti on 
of blocks. 
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The use of the idee fixe in Berlioz's Symphonie Fantastique 
proceeds not by a gradual growth and development of thought, 
but by the variety of environments in which the idee is 
placed i.e. block structure. Figure B shows two of its 
settings. one from the first movement, one from the last. 
The two environments in which the idee fixe is presented 
could not be more diverse. Despite the fact that there has 
been virtually no development or overall change in the 
melodic line itself 
compressed version 
true the second is an extremely 
the instrumentation is so different 
that there is nothing which seems to indicate that they come 
from the same piece of music. In the first example, the 
melody is presented in an expanded form. consisting of broad 
strokes and phrases that are well suited to the almost 
"cool" combination of violins and flute. The accompaniment 
is almost Beethovian, and clearly stems from the Viennese 
tradition so dear to Berlioz's heart. However, the second 
example. played on the high pitched E flat clarinet and 
accompanied this time entirely by a grouping of wind 
instruments directly reflects the programme provided by the 
composer, at this point a witches' sabbath perhaps a 
little too literally at the expense of a true musical 
coherence. or at least the coherence found in the works of 
Germanic composers. Indeed, it is Berlioz's commitment to 
literature and the formal designs of literary narrative that 
1nark him out as perhaps the first great Romantic composer. 
Berlioz is an especially interesting case, as his obsession 
and admiration of the formal integrity of Beethoven's music 
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still brings forth a result that is entirely French in its 
approach. 
English "classical" music has always incurred a powerful 
input from the folk tradition. Indeed, the emphasis on a 
"tuneful" melodic line is something that remains fairly 
constant in much English music up to the present day. It can 
be traced from the unusual melodic use of the cantus firmus 
in Taverner's Western Wynde mass <see fig. C the cantus 
firmus is shown by the bracket marked with an X), where the 
listener's interest becomes centred on the treble line 
throughout each movement of the mass - something extremely 
unusual ::"r its time but a procedure that certainly looks 
forward to the simple melodic designs and formulae of 
Italian composers of the early Baroque such as Caccini 
right through to Vaughan-William's use of folk material and 
even the composers of the Manchester School <Birtwistle, 
Maxwell Davies, Goehr> in the late fifties and sixties and 
their experiments with melodic lines and units. The example 
cited for Taverner is, as has been noted, fairly unusual. 
However, the majority of his music together with the work of 
his English contemporaries formed a style of polyphony 
clearly discriminable from Continental sacred music, and has 
long been noted by many critics for its apparent amorphous 
content, lack of clear and well balanced contrapuntal lines 
and general rhythmic complexity and diversity. Much of this 
criticism results from a mere surface appreciation of the 
music's qualities and formal design, yet even a cursory 
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comparison of the music of the English composer John Brown 
with that of the French composer Dufay (fig. D and E 
respectively) shows how this interpretation can arise. 
Although the sound world of Vaughan Williams and Birtwistle 
could hardly be more different, fig. F Can excerpt from 
Vaughan Williams' Symphony in D) and G Ca passage from the 
opening of "Down by the Greenwood Side") show a remarkable 
consistency in texture and formal outlook. Both consist of 
simple melodies offset against and balanced by equally 
simple counter-melodies, whose smooth and lyrical contours 
unfold at a leisurely pace. This makes them suited to a form 
of descriptive narrative. the lack of a strong rhythmic 
pulse in both examples reflecting a certain lack of inner 
tension and active formal design. The term narrative was 
mentioned earlier in connection with the Berlioz examples, 
but there the form and direction of the narrative was 
imposed by the pre-compositional design of the literary 
programme provided by the composer, whereas here the formal 
design appears to unfold "as the spirit moves" <Cecil Gray). 
Indeed, it is just this emphasis of one single dimension on 
the horizontal plane as opposed to a many-layered 
polyphony - that would appear to be responsible for leading 
the music away from the abstract. away from rhetorical 
gesture and didactic argument, towards forms of narrative 
expression and description. This perhaps does the same thing 
for the ear that the narrative did in painting for the eye. 
Moreover, one might argue, this concentration on a single 
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aspect with its direct and straightforward gratification of 
the needs of the 1 istener, accords well with the apparent 
English desire and emphasis on the practicalities of musical 
form and expression and one that would seem to relate 
directly to the amateur status of the composer in English 
society. 
Under the Ancien R~gime in France, music served the Royal 
Establishment by proclaiming classical perfection of the 
French kingdom. Even before the reign of Louis XIV, an era 
when artistic politicization was at its height. the Academy 
had the specific task, not so much to popularize the music, 
but to create a specific style to be safeguarded by the 
governing elite. Thus: 
Music 
... French .music, provided the sonic glitter for ceremcmies 
designed to inspire public awe of the ruler and for splendid 
theatrical diversions designed to impress foreigners and 
occupy courtiers. Above all, this .music was the .medium by 
which the King's grandeur and his glorious adventures were 
accounted to all the estates. (Isherwood Page 352 1973) 
was thus transformed into the "handmaiden" of 
absolutism (!sherwood 1973). It is interesting to note that, 
in the nineteenth century, the revival in French music 
coincided with a profound nationalistic feeling and an 
at.tempt to enhance the image of the new Republic. The belief 
in music's potential power stemmed from the Platonic idea 
that it could influence the psyche. Incubation within a 
national Academy, designed for the specific purpose of 
glorification, led to, as in the visual arts, the 
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internalization of certain classical values such as the 
attention to balance, harmony and structure. It also 
entailed a studied intellectual approach to the art, 
1~nifested by the wealth of theoretical treatises published. 
The first musical academy. L' Academie de Musique et Poesie. 
stressed the ethical value of music, 7 and because of this 
stated that is would specialize in musical composition which 
followed Plato's rules of harmony, melody and rhythm. 
By the reign of Louis XIV. strict adherence to antique 
values had given way to the use of the antique as a form of 
analogy in the opera's written under the absolutist 
monarchy of Louis XIV. the heroes of antiquity were used to 
symbolize the King. The music of the new Academy did however 
retain certain classical ideals, such as the marriage 
between words and music. This explains the rhetorical and 
the literary character of French music which reached · its 
heights in Berlioz's music. Like the Academy of Arts, the 
Academy of Music became "an aristocratic dictator" but this 
time of "music and poetical style". Members of the Academy 
included Rameau and the court composer Lully, whose operas 
found a safe haven within its walls.·~· Rameau received 
notoriety 
treating 
through 
music as 
his 
"a 
theoretical treatise on 
physiomathematical science" 
harmony, 
<Harman 
page 250 1959). 9 Like other French academies, the Academy of 
Music and other state centres of research offered, and still 
do, a rich source of support to French musicians. They 
continue to play a central role in musical training and 
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of' fer extensive research faci 1 i ties. Centres such as IRCAM 
allow theoretical development in the area of musical 
expression, a central concern to contemporary musicians such 
as Boulez and Messiaen. 
English musical activity, like artistic activity, has never 
been confined within the limits of an academy, and has 
lacked the state patronage of its French counterpart. Even 
under the Tudors, great lovers of music, and indeed under 
whose reign the blooming of English music occurred, musical 
activity was not the exlusive property of the monarchy. It 
is interesting to note that during this period musicians 
lamented the decline of musical activity. 1 0 Morley 
complained that music had fallen into "the nature of a 
mechanical arte rather than reckoned amongst other 
sciences" . as it was in France. He was remarking on a 
feature of English music which has remained relatively 
constant: the importance the practical aspect of the art. 
assumes over the theoretical. Indeed, when looking at the 
musical treatises of the period, there does seem to be an 
emphasis on technique, playing and composition. Morley went 
on to advise musicians to study other things, advice which 
Boyd (1940) claims they have heeded ever since. 
Morley was speaking at the time of the Reformation. The 
Reformation delt a severe blow to English music as it 
entailed the loss of a crucial source of support to a 
tradition which did not enjoy official state patronage. 
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Music had thus to make itself appealing to the wider public 
- upper and middle classes aspiring to "gentlemanly status". 
It could only do this by emphasizing the practical <playing) 
aspect of the art. Talents which became particularly valued 
were improvisation of vocal parts and sight-reading. Music, 
like painting, became a gentlemanly achievement, which is 
why Morley was concerned that it would become purely 
"mechanical". The emphasis has continued to be on musical 
practicalities - composers in British society do not en.j oy 
the same degree of recognition as men such as Boulez in 
France and Stockhausen in Germany - and, despite the dearth 
of internationally renowned musicians in nineteenth century 
England. London in particular remained a centre of musical 
activity drawing musicians from all over Europe <Price 
1973). Not only did musical activity in England not enjoy 
extensive state patronage, but it was also not used as a 
weapon by the state. Thus it did not remain confined within 
the walls of academic institutions and was never a slave to 
classical ideals. This explains perhaps the frequent 
incursions of folk music into the "classical" tradition, 
accounting for the abundance of "tuneful" melodies, as well 
as its freer and unrestrained nature (Price 1981). 
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STYLES IN LITERATURE 
Quinton <1982) draws attention to the disparity between the 
English and continental use of philosophy in literature. Of 
the British he says: 
The plain fact is that general ideas have never been a 
central preoccupation of British novelists. Straight forward 
reforming propaganda is an occasional supplementary feature, 
most notably, of course, in Dickens, but the nearest thing 
to a modern British novelist of ideas that comes to mind is 
Aldous Huxley and in his case the ideas are presented in a 
very externally attached, conversational. not to say brains-
trust, form: the development is not the bone structure but 
rather the obtrusive surface of his fiction. (Quinton page 
56 1982) 
"Nice 'Work" C1989) by Lodge is a contemporary illustration 
of Quinton's point. Quinton's remarks do not apply to French 
authors. Furt.hermore. writers like Gide, Malraux and Camus 
pose serious problems to the English in terms of 
categorization: are they philosophers or writers? In "Notes 
sur L' Angleterre" <1872), reviewed by Henry James, Taine 
evaluates the relative strengths of English and French 
writers. Taine describes the English love of "facts", and 
their resistance to theories. inferences and conclusions. He 
refers to their disdain towards "the more or less 
irresponsible play of conjecture, opinion and invention" 
CTai ne in James repr. 1987). manifested through the paucity 
of abstract words and general terms in the English language. 
In t.he previous chapter, reference was made to the 
differences between the French and English languages. The 
assumption was that language selectively emphasized features 
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which the intellectual tradition and its thought style 
judged most. important. The argument presented here is that 
the t.wo literary traditions can be seen as making explicit. 
the cultural priorities implicit in the different languages 
and their thought styles - a reflection of those of their 
respective socio-political milieus. 
The surface versus deep structural role that philosophy 
plays in fictional writing can be related to what has been 
said about rationalism's commitment to previously 
structure. ·1 ·1 This structuralism, inherent in the French 
language, has classical origins classicism was 
institutionalized in the French Academy as it was in those 
of Music and Arts. General philosophical and social ideas 
are the chief concern of French writers - a priority which 
as reflected in the abundance of abstract general 
terminology of the French language. This contrasts with the 
concern for narrative "realism" found in British literature. 
and which stresses the personal and psychological. In 
practice, this produces on the one hand, an emphasis on 
recording what is known through experience - made easier by 
a rich. descriptive vocabulary, which possesses an abundant 
psychological terminology <see chapter four) and on the 
other. a more speculative approach where story and 
characters are secondary to the expression of grand ideals 
or the 
usually 
voicing 
at the 
of the author's social 
expense of dramatic 
critique. This is 
and psychological 
realism. Indeed, a reproach made to Sartre' s 1 i terary and 
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dramatic w:ri tings an extreme example of the importance 
philosophy plays in literature - by Anglo-Saxon critics such 
as Aronson <1980) is that his characters are conceived with 
the sole purpose of expounding ideas and enacting conflicts. 
As such, they are two dimensi anal and do not correspond t.o 
the reader's possible experience of "real people". "Le 
Diable et le Bon Dieu". perhaps one of Sartre's plays where 
the dramatic action is the most contrived, deals with the 
problem of idealism and realism in political action. It 
centres around the central character's- Goertz's- struggle 
to find the most efficient way of becoming an "engaged" 
individual. The play's lack of dramatic success stems from 
the abundance of rhetorical devices. At the end of the play, 
as Aronson points out, an intellectual struggle has been 
resolved and a moral choice made. Yet the protagonist's 
character, rather tmplausibly, remains unchanged. This is 
because the main action is philosophical and is not an 
investigation of lived experience. 
Concern with general ideas as opposed to 
psychological/dramatic realism is found throughout French 
literature, from Corneille to Sartre, from Voltaire to 
Camus. Corneille is often regarded as his French equivalent, 
although clearly more limited in scope. His work is steeped 
in classicism, betrayed by the overwhelming attention not 
only to structure, but also to restraint a parallel is 
often made between the painting of Poussin and the drama of 
Corneille (Schneider 1925). The artificiality of the drama 
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is accentuated by both its classical settings and the use of 
rhyming verse with classical metres. A comparison, indicates 
that the characters in the French plays are again "ideal 
types" CVleber 1949). Their psychologies are of secondary 
importance to their structural role in the play and their 
function as conveyors of grand ideals/emotions in 
"Pol yeucte" , tragic heroism. ·1 ::;;: Shakespeare pro vi des not only 
a more lively and interesting storyline - the insertion of 
comical scenes often supplies a calculated and welcome 
respite from the drama but also characters that are 
"human" in terms of displaying complex, multidimensional 
personalities. 18 This is true even in historical plays such 
as "Henry V" and "Richard I I I II • Gray's claim that 
Shakespeare was not concerned with form is contentious, and 
can probably only be upheld in a comparison with the extreme 
formalism of the Frenchmen. Scenes and characters often do 
have specific functions, but structural considerations never 
compromise 
Furthermore, 
the 
the 
psychological and 
different weighting of 
dramatic interest. 
the structural and 
narrative realism, generates the same opposition between the 
static and the dynamic as was observed in the Hogarth/Greuze 
comparison. 
The portrayal of lived experience has indeed been a forte of 
English women writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Taine remarked and James agreed that the 
English gift for psychological observation has no 
correlative in France <James page 63 1987). Austen and the 
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Bronte sisters are famous for their depiction of the lives 
and sensibilities of women, although Austen did so in a less 
romantic and more factual way. Austen's fiction was a 
portrait of English life, and much of her material was based 
on her own experience of it. Her writings also betray an 
intense interest in human nature and the psychological. 
Central to her works, for example, was the theme of "self 
knowledge" . This encompassed a knowledge of the effects of 
societal expectations. as well as the more psychological 
themes of trying to achieve an understanding of one's own 
character and the motives of others. 14 This emphasis on 
recording life as it is lived, and attention to matters 
psychological, can be contrasted with a more speculative 
French genre, as represented by Flaubert's classic "Madame 
Bovary" .. , '·"-· Neither of these concerns were crucial to this 
novel which is primarily a critique of bourgeois mores. A 
century later, Mauriac made Therese Desqueroux the centre of 
his critique of bourgeois society. Although he described the 
psychological trauma of a woman who was a prisoner of a 
stifling family environment, it was secondary to the general 
points made in the book concerning French bourgeois society. 
Related stylistic differences are found in two authors who 
shared a taste for social criticism, Balzac and Dickens. 
Besides occasional excursions into romantic sentimentality, 
for the benefit of his Victorian audience, Dickens' critique 
revolved around a detailed recording and satirical 
description of Victorian society, implementing a Hogarthian 
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approach to literature. Balzac's writings are more akin t.o 
Greuzes' "drame Bourgeois" particularly good examples of 
these are Balzac's "La Cousine Bette" and "Eugenie Grandet". 
The stylistic differences are clear in Balzac's and Dickens' 
novels dealing with the French Revolution. Balzac's "Les 
Chouans" is a historical epic, where romanticism is coupled 
with a naturalism which forshadows Zola. 16 The central 
characters are stereotypes, conforming to romantic 
conventions, helping Balzac articulate his critique of the 
aristocracy of Eastern France. "The Tale of two Cities" may 
be atypical of Dickensian novels in terms of length - it is 
shorter - and thus the amount of detailed description which 
is included. However. it retains certain Dickensian 
features. These include the reluctance to speculate about 
the unknown, betrayed by his focus on two cities with which 
he was acquainted. His characters are grafted from real life 
-Merchant Defarge is based on Carlyle's depiction of a real 
wine merchant or 
projection. Dickens' 
the 
book, 
result of autobiographical 
quite characteristically, 
provides an interesting story, 
tragic are carefully intertwined. 
where the comic and the 
The idea of thought styles as a basic design or motif 
persisting over time, can be illustrated in literature by 
considering two authors such as Zola and Lawrence - Lawrence 
bas often been judged untypical of English literature. 
W'riti.ng in different centuries, they are interested in the 
same Nietszchian theme namely the decadence of 
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civilization. They deal with this theme in a manner which is 
consonant with their native thought styles. The lives and 
feelings of Zola's characters and the story line are used to 
communicate his ideas on general social issues relating to 
the conditions of the working classes. 18 Both narration and 
psychological experience are more important in Lawrence. as 
is evident if one compares the opening pages of "The 
Rainbow" or "Sons and Lovers" with those of "L'Assommoir" or 
"Germinal". where working communi ties are also the focus of 
attention. Zola's opening descriptions are impersonal . 
consonant with his desire to portray a general social 
problem. The Lantier :family depicted in the :first pages of 
"Germinal" is anonymous, a typical French working class 
:fami 1 y .. , ·.':• "Sons and Lovers", however, begins with a 
description of a specific mining community. 20 Lawrence 
engages in "scene setting" to introduce his characters. 
Furthermore, "Sons and Lovers" deals with psychological 
issues. being a detailed analysis of the interpersonal 
relationships between parents and children in a mining 
community. Lawrence's greater interest in the psychological 
is evident in his work on psychoanalysis where he examines 
the complex psychological issues which appear in his 
fictional work. One of these issues, which is examined in 
"Lady Chat·terley' s Lover" is how to achieve emotional/sexual 
satisfaction at different stages of a marriage. 
Perhaps, the differences outlined above are best captured in 
an interchange between the French author Maupassant and the 
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American Henry James. James is famous for his portrayal of 
late ninet.eenth society. He defended the importance of the 
psychological method in fiction against the attacks of 
Maupassant. Maupassant favoured a genre which "avoids with 
care all complicated explanations, all dissertations upon 
motives .. " <Maupassant in Beach page 126 1918). To 
James responds: 
It is as difficult to describe an action without glancing at 
its motive, its moral history. as it is to describe a motive 
without glancing at its practical consequence. Our history 
and our fiction are what we do: but it is surely not more 
easy to determine where what we do begins than to determine 
where it ends notoriously a hopeless task.... If 
psychology should be hidden in life, as, according to H. de 
.Kaupassant it should be in a book, the question i.I1l111ediately 
comes up, 'From whom is it hidden?' ... For some people 
motive, relations, explanations. are a part of the very 
surface of the dra.ma, with the footlights beating full upon 
them. For .me an act, an incident, an attitude, .may be a 
sharp, detached, isolated thing, of which I give a full 
account in saying that such and such a way it came off. For 
you it may be hung about with implications, with relations 
and conditions as necessary to help you recognize it as the 
clothes of your friends are to help you recognize them in 
the street. Uames page 238 1987) 
this 
The assumption that "psychology is hidden in life" was 
important to French social discourse, as chapter four 
demonstrates. 
Page 74 
CONCLUSION 
What becomes apparent when dealing with the artistic 
ma·terial from the two countries is the different methods 
used to describe them. In the case of the French work, it is 
much easier to refer to structural and formal elements, 
where one is reduced to description in the case of the 
English. This alone indicates a fundamental difference: that 
of perceptual versus rhetorical art, typical of the thought 
styles of empiricism and rationalism respectively. 
This chapter illustrates how the differences between 
rational and empirical art are the result of distinct 
"styles". The latter are distilled from thought-environment 
interaction and as such are specific to certain socio-
political milieus. Furthermore, it provides evidence that 
the styles are sustained by particular institutional 
environments. Other points made in the first chapter were 
also substantiated, such as the occu~nce of thought styles 
as designs or motifs based on the ideally typical models, 
and the use of outside influences to legitimize a critique 
of native practices. Rationalist art, used in the past as a 
weapon by the F;-ench State, has retained strong political 
undertones, accounting for its discursive, rhetorical and 
symbolic nature. It enjoyed, and still does, considerable 
state patronage. The centrality of state institutions with 
their classical values in its development explains its 
emphasis on the academic and theoretical. In England, art 
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has never enjoyed such extensive state patronage, and has 
thus never been polarized by institutions. Hence its 
perceptual, practical approach. Britain is described as the 
land of the miniature and the amateur. and its art is 
spontaneous, descriptive and concerned with the art of t.he 
narrative. In literature. the rationalist concern with 
structure and general ideas ideals and broad socio-
political issues - contrasts with the empirical emphasis on 
describing lived experience which is accompanied by a 
concern for interesting narrative and psychological realism. 
The opposition between a tradition focusing on general 
social issues versus one more concerned with the 
experiential and the psychological is an enactment of the 
respective linguistic constraints, and will prove important 
to the chapter on social discourse. 
The formal, theoretical aspects of rationalism, its concern 
with generalities as opposed 
important to empiricism - will 
subsequent chapters. In the 
to specifics which are 
emerge more clearly in the 
following chapter, the 
dissimilarity between the academic/intellectual French style 
and the intuitive British one is examined in connection with 
eighteenth and nineteenth century science. 
1, Pevsner (1955) differentiates bet\lleen the "history" and the "geography" of art. The 
former deals with historical development of art by categorizing this development into 
periods ~t~ith specific features, l"he geography of art is intet'ested in isolating the 
persistent characteristics of national style. 
2, The noun realism as it is used in this context, embodies several ideas <this applies to 
the adjective realistic and to the noun real)~ 
a) accurate representation without idealization 
b) attention to what is known through experience- sensual, psychological experience, This 
may involve describing that with which one is familiar - a point to be made in connection 
with Dickens - to avoid speculation and idealization, 
3. Gainsborough 11as admired by "the apostle of truth to nature" <But•ke page 221 1976), 
Constable, despite his dismissal by the head of the British Academy as "chaotic" and 
"uncouth" <see Burke 1976), 
4. Concerning the issue of structure, in other artistic pursuits, the inability or 
avoidance of structure in the visual arts, becomes an aversion to it. For example the 
English love of landscape gardens contrasts with the French preference for the geometrical 
organization of "Versailles" and "Les Tuileries", Like Constable's paintings, the English 
landscape gardens embody the assumption that it would be presumptuous to impose order on 
nature. Whereas the English worked to make their gardens as natural as possible the French 
transformed them into logical contructions, a display of man's intellectual mastery of the 
natural world, 
Another example of aversion to structure is in the perpendicular style of most English 
parish churches. The churches are noted for their compartmented, square appearance which 
is due to their being built block by block. Churches are coordinated as opposed to 
moulded, like those on the Continent, which are built to an integt•al plan. A comparison 
between the thirteenth century cathedrals of Chartres and Salisbury indicates that this 
difference is due to national ~taste" not that the two churches are at different stages in 
architectural development, 
S, Codes are culturally specific symbol systems which have meanings attached to them 
dependent upon the thought styles, The latter, as has been argued, are a product of 
specific societal substructures. Thus the symbolic meaning is dependent upon substructure 
as the chapter shows, 
6. The students at the French Academy attended drawing classes and lectures on what 
Colbert referred to as the "pr~ceptes positifs" of art (Isherwood page 160 1973), given by 
notable artists such as Le Brun. Successful students - in terms of the competitions run by 
the Academy - had the coveted opportunity of studying at a branch of the Academy set up in 
Rome. They would thus become thoroughly acquainted with classical culture at a time when 
the classical metaphor was being used as a political analogy by the French State. 
7. Baif and his circle - members of the first Academy of music and poetry - believed that 
to instill morality, music had to allow textual material to be audible and provide an 
interesting harmonious accompaniment. They advocated the classical ideal of the marriage 
between words and music, as opposed to one dominating the other (Isherwood 1973). 
8. Lully modified the Italian opera, emphasizing opera's literary aspects and moulding the 
music both to suit this requirement and the taste of his French audience. He combined the 
element of spectacle desired by the court with a music which simplified the Italian 
operatic style to serve the words better. The literary considerations of French opera 
stood in opposition to the Italian attitude towards the form. The Italians believed that 
musical embellishments deMnstrating the performer's prowess, were of essential 
importance. 
9. Rameau's treatise tried to classify music scient.ifically and philosophically, Rarneau 
believed that music was dependent on " reason, nature and geometry", and that thus it was 
"a physiomathematical science", In addition he thought- and was right about the music of 
the late Baroque and the F1•ench St.vle Galant.- that harmony followed from melody: "melody 
is born of harmony". (Harman page 250 1959) 
10. 
But what safe 1 .. musicke? One of the seven liberal sciences? It is al11ost 
banished froM this Real me, lf it rere not the Queen's 11aiestie did favour this 
excellent srienre, singing men and choristers might goe abegging, together ~it.h 
their maister the player on the organs. f8oswell in Boyd Page 17 1940.! 
11. The surface versus deep structural usage of philosophy can be illustrated by extracts 
frorn Forster and Sartre. In "The Longest Journey", Forster uses philosophy "as a sub,iect 
matter" (Quinton 1982) for his writing, The second extract is from Sartre's play, "Le 
diable et le bon dieu", where in a short excerpt political issues are discussed within a 
philosophical framework, 
'The cow is there', said Ansell, lighting a 11atch and holding the carpet. No one 
spoke, He lfaiting until the end of the natch fell off. Then he said again, 'She 
is there, the cow. There nott. ' 
'You hare not proved it,.' said a voice. 
'I have pro~·ed it to myself.' 
'I have proved to Dyself that she isn't,' said the voice. 'The tt'W is M.1 
there. 'Ansell frottned and lit another match. 
~"he's there for me, ' he dec lued, 'I don't care vhether she's there for you 
or not, Vhether I '11 in Cambridge or Iceland or dead, the cott vii 1 be there. ' 
It t~as philosophy, They 11ere discussing, thi existence of obieds, {),1 they exist 
only then there is someone to fool: at them? or have they a real e;dstence of 
their attn? It is all very interesting, but at the same tin1e very difficult, 
Hence the cow, :J"he seemed to make things easier, She seemed so familiar so 
solid ... 
(Forster, The Longest Journey page JJ 
NASTY 
Les hommes de Oieu detruisent ou construisent et toi tu conserves. 
60£TZ 
/'loi? 
NASTY 
Tu sets du desordre, Et Je desordre est Je meil leur serriteur de I 'ordre etabl i. 
Tu affaiblis Ia chevalerie entiere en trahissant Conrad et tu affaibliras la 
bourgeoisie en detruisant florms. A qui cela profite-t-il? Aux grands. Tu sers 
les grands, 6oetz,. et tu les serviras quoi que tu fasses: toute destruction 
brouillonne, affaiblit les faiblesses,. enrichit les riches, accrolt fa puissance 
des puissants, 
60£TZ 
Done, je fais contraire de ce que ie reux? (Arec irooie.l, Heureusement, Oieu t 'a 
envo.ve pour 11 'eclairer, Que 11e propose-tu? 
rsar trt~, Le Oiable et Le Bon Oieu page 9JJ 
Nasty gives a dramatic in depth analysis of the situation, revealing the unforeseen 
consequences to Goertz in an analysis of the genre that has become the hallmark of 
structuralist philosophy, The formal, almost pontificating, style is certainly not one to 
expect from a conversation between friends - indicated by the first person pronoun. 
12, Polyeucte deals with the theme of t1•agic heroism. A young Armenian Lord becomes a 
martyr to the christian cause. Although this is the main theme, others include honour and 
the problem of conflicting loyalties - Polyeucte's young wife marries the Armenian instead 
of Roman guard because her fathel' wishes it. The play opens with Polyeute's account of his 
young wife's premonition of his imminent death and how she has begged him not to go out of 
the palace. 
Je sais ce qu'est un songe, et le peu de croyance 
Qu'un homme doit donner a son extravagance, 
Qui d'un amas confus des vapeurs de la nuit 
Forme de vains objets que le reveil detruit; 
Mais vous savez pas ce que c'est une femme: 
Vous ignorez quels droits elle a sur toute l'&me, 
Quand, apres un long temps qu'elle a su nous charmer, 
Les flambeaux de l'hymen viennent de s'allumer. · 
Pauline, sans raison dans la douleur plongee, 
Craint et croit deja voir ma mort qu'elle a songee; 
Elle oppose ses pleurs au dessein que je fais, 
Et tache a m'empecher de sortir du palais. 
(Corneille, Polyeute act l scene l) 
13, What has been said about the French playrights is also~ Anglo-Saxon writers 
such such as Shaw and Wilde, They, however, are working within a particular genre - satire 
- where the audience does not expect realism, 
14. "Sense and Sensibility" centl'es around the clash of sense, embodied in Elinor and 
sensibility, embodied in Marianne. Marianne is deceived by Willoughby, His true colours 
are revealed to her by Colonel Brandon, who eventually becomes her husband. 
Marianne Dashwood was born to an extraordinary fate. She was born to discover the 
falsehood of her own opinions, and to counteract, by her conduct, her most favourite 
maxims. 
(Austen, Sense and Sensibility page 333) 
IS, Flaubert's speculative approach does not succeed in developing the same feelings of 
intimacy with the leading protagonist as, for example, Charlotte Bronte does in Jane Eyre 
or Austen does in En1n1a or Sense and Sensibility, Flaubert's is clearly a portrayal from 
the "outside". His description of what Madame Bovary experiences after she starts an 
affair with her lover Rodolphe, illustrates the point, Flaubert uses an extended metaphor 
to describe her feelings in a highly romanticized fashion. 
Elle se r~p~tait:"J'ai un amant! un amant!" se d~lectant ~ cette id~e comme ~celled' une 
autre pubert~ qui lui serait survenue, Elle allait done poss~der enfin ces joies de 
!'amour, cette fievre du bonheur doni elle avait dhespere. Elle entrait dans quelques 
chose de merveilleux ou tout serait passion, extase, delire; une irnmensite bleuatre 
l'en~ourait, les sommets du sentiment Hincelaient sous sa pensee, !'existence ordinail'e 
n'apparaissait qu'au loin, tout en bas, dans l 'ombre, entre les intervalles de ces 
hauteurs, 
tFlaubert, Mma Bovary page 191) 
16, This passage indicates the stereotyped qualities of Balzac's characters, as well as 
how they are used for voicing his opinions on social issues - in this extract the social 
position of women and how this contrasts with their emotional power. One of the themes of 
"Les Chouans" is the important role women played in the French revolution, As such the 
character of the republican Marie de Verneuil is far more developed than that of her 
royalist lover, the Marquis de 11ontauran, This is a dialogue between them, 
- Mademoiselle, dit-il avec une ~motion mal d~guis~e, Hes-vous fille ou femme, ange ou 
d~mon? 
- Je suis l'un et !'autre, reprit-elle en riant, N'y a-t-il pas toujours quelque chose de 
diabolique et d'angelique chez une jeune fille qui n'a point aime, qui n'aime pas, et qui 
n'aimeras peut-ttre jamais? 
- Et vous trouvez-vous heureuse ainsi? dit-il en prenant un ton et des manieres libres, 
cornrne s'il eut deja concu moins d'estime pour sa liberatrice, 
- Oh! heureuse, reprit-elle, non, Si je viens ~ penser que je suis seule, dominae par des 
conventions sociales qui me rendent necessairement artificieuse, j'envie les privileges de 
l'homme. Mais, si ,je songe ill tous les moyens que Ia nature nous a donnes pour vous 
envelopper, vous autres, pour vous enlacer dans les filets invisibles d'une puissance a 
laquelle aucun de vous ne peut resister, alors mon r~le ici-bas me sourit; puis tout a 
coup, il me semble, et je sens que mepriserais un homme, s'il Hait Ia dupe de seductions 
vulgaires. 
(Balzac, Les Chouans page 167) 
17, The above contrasts with the vivid, satiric Dickensian scenes. 
Funerals had at all times a remarkable attraction for Mr Cruncher: he always pricked up 
his sense, and became excited, when a funeral passed Tellson's. Naturally, therefore, a 
funeral with this uncommon attendance excited him greatly, and he asked of the first man 
who ran against him: 
'What is it, brother? What's it about?' 
'I don't know,' said the man. 'Spies! Yaha! Tst! Spies!' 
He asked another man, 'Who is it ? ' 
'I don't know,' returned the man, clapping his hands to his rnouth nevertheless, and 
vociferating in a surprising heat and with the greatest ardour, 'Spies! Yaha! Tst, tst! 
Spies!' ... 
The idea was so acceptable in the prevalent absence of any idea, that the crowd caught it 
up with eagerness, and loudly repeating the suggestion to have 'em out, and to pull 'em 
out, mobbed the two vehicles so closely that they came to a stop. On the crowd's opening 
the coach doors, the one mourner scuffled out of himself and was in their hands for a 
moment; but he was so alert, and made such good use of his time, that in another moment he 
was scouring a11ay up a by-street, after shedding his cloak, hat, long hatband, white 
pocket-handkerchief, and other symbolical tears. 
(Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities page 185) 
18. Zola's leaning towards broader social issues is stated in an outline of his plan for 
"Germinal": 
J'ai toujours, dans Ja serie des H~on-Hqqpart garde une luge place a !'etude 
du peuple, de l'ouvrier, et (eJa des l'idie premiire de l'oeuvre. !Ia is (e n 'est 
qu'au moment deL 'auwoir que, ne pouvant 11ettre dans (e livre J'etude du rdle 
poli tique et surtout 50( ial de l'ouvr ier, je pris Ja resolution de reserver 
(ette tuttere, pour en fiire un autre roman. Et, plus tard, (e proiet s'est 
pr~(fse, Jorsque Je me suis rendu (OIIpte du vaste mouve11ent sodaliste qui 
traviille la vielle Europe d'une fafon si redoutable, Le (i1dre d'une grtive s 'est 
impose naturelleA!ent i 11~11 (Of!JI/e Je seul dramatique qui devait donner aux faits 
Je relief nJcessaire, 6eraioal est don( Je (01/plement de L 'Auwair.. Jes deux 
fares de l'ouvrier. 
L 'AUtJIIJIJIQir decrit les soeurs de l'ouvrier: if reste J etudier sa vie sociale et 
politique, Les reunions publiques, ce qu'on entend par Ja qut:st.ion sociale, Jt:s 
aspirations et Jes utopies du proJetar iat seront anal.vsties. l'!ola in Becker page 
9 and II 198.0 
i9. The opening scene of "Germinal" plunges us straight into the narrative drama. The 
description he gives of the Lantier family is "impersonal" in the sense that their 
identity is of no importance. They represent a typical working class family, living 
anywhere in France, 
Quand Gervaise s'eveilla, vers cinq heures, raidie, les reins brises, elle eclata en 
sanglots. Lantier n'etait pas rentre. Pour la premiere fois, il decouchait. Elle resta 
assise au bord du lit, sous le lambeau de perse deteinte qui tombait de la fllche attach'e 
au plafond par une ficelle. Et, lenternent, de ses yeux voiles de larmes, elle faisait le 
tour de la miserable chambre garnis, meublee d'une commode de noyer dont un tiroir 
rnanquait, de trois chaises de paille et d'une petite table graisseuse, sur laquelle 
tra1nait un pot ~ eau ebreche, 
(Zola, Germinal page 10) 
20, At the beginning of "Sons and Lovers" Lawrence describes in detai 1 the miners 
dwellings, and then introduces the Morels who are to be the focus of the story, 
"The Bottoms" succeeded to "Hell Row". Hell Row was a block of thatched, bulging cottages 
that stood by the brooks ide on Greenh i 11 Lane, The brook ran under the alder-trees, 
scarcely soiled by these small mines, whose coal was drawn to the surface by donkeys that 
plodded wearily in a circle round a gin. And all over the countryside were these same 
pits, some of which had been worked in the time of Charles II, the few colliers and the 
donkeys burrowing down like ants into the earth, making queer mounds and little black 
places among the COI'n-fields and the meadows. And the cottages of these coalminers, in 
blocks and pairs here and there, together with odd farms and homes of the stockingers, 
straying over the parish formed the village of Bestwood, 
Then, some sixty years ago, a sudden change took place, The gin-pits were elbowed aside by 
the large mines of the financiers,.,. 
The Bottoms consisted of six blocks of miners dwellings, two rows of three, like the dots 
on a blank-six domino, and twelve houses in a block. This double row of dwellings sat at 
the foot of the rather sharp slope from Bestwood, and looked out, from the attic windows 
at least, on the slow climb of the valley towards Selby, 
(Lawrence, Sons and Lovers page 1> 
:I 
I 
u 
Greuze. J.B. L'accord~e du Village fig.2 
Krs Siddons fig .5 
Romney, G, Kiss Xartindale 
:Constable, J .G . Flatford Mill fig .6 
r- . ~--~-
\ 
i Turner, J .K. V. The Fighting Tenteraire fig. 7 
John, A. Colonel T.E . Lawrence fig.8 
Bacon , F. Three Studies for Figures at 
the Base of a Crucifixion fig .9 
Braque , G. Bottles and Fishes fig .lO 
zanne, P. The Black Clock fig .ll 
Gauguin , P. A Vase of Flowers fig .12 
-
Rauen Cathedrale fig .13 
David, .J.L. Portrait of Jacobus Blauw fig.14 
Champaigne, P . de Triple Portrait of Cardinal 
Richelieu fig .15 

~NO 
FIG. A THE OPENING 
MESSIAEN'S 
OF tLE LORIOT' FROM 
r CATALOGUE D' OJ SEAU X !' 
Uien mocliri { J> r: 100) leni ( i':: 5o) 
q ~~~ ;: ~-V\ ~ ~~~~t.M~ .0 ~~i~ :il~-~- .,. (\, j,.. I iJ.::' 
.it" I;' 4 If:__,., -
"' I .., . .,.. .n • P"" ..., . if " J I' n. ., • • .. L I• 
B s- - - - - - - - - - 1 -
I 1\ , ll'"\ ,, .,fl ., I" r on 
1/ '-.X , '- II 
Pf CAIIW)e. J ,.y ~ rr j .sourJ. So.,s sou ref. SovrA. 
p 11 1' I') 
'""'" 
) _,.,. ) 
J• _IL 11' , h.a.l ~ I • 
" 
X 
,. 
-
"'!.II ~· { h '1- u. IJ; 7 I ..... .K"" r 
,}f Jl.' ... '-11 k 
'" 
;/( .. ,.,_ , .. -~ 
_1t ... 
" :..tfJ ~ ., .. .___, 
,J 1H .. • ".r:;; I ) i~ ,t " 1f .. ..._, J Pe&l. *PeJ. 
* etl. •fed. 
1 
8--- - - ..J 
8- - - - - - -, 
1 / .f'l' 11 ., 
• .. 
.., 
11 .. ' 
-
-
-I 
_lj- 1t _... 'll { \ [_[l"'\__ 
, 
J :f.f '1 .. E I "'i~ 
-------------~~~- ~ 
:tl-
Ped. 
.:;~ , ,:;:. > ~i~ 
----------~------~-- * 
8----- ~ - - - - - -1 B- - - lf - - - - --.., lf~ ~ j. I Ll-iJ-f~~~ ~~ !!:4~ ~4!1- ~ I /'1 111• ~ i" ::-1.~ ~ ... ~· ~48 Dl ~.u-= I / I' If I'""' il- • • ll"\ 
v 
,J rrt£ E::::: -
/)_ ;;;;:::;; 
-
/ 
X ,., .. 
\ VI J .• ,. 
., 
_)f' ... 
"' 
41"_.. " ... 
Jfl .. .. '1· 
Ped. 
-
Le"'t 
-,, 
•tr u .,- Jl' Ia 
-1J .,_ IIJ II' _i; -~ • .,-~ ... 4 .. 
~ ,. .... 
-
.......:: ~ 'P,j -..;;;:: 
- ~ ~ ~ 
II ~
-G-Ill' ,.,., _.., .,.,.,. 
II 
.,_ l.t"., 
"'- \ '1 .. It""" 
-" 
~r- h .., .. 
q .. ~ "'" f=i )fl ;?" ~ .. " 
--· rea. 
8re.."' 
e- -, q~~~~~ ~ ,..H ,. ~ }:~ Jt,. t~~ u.- I I J'\' ~ •LI' 
"' 
~ • If" 
_L' v 11J.- • l'oll' 
-
• IIi ~ I /\--, m IJJ.- Ill" r 
I ~ ~ ,, 
rr J 
"':f ~ l SovrJ.. StMS SIJv ,-J • p n 
1\• 
-
L/ 
I• AI' A V' .... ., ) 
\ _/_ __1l.'&lll . .H'- I "1- J.t .. 1\\ l 
- ... , Jt' .. '-..Y J,.., A A 
"" 
- ·n ... 1// 
rtJ• ~ .. ___. J ~Jr .. .. r ,:;;; > =J~ 
. eJ 
- J 
i b~;: .;. r- r- ~.»~ 
. • 
""' ""'· 
fr,... 
"'' .t'~ :___']. v .. ~J~
11 _'I). • r 
II 
~ 
~ 
ll ~ ,. 'II_, ..... 61 M 
•• I 
!of• - Jlo' ... Jlr 
.. I 
j=i :; ~i 
* 
~~~ ~ ~ ..--.. ,;_ ;;... n 
"' 
.,.-
-u.- • 1.1' . jl 
-----
_L'I 
I 1"'1 
L_ 
"' 
.v 
PP J 
St>t.Jrtlt. 
p (l_ 
'"I· I lL 
J. 1\. 
L 1LW _, "' { r'\ 
I 111' 'f..- \. _J_ 
I t• ..,... __, -..} 
Peel. ~ PeJ. I 
8-- - - _J 
Fl G. B TWO 
SYMPHONIE 
, 
EXTRACTS FROM BERLIOZ S 
FANTAST/QUE 
' ;" ..--.... ~--- ~ •  .... ,.... .,- "J ..=. .;..,. .. ,...., :::J tc::/1 
-
~ .., 
111.-.-. .... ,.. r , I 
1';[7 .. -. 
TE 
-J espress. ,· r::::::::.. I 
-=::::::: -=::::::. -==. )fiOLI ~J 
".,;..--- t'- ,.- -::::--..... -~---- ~-... I I J :::J ~ ...:. ~ 
-v • ,..... ".J lllrll - -... ~ . r I 
l'lii'- I• • 
t J f7 } 
-===.. c::::::::.. sf::::::-
/'\ 
-:::::::::::. 
-
-I I 
v ~ 
-- -
~ .II ~ 
"' 
f , r , \ :v-. 
r:.;!.. • • , .. --.-. Ji ::::::- ;:::::::- .::::::=-
"' 
,.... ,.... ,... 
-T71117 ... ~ -
-- - -
-
7 )i .a .. 
·- I" f 
, 1 i!' 7 , ... il' .. , .. • --. I p ::;:::::::- :::::::> 
.::::::=- :::::::::=--
... . . . . 
~. • • Iii • • • ;J • lO l• ill - __. -- --- -- - -. -.II - " ~~ r -,., II"/' 7 
I 
p~ ~ ~ I~ 
. '1rc.o . . . 
"' 
till • •• • • •• .,, ··~- -- -- - -
-· 
... ~ ~ ~<T , I --. , \ • I 1/ 
"\ ,~ ~ ~ '1 
'"' 
t\ f'\ ~ I) ~ h 1"1 
""' "" 
,..... 
oe.s 
. 
II " r 17 
- -
.... [J .. .. Dil .. 1- '-
~ Jl II ~ 11! I~ 'II I • '!1: • II! • • 
. 
• • .. 
'"'" u lil ~ v • • .. • • .. r• .. .. . • • • II • II II • • J poco J 
-
.solo 
~~~r,,.. 
I ~~ f:r b ,i,.. IAJI 1 tr tr- ~ ... J • /'\ I t I Jl • • • • .... - .. .. -If -1/ I • •• ,. ./!.II ~ II" 0 , .., > L) lit 1f iT I 0 { I - .. 
" 
TTl' lrlW • 
' 
1\ 
pt~c.D j-'' ~ v 17 ~ [) .....::~... v 
.. I c.rt~ c . 
- - - - - - -
{)J 
I i/ , 
7 A 1.' 
\' f"¥JJCI 
'-JI u 
-
.. .. ..;. 
- • • J • • • -- -. " -. • • -. . .. • . . .. ... i 1 ' ' .. ' poe.• J 
f:8Lc 
t..ro 
NOR 
s.ws 
Ff G. C THE OPENING OF THE GLORIA FROM 
TAVERNER'S WESTERN WYND£ MASS 
() :It ! 
/ I 
-· 
u 
--
[x 
L"' ...... ~· ,., 
' --
o· 
-,., ""' ...... ... _-'_U_• 
-- 0 ~·· f-"' r...:v '- ... --u.u . ... .L J ho- tni - n1 • vo\u,to.. L I:i: 1n ter- Clio pea..)( - - - - vus Po-no.e. 
() 
I. II' 
hY"'' ..-..• .... 
-
-""'. ,. 
-
I \..ll 
-
... ..... D 
-
... , . o• ~ , - ~ c_ u· 
J ~ ..... ~~'" ' '--&-J'o:i ~ ~ c Et Ill ter- rc... pt).x ho 
- Mi-ni. 
- Pl:>.s bo-l')o..e- volu,.+o.. -
" I I ..... ~ 
--v I. If 
-
,.... u J AU'-. ~ ,. 
--- _L' 
.L ,. 
I IV'\ v "' 
-· -
,.... 
-
{_ 
-
r- ~· - Y' -
-
-
o• ,. 
- -
--
_j 
-
... 
fU E:t ;,., 1~-fbl. poJC h o~i ni ·- I - - - b1JS bo -llo.e vo lun+o.. -
D· .... ,... . 
........... ,. 1 u· :J u ,... 
-
J-· 
-· ,. tr r- "7 
-I J..\.1' 
I v 
. 
1, ter - rD.. Pca..IC ho - ""1 - n 1 
-
" 
~ 
VJ..n ,.. 
-J\.1'\Y ~ C • c .... :> ,. 
--
g 1-£ 
~ • 
-
l:ll ~ 0 ,...,_ 
..) ':-"' -
- - -
tis. LA ucAe>.. - "''-'S - te., 
("\ 
/ 
If 
--1""\V ..... 
..... ..., {_ ,u :J.., 
J 0 tt). u -Elt~l!'"'D ~· 
- - -
ti~. ~Aok - IWIVS 
-te, n 
Jr ,... 
11 o• 
-- --
~ 
"\ v 1/ ... CJ ..... ~ ,.. 
'-Y ... 
-
........ ~ 
lEU -
- - -
tis Lo. \)~D\ - ~1)5 - te, 
J, 
..,. .... 
-
--
,. 11" p.o' fill 
-
.!1 .-. &.7 
-
-I h !, 
-
~ 
v 
--
..... 
-
-. vu-- .... 
-
-
,...., u 
-
... 
~ -
... ] 
..... 
- 1.1' (.J 1'-. 
~ a_ -o 
""' 
-
'be.-lle -tAi- C.i-""-"S - te, o..d- 0-r"DI.- MUS 
-- -... 
r ~ 
--" 
. - Lll 
~e cl' . \.. t ~ 11e- , c.a 11\vS e., 
- 0 - '"' - I\IIU,S te l: J ~\o 
10. 
-
l"t. 
~ 
-= 
CJI• 
-. ,... ,. ....u..• ~ _u_ I'-' 
..... 
- -
'b~ ne.cli -c. i te, tJ.d I'll\ liS - O - r-11\ -liS ""~ 
,... . 
1"11.' -
_,. 
-
~ ~ 
,.. 
-
u• - ~ -""' ~ 
-
. 
-
t.e.- 01. el - o - r~- M"'S ) 
FIG.D EXTRACT 
BY JOHN 
FROM A 
BROWN 
CAROL 
TO 
() I 
.. .. .. 
.... . .. 
• 1\ 
J be?~ - Lu 
I 
I 
v J. • 
rv-.. V r 
1\. v 
I 
• • 
• 
.. 
. -· 
.... 
• -
/\ 
1/ 
hot.<) ~"'::1 this be~ _ rr.----, 
... 
" f 
OR. v ..., 
"'' 
. . 
[ 
Ill - -I • 
-
...--;1 
1"\ ......1 ~ 
,........ F=~,: 
""'" 1 ..... • ·-'/ ... - • 
-
• 
'"1!/ .. 
- •• v • .. .. .. J - .. • ~C:::l:::j ~ 
-- - - - - - -
-r,---, - -n ~ 
/ 
y h ~ .., 
nv 1 • • • - I 
.Y Ill 
-J ... _:; 
- - - - - - -
- - - -
n ~ 
/ 1 
-
IIlLa. .. 
y k • ~ 
..., 
-
r-
·-
• 1/V"\ v ( • I\.._\/ 
-~ _v_ 1:::::=:::::::: l.o-o" 
- - - - - - -- -
.. 
'\• I"" J 
-
.. 
I • 
-
I/ v 
-
• 
• 
-
..,, 
I 
~ 
I 
--
1=:81 1 
. 
• 
- • _. 
- - - - -
~ ~l"!oo 
.A .1fiLIII. 
~ ~ _. 
• • I 
. 
r 1 1-
.. 
-
.... 
- - - -I 
J 
--
• 
.... 
.. 
... 
I • .,. 
•• 
. -
~ .. I 
• I ,... .. _. 
_l_ ., ..... 
_l_ 
I 
- - - -~ 
-
- ~ 
~ 
~ 
- IJ 71'=" I 
_l 
.... 
-
,.. 
FIG. E THE OPENING 
DUFAY' S MASS 
/) I I ,., 
~ :>o 
-
., 
• • • M "U.' ..... .. ... , 
J Ia<~ ~ c: 
- -
rL 
- -
e. 
() 0 o_o 
or I 1/? 0 .l ~· 
. "" 
i'-Y l 
IV k''j - - - rt- e 
(') 
/ '7 ' 
.> Cl 0 \11-( 
"'\ 4 1"""'!.. 
or]! 
J I 
I~ K~ - - ri.. - e 
I 
........ IC1I 
' ~ 
-7. L7• 
I L .... ... 
&.( 
- - -
,... !) 
I .;'\ 
- ""' • 
0 2 { 
""' 
v 
• 
.. _. 
\. 
"" 
._) 
e I - - lei. 
- /}• t n { .... (J 
/ 
,...,.... 
y 
aJ e - - -
!"\ 
n ~ 
v ~ IC1I 
l>r"\ 
\.;,){ 
-~ e. 
- - lei.. 
-& I 
...,. 
l• 
-
,a 
I _{o 
e I 
OF THE 
'SE LA 
-
.. 
-
.. 
... -. 
::J 
n 
I 
,..... 
I'"" 
,.~ 
- e. 
). 
? r .. 
KYRIE 
FACE 
0 
-
...... 0 
,..., 
.. 
..., 
,... 
.. 
• .... 1: 
-..... 
-
- -
~ 
"" ~ 
-
,., 
... 
lei.. 
- -
I 
,... Cl 
-
CJ t-' I \ 
-"' 
FROM 
AY PALE' 
... rJo .. 
. ... ,., 
-- ---· 
I 
, 0 ,. 
- -
,..... 
.... D 
-
""' 
-& I ll.. 
,., ~ 
.. 0 _. .... 
,..., _...,_ 
• 
.,,. 
r ...... 
- - -
• • 
-~ 1111 
r ,. , 
"' I 
- -
-
- -
s.,~. 
I J 
.... 
-':} ,... 
-
..... Iii# 
-
{ G L.l ,... 
..... 
I I 
I 
-
J. ~ ~ 
-----=-- -- ~ ~ .,. . • -.....I T f- f:. ~ , 
IJ I' (tll,t ... 'b,le I I I I 
- I~ .,_ ~· 1'1 r+· 
[..J p 
1'\ 
I..J 
1'1.»-
.,) f:rr.-r.-t_."' i'L ! sot_o 1'\ 
- 1 -~ 
.;,.) ! r.e\o _ .... .p l-ot • ['6"" 
., • + 
-· 
-. + .,.. - "A· 
....... ..,. ~- . ~ .fl-_ ~ .. -~ p 
's 
p (A,~\,,Ie. I I I I 'p 
n 
~ 
" ~+.s 
..J 
., 
, 
lie 
t 
~ ~ ~ ct·~ l.>l'ltS. () ,~ 
--
I II ,.-
--
~· - I --I 
·~ lrl' I I II _l 1 J /I 
I I I I I I I I l 
'"'IT ~v l'pp I I ~"'1 j I, I I I I I 1 I I I 1 ~&- r--, UlltS. IPt"U-
1l 
. 
iJ P c""'-1-"'b,/e ..._ .. . II ~ ~~ l#p _,p 
,... 
-1 .. r 1 r1a • «.t;"it;v-r I I I l" 
~ I fP I I l,_l ',t- I i" 1..--- ...... 
-
I' ........... ,- --.,...., 
,_ 
---...... I 1' I p,'l-e 
rr 1 I I I I I II II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I _l {::: ~ I I r,~~ • . 
I -
""f 
----:mwA3 18 STAVE COPYRIGHT Cl l'iloNOf'US LTO 197& 
j r 3 ~ ,_,...,_ ~ ----,~-... ,.. - .. ---.... ~ 
J \ . fG1 J f= ' ; , ~r f I ., I 
Ill c r l r I i 
verJ slow bo_, f( ..::-r 'f""'"f 1/~f /P<f :::;::::-:-f/'1' f<>CJ:> c~. poco 01. fCU> --
Se..,~ v.6r,.'ft, f.,C.<> c. f't:>CD lo, "ob. + ~ ~ ~ I p - ,. - - ~ t- ' \1"' ~ • Q - 1'. c~ ~rol. U) I I g b .. :l -<=Pm ,.~ <'~ ,.~ ~ r"• J ['_ --_ --- }_ -__ _ ? trlf Lj 
j J I~,.......,....., + 
B. P. I ~)~~~ J 4 ~ g_ j J lztf j ' I 
N'-=:. P P ~Pff 
Mr5. (;.. 
( w.-1'- s.,. d -face.) o.s •+ S•~·- d.-
to l"ler.re.lf) J T .....~. \.b. - 3 ...., -===:.p~o:::::::::=- se .... pl·c.e 5"'·'·~ but .... ~ '"' ... -fnt.,ct!. 
~w ~ ' ~~ ~ ... - ~ i ~ •, ' - ~ - - ~ -
J F' FE (J7 JF ' l ) ; f 11[ f f ~f 1f f 1 
1 cw ,__. t-) (., .... ) -t-here. ..... ~ e.. lo.. - ,t~ "eA." tke. 
+ 
vic. J£•; J jtj':[J3 1d ~.bJJ '! liPJJ .J J 1'J1) :tJ 11J.. ~ )1 ,J;- £ I 
. . . "--" , & --fl.• .... - ......_ __, • ........... --
- ..:. - - . - ~ _ ____, 
rrrc.p>pr, PPP P ===--tf'P<=f :::::-prr-= f 
~ 
.... ---- ---
-- -- -
POCP .f 
"':::=- rrr. c:::::::.. r;:::-rr r 
P s,...,,,.,'?!> 
J -
"::::>-fpp.-::::. r >rrr-=:::. r ===-rrr -=::::::: f. - P/1' 
ra---
Pl'ff poe. c.re.s.c... Poco ""' poc.a --
Ill>""~.) 
-- ---
---
vlc.lf=:==#r· ., Q l~oJ. t ]. ,. .., f[552!J f ilr '1 I T l f ,.~,. =-1[ F I 
~PAN-A3 
-==::::: ~ 18STAVE (' f(f <P> p Pf -=:::. f :::=-ff <r>- rr r --====.r>rrr -=:: r ::---- 'fP ~I' 
CO~JIUGHT It ,. .... 01"\JS LTO lt7t 
CHAPTER THREE 
SCIENCE IN NATIONAL CONTEXT 
Important scientific results have energed from a 
variety of contexts - from isolated geniuses as 
mtHh as scientific societies, from practical nen as 
~tell as theoretic fans, from 11ild speculations and 
froAJ severely disciplined reasoning. In different 
countries and different periods the methods and 
goals of science have covered a range of 
possibilities. (6a.r Lussu in Crosland page 43 
1918.1 
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The previous chapter focused on the features of the 
nationally specific thought styles, and substantiated 
various other claims made in the first chapter. This chapter 
concentrates on validating the proposition that the thought 
styles issue from culturally specific thought-environment 
complexes. As such, the emphasis will be more on linking the 
characteristics of the thought styles to the different 
cultural environments. The fundamental argument is that 
features of the national thought styles are sustained by 
communi ties with different structures and functions. These 
communities internalize contrasting ideals of knowledge, 
products of national political difference. 
The example of science is a particularly interesting one 
because of the assumptions attached to it. In the past 
science has been considered a progressive, universal, value-
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free study with absolute truth as its attainable goal. 
Progressiveness and t.he t.eleological model have been 
seriously challenged by alternatives such as Kuhn's idea of 
development through successive revolutions and paradigm 
shifts, and Popper's model of conjecture and refutation. The 
notion of value--freedom is no longer tenable eit.her, since 
it has become obvious that social, economic and political 
factors affect the development of science. Thus there have 
been many attempts to account for the complexity of the 
relationship between science and culture - an early example 
can be found in Sears Cl950) work. The assumption that. has 
proved the most resistent to criticism is that of 
universality science as a universal enterprise built upon 
common ideals, sharing theories and methodologies. In a 
val ume entitled "Science and Society", edited by Kaplan 
(1965). Cardwell maintains that unlike art. law and 
literature, science is truly international, a view shared by 
de Beer in the same volume .. , That scientific achievements of 
one country are a function of its neighbours is, some would 
argue, unquestionable <see Jenner quoted in de Beer <1965)): 
the chemist Lavoisier built his chemical revolution on the 
discoveries of Priestly and Black, and Darwin's single 
greatest predecessor was the Frenchman Lamarck. What is more 
tenuous is to suggest that cultural factors exert a 
negligible influence on the development of the scient.ific 
enterprise. Over the centuries, consistent differences in 
political structures have affected the organization of, and 
the values incorporated into, the English and French 
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scientific communi ties. These macroscopic factors have had 
repercussions for the methods and ideas of the individual 
scientist. Rephrased in terms of the thesis, macroscopic 
factors are responsible for different thought styles which 
have initiated contrasting scientific approaches. 
Randell <1969) has pointed to distinct traditions of 
scientific thought. Other references are to be found in the 
on scientists of both countries. biographical literature 
Crosland <1978), in his comparison of the scientists Gay-
the Lussac and Davy, proposes the between 
"classical" and the "intuitive" 
opposition 
scientist. Furthermore, 
research indicated that during the era of scientific 
professionalization, the classical/intuitive distinction was 
widespread among French and English scientists. The 
classical or French scientist, as he is portrayed in the 
literature, was both an intellectual and a professional. A 
lover of systematici ty and analysis, he was concerned with 
the theoretical aspect of science. Going beyond the evidence 
of his senses, the French scientist used general. scientific 
principles to structure and 
The English scientist used 
order the various disciplines. 
his intuition and perceptual 
intelligence to provide novel and interesting insights into 
scientific research, preferring the practicalities of 
experimentation. The different attitudes went so far as t.o 
govern the materials t.hese scientists studied <Crosland 
1979). Like the artistic types, these scientific ones are 
ideal in that not all English and French scientists 
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conformed to the models. However. they capture the relative 
strengths of the scientists in both countries. 
This distinction. the starting point, is then related, 
following Greenaway's <1956) assumption that scientific 
education is of great importance to the underst.anding of the 
scientist's mind, to the scientific training of the two 
countries. Education is just one of the ways in which the 
scientific communi ties in France and England have differed 
over the centuries. A description of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century scientific establishments stresses that 
they were a product of a stable political difference: the 
strong interventionist French state versus the weak non 
interventionist English state, This contrast dates back to 
the dawn of absolutism in France. Contrasting the two 
communities serves to highlight some of the consequences of 
these different political systems. The contrast was 
responsible for the institutionalization of the amateur 
versus professional approach to science in England and 
France respectively, a difference hinted at in the previous 
chapter in connection with art. The link between empiricism 
and amateurishness is regularly made in the 1 i terature on 
English education <Halls 1965, Dancy 1968). Secondly, it 
gives us an insight into the origins of the contrasting 
pragmatic and intellectualist approaches to knowledge - to 
be explored in later chapters - typical of the rationalist 
and empirical thought styles respectively. An account of the 
genesis of both these properties adds support to the idea of 
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thought styles as distilled from thought.-environment 
complexes. Finally, the discussion highlights the origins of 
the "structure" in French society, which is commonly 
attributed to the philosophical bias of the Cartesian mind 
<Halls 1965). An alternative explanation is given for the 
presence of structure in French society and its absence in 
England - an explanation to be elaborated in a later chapter 
on education. This leads to the conclusion that certain 
psychological differences are not only sustained but also 
mirrored at the social level. 2 
SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES 
The work of historians, such as Crosland, Mckie and others,':'~ 
makes it possible to offer the opposition of the intuitive, 
perceptive English scientist against the systematic 
Frenchman as a workable hypothesis, capturing the relative 
strengths of the scientists of both nations. Chemists are 
the focus of attention because of the abundance of available 
comparative material. There is potential to extrapolate and 
to see whether similar differences arise between scientists 
working in other fields. Here biologists will be used, 
chemistry and biology being the two areas in which major 
scientific revolutions occurred during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 
Hartley, in a collection of essays on key figures in 
chemistry, describes Lavoisier as lacking in "qualit.ative 
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intuition" Cpage 32 1971). but refers to his "systematic 
mind" <page 20-21 1971). Furthermore, "he relied on 
measurement and lacked the superb qualitative insti nets" 
which lay behind the discoveries of Priestley <Hartley page 
4 1966). Hartley talks about Priestley's "enthusiastic 
energy", "curiosity", his "keen observation", "exceptional 
visual memory" and the "ingenuity and enterprise with which 
he devised and carried out new experiments with the simplest 
means" <Hart 1 ey page 17 1971) . Mckie C1952) • 1 n a biography 
of- Lavoisier, refers to Priestley as "one of the greatest 
scientific experimenters of his time" Cpage 85 1952). The 
work of Lavoisier and Priestley does differ, supporting the 
characterizations of their biographers. Priestley's 
innovative experimentation is translated into the type of 
apparatus he used and the format his experiments took. These 
were explorations and discoveries, and Priestley himself 
says about his investigations into the nature of air: 
... I will frankly acknowledge, that, at the co11Jl/1ence:ment of 
the experiments recited in this section, I was so far from 
having formed any hypothesis that led to the discoveries I 
made in pursuing them, that they would have appeared very 
improbable to me had I been told of them: . .. (Priestley in 
Leicester and Klickstein page 113 1968) 
In the same paper "Of Dephlogisticated Air, and of the 
Constitution of the Atmosphere" he apologizes to his 
audience for repeating how "surprised" he was at his 
findings. His discovery that plants purify air was the 
result of "casual" observation <Priestley in Leicester and 
Klickstein page 123 1968). Priestley's experiments contrast. 
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with the meticulously planned, precision analyses of his 
French contemporary. Before carrying out experiments on the 
calcination of tin in closed vessels, Lavoisier "reasoned to 
himself" about Boyle's findings. Judging them inconsistent, 
he set about his own meticulous investigations. These were 
carried out in a logical stepwise manner with the utmost 
care and .accuracy. Lavoisier was concerned with 
quantitative, analytical chemistry, as the multiple tables 
and frequent references to precise measurements testify, not 
with interesting experimentation which appealed to the 
imagination and the senses. 
Moving ·to a later generation of chemists, the contemporaries 
Gay-Lussac and Davy have been the subject of a detailed 
comparison by Crosland <1980). Davy emerges as an 
imaginative innovator who regarded science as an adventure: 
a romantic scientist <Crosland 1980). Gay-Lussac, on the 
other hand, was a disciplined investigator. He searched for 
the principles underlying his scientific discoveries and is 
remembered for his method of volumetric analysis and his gas 
laws: a classical scientist <Crosland 1980>. Crosland <1978) 
also remarks on the few quantitative experiment.s which can 
be accredited to Davy, besides the number expected of a 
chemist in the generation after Lavoisier. If historians are 
to be believed, Davy's genius lay elsewhere. Hartley (1966) 
refers to his "clear penetrating vision", "genius of 
experiment" and his "quickness of perception" which was 
"often led astray by fau 1 ty measurements" . The work of this 
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pair displays contrasting features similar to those of their 
:forefathers. Indeed, Davy does show a neglect of 
quantitative measurement. A series of papers 011 alkalis, in 
particular one on their decomposition visually quite 
spectacular betray how taken he was with the perceptual 
aspect of these experiments, referring to "the beautiful 
effect of continued jets of fire". Gay-Lussac' s papers are 
similar in style to those of Lavoisier. They contain careful 
theoretical consideration of t-he sub_j ect matter to be 
investigated. This is followed by extensive quantitative 
analyses, presented in neat tables so that. the measurements 
can be easily checked. 4 
Dalton's strengths lay in his "powerful pictorial" and 
"concrete" imagination. These were great assets as. "it so 
happened that the ni net.eenth century thrived when it was 
pictorial and languished when it tried to be subtle" <Farrar 
in Cardwell page 290 1968). That he reasoned in concrete, 
perceptual terms is suggested by his ball and stick atomic 
models, and the depiction of atoms in all his work as solid 
little balls. Indeed. as Farrar notes, "there was never 
anything shadowy or metaphysical about his atoms; too small 
to see but very real", which is probably why they were 
unacceptable to the Frenchman Berthollet. This, however, was 
not the only respect in which the two men differed. Dalton, 
despite his speculative atoms, was committed to empirical 
investigation. In a paper on the theory of the absorption of 
gases, his opening words were "From the facts developed in 
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the preceding articles. the following theory of the 
absorption of gases by water seems deducible" CDal ton in 
Leicester and Klickstein page 209 1968). Berthollet, in a 
treatise on chemical affinities, starts from general 
theoretical considerations - as Gay-Lussac points out in a 
memoir on the combination of gases <in Leicester and 
Klickstein page 295 1968). He arrives at the principle that 
combination does not depend merely on elective affinity. but 
also on mutual proportions. This 
point 
is 
and 
followed 
confirm 
by 
its experimentation 
universality. 
to prove his 
Already in the seventeenth century, clear differences had 
emerged between English and French chemistry. The English 
school was oriented towards gaseous experimentation, the 
French towards theoretical issues. precision analysis, 
description and classification of compounds. The English 
preferred a more qualitative methodology, the French a more 
quantitative one. The contrast can be accounted for in terms 
of the types of scientists who made the major discoveries 
(Leicester 1956). In England, the leading lights were 
scientific amateurs. whereas on the Continent discoveries 
were made, in practical chemistry, by pharmacists and in 
theoretical 
chemistry 
accounted 
chemistry, by 
had some form 
for their 
physicians. 
of scientific 
insistence 
Men coming to 
training which 
on theoretical 
considerations. analysis and systemization, as opposed t.o 
the intuitive and perceptive strengths necessary for 
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innovative experiment.ation. Rouelle, Lavoisier's teacher, 
was famous for his systematic methodical approach 
exemplified in his work on the classification of salts 
<Partington 1964). The latter consisted of arranging salts 
into classes according to ease of crystallization. Most 
French chemists seemed to have been similarly interested in 
analyses which they recorded in lengthy theoretical 
treatises. The other French chemist of note in the era 
preceding Lavoisier was Geoffroy. who compiled, again from 
studies of salts, a widely used table of chemical 
affinities. This is not to say that there were no 
quantitative British chemists. But, as Hartley C1964) notes 
of one such chemist, Hales, whilst he drew up quantitative 
measurements of the amounts of air released by heating 
various sol ids, he ignored the qualitative differences in 
the airs themselves, as well as the significance of the 
apparatus he used. It was left to Priestley, the 
"qualitative scientist par excellence", to use the latter to 
its full potential. 
If the era before Lavoisier's revolution was the one where 
qualitative chemistry thrived <Boas 1958, Farrar 1968) it 
was also the one that produced many famous English chemists. 
Boyle's success lies in his qualitative approach, in a 
period where obsessive quantitative measurements were as yet 
unnecessary <Boas 1958). He could have made his experiments 
more accurate, but it would not have made any difference to 
the interpretation. The significance of Boyle's work lay in 
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the approach not in the results. which was the exact 
opposite of his systematic French cont.emporaries. He was 
unable to coordinate his many brilliant experiments int.o a 
coherent whole. Boyle's confused writings betray a method of 
working and thinking which made it difficult "to draw up 
comprehensive, systematic t.reatises" (Boas page 206 1958). 
Boyle was, however, not alone in this failing. Men such as 
Hook and Wren, in true amateur fashion. often did not even 
record their thoughts, never mind systematizing them.~,,,, 
The systematic approach in French chemistry continued 
through the chemical revolution into the nineteenth century. 
There are indications that by the end of the eighteenth 
century, there were at least two differing currents within 
the discipline: the analysis of compounds by men such as 
Vauquelin coming from a pharmaceutical background. and the 
use of a more speculative theoretical approach.~ Berthollet, 
coming to chemistry from medicine, was more interested in 
theoretical aspects of the science and formulated an atomic 
theory which differed from Dalton's, but proved more 
acceptable to his French public. This was largely because he 
worked wi·thin a Cartesian rather than a Newtonian framework, 
i.e. reasoning in terms of abstract forces of attraction and 
repulsion instead of solid massy particles. Moreover. 
Dalton's "rules" of chemical combination contrast with 
Berthollet.' s "law" of chemical affinity, and point to other 
differences in scientific outlook. The former were of 
practical value to guide investigations, and could be 
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applied to "facts" which had already been ascertained. The 
latter were universal truths. Dalton's rules were convenient 
summaries of data where Berthollet's laws captured the 
underlying scientific reality, to which specific cases could 
be fitted. This distinction is a good example of the 
consequences the different thought styles had on scientific 
thinking. 
French chemists seemed to have been obsessed with accuracy. 
which is probably why they were such good quantitative 
scientists. 
wherewithall 
However. 
to cater 
it appears 
for this 
that they had the 
obsession. Lavoisier 
astonished the English scientist Young by the amount of 
precision equipment he had at his disposal, and to which he 
frequently referred. In a paper on the calcination of tin, 
Lavoisier comments on a precision balance, built by the 
inspector of coinage as probably "the most perfect of its 
kind". His laboratory, described by Mckie, <1952) 7 must. have 
been a necessity for a scientist of Lavoisier's standing: 
member of the Academy and as such a government official. 
Gay-Lussac followed in Lavoisier's footsteps perfecting 
gaseous analysis, a more accurate method than the 
gravimetric analysis. Such accuracy did not leave a lot of 
scope for speculation and imagination. In addition, French 
chemists in the nineteenth century, and perhaps even 
earlier, were constrained by institutional factors. making 
it unacceptable for a scientist to use his imagination, and 
allow his intellect to roam free. Indeed, as Crosland points 
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out, there would have been no place for Davy in French 
science, committed as it was to a scientific methodology of 
accuracy and precision. The sobering effect of institutional 
pressures can be related to the rationalist/empiricist 
dichotomy in science. They resulted in the different 
conceptions of science held by the two men which in turn 
affected their methods of working. Clearly "For Gay-Lussac 
chemistry was discipline, for Davy it was an adventure" 
(Crosland page 115 1978). 
A comparison between Darwin and Lamarck is consonant with 
the picture which has so far emerged. Despite their deeper 
knowledge of comparative anatomy and morphology, Darwin's 
colleagues, "the systematisers". failed because they refused 
to use their imagination and speculate about ultimate 
questions such as the reasons for particular patterns of 
creation CHimmelfarb page 131 1959) 0 Indeed, Lamarck's 
greatest concern was structuring the discipline of zoology: 
Experience in teaching has made me feel how useful a 
philosophical zoology would be at the present time. By this 
I mean a body of rules and principles, relative to the study 
of ani:mals and applicable even to other divisions of the 
natural sciences: for our knowledge of zoological facts has 
made considerable progress during the last thirty years. 
(Lamarck page 1 1984) 
Uninhibited by his meagre training, when Darwin encountered 
tropical geology for the first time, he did not "do what 
most a1~teurs would have done in the circumstances - that is 
devote the first bewildering weeks to sorting out and 
analyzing the composition of rocks". Instead, he " .. leaped 
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to the highest stage of enquiry. the problem and meaning of 
geological phenomena" CHi:nunelfarb page 82 1959). In :fact, 
Darwin's success rested on his boldness in speculating about 
what he observed, and spontaneity uncurbed by institutional 
pressures. What is clear about Lamarck is that he was a 
scientist according to the way he has been 
portrayed in this thesis. His philosophical zoology was a 
teaching aid in which he attempted to organize · and 
synthesize his biological knowledge by abstracting 
principles. These principles and general laws - a similar 
emphasis on "laws" as is :found in the work of Berthollet -
were systematically deduced :from principles derived from 
laboratory experiments. They were 1) that increased use of 
organs increased their strength 2) that fluid motion 
modifies cellular tissue and 3) the evidence of an inner 
power or elan vital <page 5 in Lamarck 1984). Lamarck was 
formulating second order generalities, in contrast to Darwin 
whose ideas all stemmed from direct observat.ion. Using these 
generalities, he intended to: 
observe nature, to study their productions in their 
general and special relationships, and finally endeavour to 
grasp the order which she everywhere introduces as well as 
her progress, her laws and the infinitely variable means 
which she uses to give effect to that order... <Lamarck page 
10 1984) 
He admits to treading between philosophy and zoology in 
order to discover great truths. Both the process of 
scientific discovery of biology and the systematic thinking 
of philosophy were necessary to est.ablish a zoological 
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system. The freedom to speculate in the way Darwin did, was 
not open to Lamarck. True, Darwin was responsible for the 
"law" of evolution, but this law was arrived at. by different 
means: extensive empirical observation and uncontrolled 
speculation. Darwin was anxious to deflect accusations of 
conjec·t:.ure, maintaining t.hat his theory was based on hard 
facts. However. conjecture played an important part in its 
genesis, as his notebooks testify. They also show his method 
of working: moving from "fact" to theory. The Beagle 
notebooks are collections of descriptive observations and 
are followed by the red notebook, transitional in that it 
incorporates both facts and theory. The post voyage 
notebooks are theoretical in orientation. 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENCES FOR TWO MAJOR SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 
The different characteristics of the scientists discussed 
had i roportant 
revolutions of 
implications for 
the nineteenth 
the two 
century. 
major scientific 
The Frenchman, 
Lavoisier. using a set of general intellectual skills 
<Hartley 1971), .;;~ brought order and clarity to the wealth of 
chemical knowledge. Moreover, he applied logical reasoning 
to refute the inconsistent "phlogiston" theory. The central 
tenet of this theory was that heating a metal caused a metal 
oxide to be formed, letting off "phlogiston". Lavoisier 
reasoned that it was improbable that a metal upon heating 
would release a substance while forming a heavier compound. 
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This is why Hartley C1966) refers to Lavoisier's application 
of the principle of the balance sheet - that outgo equals 
income to chemistry, a principle be also applied to his 
:r-esearch at his experimental farm at Frechines: 
METAL CALX + PHLOGISTON t 
1' 
Substituted 
METAL + OXYGEN -t METAL OXIDE + CALORIC HEAT 
Having refuted the "phlogiston" theory, he then undertook, 
with the help of Guyton de Morveau, to structure and 
systematize the discipline of chemistry. For this he needed 
a new language: 
A well composed language adapted to the natural and 
successive order of ideas will bring in its train a 
necessary and immediate revolution in the method of teaching 
and will not allow teachers of chemistry to deviate from the 
course of Nature: either they must resist the nomenclature 
or they must insistently follow the course marked out ~Y it. 
The logic of the sciences is thus essentially dependent upon 
their language. (Lavoisier page 5 1790) 
Further: 
If after having considered languages as analytic methods, we 
consider them merely as a collection of representative 
signs, they will afford us some observations of another 
kind. In this second aspect we shall have three things to 
distinguish in every physical science, the series of facts 
that constitute the science: the ideas that call the facts 
to mind and the words that express them. The word should 
give birth to the ideai the idea should depict the facts: 
they are three impressions of one and the same seal: and as 
it is the words that preserve and transmit ideas, it follows 
that science can never be brought to perfection, if language 
be not first perfected, and that however true the facts may 
be, and however correct the ideas to which they give rise, 
they will still transmit false impressions if there are no 
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exact expressions to convey them. (Lavoisier page 5 1790 
reprint 1965) 
There is an emphasis on systematization and the wish to 
i'ormulate a theoretical framework within which to work. 
Biologists had already attempted systematization, most. 
notably Lamarck. In biology there was a need for 
unconstrained. imaginative speculation as well as a return 
to hard data - most of Lamarck's observations were made in 
his laboratory on dead material. This is what Darwin brought 
to biology: 
I have continued steadily reading and collecting facts on 
variation of domestic ani~ls and plants, and on the 
question of what are species. I have a grand body of facts, 
and I think I can draw some sound conclusions. The general 
conclusion to which I have slowly been driven from a 
directly opposite conviction, is that species are mutable. 
and that allied species are co-descendants from common 
stocks. (letter from Darwin to Jenyns in Nurray page 175 
1908) 
NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES 
In this description of the two scientific communities, 
spanning the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, it 
emerges that scientific differences stem from the different 
social organization of scientific knowledge in the two 
communities. These contrasting CQmmunities were generated by 
a stable political difference between the two countries. A 
strong interventionist state in France, cultivated an 
intellectual bureaucracy for a number of politically 
strategic reasons to be elaborated later <see chapter six). 
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Among other things, the bureaucracy served to glorify t.he 
state, which housed it in a highly centralized netwm-k of 
institutions hence the structure inherent in the 
community. This was not the case in England, where the weak 
state had not manifested comparable interests. Non-
in·terventionism led to an unstructured scienti fie community 
where leading scientists discriminated against government 
intervention. 
1) EDUCATION IN THE TWO COMMUNITIES 
In outlining the national chemical traditions, reference was 
made to the different training prominent scientists had in 
the two countries. This training was just part of. on the 
one hand, a system designed to produce a bureaucratic elite, 
on the other, a system which nurtured a much more "amateur" 
approach. 
In pre-revolutionary France, there was no scientific 
profession in the sense that there was subsequently in the 
Napoleonic era. The structure of education and subsequent 
careers were with the exception of medicine - not as yet 
formalized. However, even at this stage, scientific 
education was different in England and France. By the time 
he was twenty, Lavoisier had studied the classics, 
literature. law and science with the leading scientists in 
the country at some of the best institutions: Rouelle in 
chemistry. Jussieu in biology and Guettard in geology. As 
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Mckie notes his literary training was not wasted <1952). It 
made him aware o:f the importance of language as a tool of 
thought. and helped him express his ideas in a clear concise 
fashion. Lavoisier was no exception as regards being highly 
trained. Men of lesser calibre. like Fourcroy and 
Berthollet., came to chemistry through medicine, combined 
with a broader scientific knowledge provided by the lectures 
at the Jardin du Roi and the College de France. Berthollet, 
from a cultured bourgeois family, studied first at the 
College de Provinces, then at the University of Turin and 
finally at the Ecole de Medecine in Paris. His interest in 
chemistry grew out of his medical research. Fourcroy was an 
instance of someone who had come from humble beginnings and 
thanks to a good education College d'Arcourt in Paris 
followed by L' Ecole de Medecine 
influential scientists of his day. 
became one of the most 
After the French Revolution. France saw the creation of 
schools such as L'*cole Polytechnique - a college of higher 
education providing scientific education "which was 
complete and yet general enough to provide t.he foundations 
for all possible applications" CCrosland 1978) - the aim of 
French scientific education to this day. Curricula were 
rigidly structured to cover all scientific disciplines. and 
the teaching was of the highest quality. During the first 
two years, undergraduates were expected to study a) 
mathematics, to enable an appreciation of the form and 
movement of bodies b) physics and chemistry, to enable an 
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appreciation of the form and composition of matter (Crosland 
1978). This was a translation into curricular terms of the 
Cartesian emphasis on general principles. The hours allotted 
to each subject were carefully calculated in terms of 
percentage time. 
HOURS PERCENTA.G.E.. IlJ.I1Ji 
Mathematical Analysis 48 8.8 
Mechanics 72 13.3 
Fortification 54 10.0 
Public Works 54 10.0 
Mining 27 5.0 
Physics 60 11.0 
Chemistry (technical) 30 5.5 
Chemistry (experimental) 30 5.5 
Architecture 45 8.3 
Drawing 120 22.0 
<Crosland 1978) 
Furthermore. the course at the Polytechnique allowed the 
more bri 11 iant students to stay on for another year for 
research purposes. After the Polytechnique, post-graduate 
studies for engineers were available at the Fonts et 
Chaussees, where teaching was more informal - conducted by 
older students and visiting speakers. Gay-Lussac, was an 
example of how successful this system could be. 
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In a discussion of Dalton's educat.ion, Greenaway (1972) 
points ou·t how few leading English scientists had enjoyed 
higher education. The pattern was the exact opposite to that 
found in France. The most important scientists, men such as 
Faraday, Priestly and Dalton, were virtually self-educated. 
In nineteenth century Britain, eight out of fifty prominent 
scientists went. to universities, eight had grammar school 
education, but went no higher. Eighteen were apprenticed or 
entered family businesses at an early age <Greenaway page 55 
1952). Faraday's education consisted in little more than the 
rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic. Having 
mentioned Gay-Lussac's education, it is of interest to 
compare it with that of his British rival, Davy. Educated in 
a preparatory school in Truro, he was introduced to science 
by a Quaker saddler, Robert. Dunkin.:'~' Davy's education was 
not, according to Greenaway's survey, as rudimentary as that 
of John Dalton. After leaving school at fourteen, Dalton 
became a personal tutor. 
Darwin's education seems to have been an equally haphazard 
affair. His father, having described him as a very ordinary 
boy, sent him to Edinburgh to attempt a medical career. This 
failed, and Darwin then went to Cambridge, to prepare for 
the priesthood. At Cambridge he did not "distinguish 
himself" <Ruse 1979) and did not even take honours. Despite 
this. it was there that his interest in science was kindled 
through his acquaint.ance with such figures as Henslow, the 
botanist, Sedgewick and Whewell, although this was mostly at 
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an informal level CRuse 1979). Perhaps one could suggest. 
that, without the academic training that was available in 
France, English scientists did not develop systematic 
analytic thinking and had to rely on different aptitudes: 
their intuitive and perceptual abilities. 
2) SCIENCE UNDER THE OLD REGIME 
An art.icle by Gillespie C1984), concerning the development 
of ballooning in England and France, shows how 
the amateur versus professi anal distinction is 
intimately 
linked to 
institutional contexts. The article also conveys very 
succinctly the organization of the two scientific networks 
and how they affected the development of the same activity 
in the two countries. Whereas in France. ballooning was 
seized upon 
Academy of 
by the scientists of the official 
Science, who provided it with 
body of the 
funds and 
transformed it into the science of aerostation, in England, 
it fell into the hands of adventurers. This was largely a 
result of the disinterest shown by The Royal Society. 
Consequently. in both countries, ballooning became 
identified with distinct social classes. In France, it 
became associated with scientists and the Academies as a 
legitimate field of experimentation, in 
adventurers, alienating institutionalized 
ballooning was considered a legitimate 
England 
science. 
with 
As 
scientific 
discipline, experimental failures in the case of the French 
were interpreted within a scientific framework as one of the 
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hazards involved in experimentation. In Britain, where 
ballooning had become the province of adventurers, failures 
confirmed suspicions of charlatanism: 
Natural knowledge in the Old Regime was highly centralised 
and coordinated through the agency of national societies, 
engineering schools, provincial acade:mies, and government 
departments. Nembers of the French scientific caiiJJJJunity were 
experienced in applying expertise to matters of national 
importance and in exploiting established procedures. 
Government sponsored research aimed at the technical 
development of industry thus formed a scaffolding on which 
French aerostation was built. Four aspects of this 
institutional structure were particulary i111portant. First. 
academies actively sought skills and techniques from 
artisans and amateurs. people lacking the social status 
necessary to be members of the society. Second, individuals 
such as Piltltre who showed a tendency towards showmanship 
and :might otherwise have conducted their own adventurous 
flights, were assimilated into more scientific experiments. 
Third, the Paris Academy embraced both science and its 
technical applications was responsible for inspecting new 
inventions and granting patents, and did not consider the 
development of aerostation an improper activity. Finally, 
these institutional structures constituted a powerful 
motivating force in their own right, since provincial 
societies sought to emulate the Paris Academy. (Gillespie 
page 267-268 1984) 
A highly structured procedure existed whereby new projects 
could be made legitimate and enjoy state patronage, a sharp 
contrast to the situation in Britain: 
... the British government did have scientific advisers for 
problems it deemed of natio11al importance. The Royal Society 
under Banks coordinated voyages of scientific discovery and 
assessed methods of determining longitude, and Banks 
orchestrated research aimed at the more efficient 
exploitation of Britain's colonies. However. these efforts 
reflected the expression of Banks' own interest and personal 
patronage more than an accepted role for the Royal Society. 
The comparative weakness of scientific institutions enabled 
a wealthy and influential man lilre Banks to dominate the 
entire scientific scene: specialist societies would soon be 
formed to challenge this hegemony. The lack of scientific 
organisation in London permitted Banks' opinions on new 
machines to go unchallenged. As a result, aerostation was 
never considered important to the nation. (Gillespie paa·e 
268 1984) 
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This picture can be elaborated by referring to the 
differences between the two Royal scientific institut.ions: 
the Academy of Sciences in Paris and The Royal Society. 
Intellectual life before and after the Revolution was 
centred in Paris, home to numerous academies. Among them was 
the prestigious Academy of Sciences. A rigidly organized 
institution, it was established in 1666 by Colbert with the 
specific aim of fostering a 1 ink bet ween science and the 
state. It was subsequently reorganized in 1699 by Louis XIV, 
who gave himself the exclusive right to select members from 
lists presented to him by the academicians. The members 
became salaried government officials and advisors hence 
why they could afford expensive laboratory equipment 
deriving both power and prestige from their positions. 
Fontenelle, quoted in Hahn <1971), compares the Academy with 
its English counterpart. He is careful to acknowledge that 
the French institution, 
two masters science 
unlike its English counterpart, had 
and the crown. Despite the King' s 
control, academicians had the right to publish documents 
without consu 1 ti ng him, a considerable privilege under an 
absolutist regime. This strange mixture of control and 
complete academic freedom has often been a characteristic of 
French academic life. In Article 31 of its statutes, dated 
1666, the King granted the Academy monopoly over certifying 
new machinery. 10 Although the highest rank in the Academy -
members were divided into several grades - was made up of 
noblemen, an emphasis was put on intellectual achievements 
Page 108 
as a condition of membership. Furthermore, their members 
activities were organized so that research was conducted 
with maximum efficiency. Most disciplines were represented -
from sciences such as mechanics, astronomy, geography, 
physics and medecine to architecture, drawing, metallurgy. 
painting, agriculture and navigation. Each academician, for 
purposes of efficiency, had to specialize in a field of 
study and then give an account of his research to "enrich 
those composing the Academy through his wisdom [ lumiere] and 
to profit from their remarks" 
1971). 
<Huygens in Hahn page 23 
The Royal Society had altogether more modest beginnings. Its 
origins may be traced to a series of informal meetings, 1 1 
which took over fifteen years to become formalized into the 
Society. Although it had the Royal seal of approval, it was 
not submitted to the same close control as the French 
Academy, did not possess the same powers or receive the same 
funding. The latter helps explain why, for over two hundred 
years, being a "gentlemen" became almost a prerequisite for 
membership. Gentlemen of the leisured classes had the time 
to dabble in scientific matters and the money to support the 
Society. Even under the Old Regime, with no scientific 
profession in the modern sense of the term, French men of 
science were salaried government officials, whereas in 
England :membership of the most prestigious institutions was 
confined to the amateur gentleman. Anot.her important 
consequence of the lack of state patronage was that the 
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activities of the Society could be determined by the 
opinions of one man. such as Banks. 
3) MODERN SCIENCE: THE BIRTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROFESSION 
I wish simply to suggest that science in France had certain 
features not present in science in other countries and that 
national educational patterns and institutions in France 
provided a general encouragement for the pursuit of science 
but in certain directions rather than others. Prizes offered 
by the Academia des Sciences for research topics were only 
one way in which latent genius was encouraged to express 
itself. Vithin such a system valuable scientific work was 
done. The intellectual, religious and political environment 
of the French was different from other countries. Nethods of 
teaching, social support, and economic stimulus were 
different. Science in France was highly structured. with 
career patterns :marked and membership of the Academie an 
unbelievably important goal. (Crosland page 10 1977) 
The differences isolated previously survived the political 
upheaval of the French Revolution. In fact, the contrast. 
bet. ween a highly structured community in France and an 
unstructured one in England was accentuated by the new 
policies of centralization under the Napoleonic government. 
A> FRANCE 
The following hundred years saw the establishment of what 
can properly be described as a scientific profession. If 
anything, the Revolution boosted the already flourishing 
scientific activity. According to the Ideologists, whose 
philosophy inspired many key revolutionaries, the future of 
the new society lay in science. The scientific profession 
became part of the large scale restruct.uring of intellectual 
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and professional life over which the state was to have 
tighter control. Science became incorporated into a wider 
movement creating a professional state bureaucracy centred 
on Paris. In this new scienti fie community, structure was 
maintained by the highly centralized network of state 
institut.ions, providing education and research facilities 
for the new bureaucracy. The Napoleonic era saw the 
proliferation of specialized schools for the training of 
scientific professionals. The newly created Universite 
Imperiale de France incorporated a career structure based 
upon academic merit and "good conduct" CFox in Geisen 1985), 
explaining the educational differences outlined previously. 
A strict hierarchy of degrees determined accessible posts 
and teaching positions. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, "patronage" and the "cumul" were two factors 
increasing the structure of the French scientific community. 
Patronage 
successful 
nineteenth 
also played an important 
career. However, during 
century, training and 
role 
the 
in determining a 
course of the 
education assumed an 
increasing importance as the status of the scientist changed 
from political bureaucrat to intellectual civil servant <Fox 
in Geison 1985). 
After the Revolution, new specialist scientific schools. 
such as L'Ecole Polytechnique, provided scientific education 
alongside the schools of the Old Regime i.e. L' Ecole des 
Pants et Chaussees, L'Ecole des Mines. Research institutions 
such as the College de France and the Jardin du Roi also 
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survived. but the latter was transformed into the Musee 
Nationale d' Histoire Naturelle. These were the institutions 
referred to by Hahn 0971) as "capturing the leading edge of 
research". There was an abundance of Societies which 
conducted science's public relations CHahn 1971). Two of the 
most importan·t 'tfere the Philomatique and the Societe 
d'Arcueil. integral parts of the Parisian community, acting 
as stepping stones to membership of the Institute - the new 
name given to the Academy - thus increasing the cohesion of 
the conununi ty. It was here that young scientists came int.o 
contact with the doyens of science and made a name for 
themselves through publishing research in the various 
periodicals and memoirs. The Societe d'Arcueil was set up by 
the chemist Berthollet for the specific purpose of fostering 
links between older, experienced scientists and the young 
blood. He. for example, was influential in determining the 
success of his protege Gay-Lussac. Berthollet, like Laplace 
and Fourcroy, had been a leading scientist during the 
Monarchy and continued to be employed by the state under 
Napoleon. Not only were these men scientists and teachers, 
but they also acted as statesmen and government officials. 
As such they were able to exert political pressure to 
further the careers of their pupils. A system of patronage 
was established which. together with the ability to use the 
educational system 
qualifications in 
provided 
the top 
i.e. obtain 
institutions 
educational 
formed the 
prerequisite for an official position. This system had an 
element of mutuality about it. benefiting both pupils and 
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teachers. 12 Despite being often referred to as one of 
France's most neglected scientist.s, Lamarck held many 
official positions: a much coveted chair at the Institute. a 
chair at the Faculty of Sciences, and a lectureship at the 
Musee d'Histoire Naturelle, Thus, in theory Lamarck, had the 
potential ·to disseminate his ideas. However, in practice, he 
remained on the sidelines of organized science. This was 
because his philosophical style did not generate sufficient 
research material to attract brilliant research students and 
it. became easy to ignore his achievements. As Ostram points 
out, "Able proteges, after all, were usefu 1 in keeping the 
patron before the public eye" (Qstram page 36 1980). 
Intimacy with the state held the potential danger of 
stringent control over, not only the organization, but also 
the nature of academic activities, as took place during the 
July Monarchy. This bad experience, in fact, led to an 
unprecedented bid for freedom by scientists who appealed to 
industry for support. The result of this move was 
intellectually damaging. The advantage of state patronage 
was not only that scientists basked in ministerial favour, 
but also that it created a space for research, free from 
utilitarian concerns <Hahn 1971, Fox 1985). Moreover, 
institutions in France have continued to play a role in 
nurturing disinterested academic research and II 
legitimise the place of intellectuals in modern French 
Society as distinct from their utilitarian roles as teachers 
and applied scientists" <Hahn page 310 1971). The French non 
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pragmatic approach to science which was generated in this 
academic environment had advantages as well as drawbacks. 
Gay-Lussac applied his skills to Industry and urged his 
count.rymen to concet-n themselves with practical issues. He 
acknowledged the importance of theoretical research but 
thought that French scientists lost themselves in 
abstractions. Gay-Lussac praised the English who understood 
the uti 1 i tar ian value of science and applied their ideas 
Cc.f. Leclerc's comparison cited in chapter one). It was not 
until the end of the century, when the much resisted links 
with industry were formed, that French science came down to 
earth. The effects of the alliance with industry remains 
with the physical sciences to this day in that they are, in 
an intellectual and academic sense, held in much lower 
esteem than the mathematical sciences <Halls 1969). 
The patronage system declined towards the end of the century 
as did the "cumul". The latter, another typical feature of 
the French community, refers to multiple membership of 
research and teaching institutions which again contributed 
to ·the cohesion of the community. Leading scientists such as 
Fourcroy, 
lecturers 
Berthollet and Laplace functioned as teachers, 
and examiners simultaneously in different 
establishments as well as being active in politics - Laplace 
was Minister of the Interior. The decline of "patronage" and 
"cumul" can be linked to a change in status of the 
scientist. The nineteenth century acted out a conflict 
between the incompatibility of the "intellectual" and 
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"bureaucratic" conception of the scientist (Fox in Geison 
1985). The ever-increasing educational potential meant that 
academic credentials became the crucial factor in 
determining professional success in a greatly expanded 
scienti fie couununi ty. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, a scientist in g-over·nment employment retained. and 
still does, intellectual prestige by virtue of his training 
at the top academic establishments. As a Faculty member, he 
had to hold a doctorate, and had a precise career mapped out 
for him. Access to the highest positions was dependent. on a 
good record in teaching and research which would be a 
recommendation to the Minister of Public Instruction. Only 
very rarely was he guaranteed any political power <Bourdieu 
1979, Fox in Geison 1985). 
B) BRITAIN 
While the official body of French science, housed in the 
Institute, was renowned for its scient i fie excellence and 
competence, The Royal Society in Britain was still in the 
hands of amateur gentlemen. Indeed, many an English 
scientist agreed that Paris was the place to nurture the 
talents of budding scientists. "If a man is thought to 
display talent, he is turned to Paris, as the only soil 
where it can be nourished or admired" <Lleyel in Crosland 
page 102 1977). 18 By the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the Society had already acquired a bad public 
image. '.. With no state patronage, it needed the weal thy 
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di lletantes as a source of income, This kept to a minimum 
the number of members who could make any genuine 
contributions to science. Furthermore, The Royal Society 
suffered during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
because it did 
establishments like 
not have the popular 
The Royal Institu·tion and 
appeal of 
The London 
Institute and2) it had no visible utili·tarian function as 
most industrial innovations were made outside institutional 
settings <Lyons 1944), The professionalization of science, 
because of the lack. of state intervention, took longer in 
Britain, and thus during the nineteenth century scientific 
education was still rather primitive. In fact, British 
education in general could in no way be compared with the 
system being established in France. With the exception of 
the private system of the upper classes, education was still 
dominated by philanthropic initiative. Universities, because 
of their association with the upper strata of society, were 
less interested in academic success than in providing a 
gentlemen's finishing school. 1 ~, As such the teaching of 
science at Oxford and Cambridge was amateurish. Chairs were 
held by notable figures such as Whewell and Babbage, who 
expressed a deep "love" of science which "they communicated 
or not as the case may be" <Ruse 1979) to their students. 
Science lectures at the time were not compulsory. This state 
of affairs led to the "Crisis in Science", motivating the 
foundation of The British Association for the Advancement of 
Science in 1831. At this poin·t it is pertinent to remark 
that it was this kind of association which was the 
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foundation of the scientific profession in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. not the government. This was another factor which 
contributed towards creating an unstructured community. 
Ironically, whilst the French provinces were complaining 
about the centralization of science in Paris, the English 
were arguing that they did not possess the network of 
provincial scientific institutions that the French did! The 
Association was aimed particularly at the promotion of 
science in the provinces. meeting every year in a different. 
city. The history of its creation highlights three important 
features of the English scientific enterprise a) its 
amateurishness b) that most valuable scientific research was 
conducted outside institutional settings (c.f. the link with 
artistic activity> and c) the resistance in England to state 
intervention for which there was no precedent <Orange 1972). 
The second feature is important in the light of what was 
said about institutional pressures affecting scientific 
methodology. The "declinists" 
English science had declined 
those maintaining that 
men such as Brewster and 
Babbage, Professor of mathematics at Cambridge, saw it as 
their task to remedy the poor condition of English science. 
This had been made worse by institutions like The Royal 
Society, victim of". years of misrule.,, 
or coterie ... [ whoJ have invariably 
improvements ... all change in the mode 
managed by part.y 
opposed all 
of management 
<Babbage in Orange page 153 1972)", Universities were not 
spared their scathing attacks. This alienated academics such 
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as the geologist Whewell who refused to have anything to do 
with the first meeting at York. Brewster, quoting Babbage. 
asserted that none of the major scientific activities could 
be credited to leading institutional establishments (in 
Orange 1972), confirming the earlier impression that the 
most important scien·tific discoveries in England were the 
achievement of men with little formal scientific training, 
working out.side institutional sett.ings. The "depression" of 
science was due to governmental neglect. Scientific 
organizations were badly run, and not only did scientists 
not enjoy the same privileges as their French counterparts, 
in addition they were "persecuted" by the patent laws 
<Brewster in Orange 1972). It would be the task of the 
Association to remedy this by 1) systematizing scientific 
practice 2) ridding science of the practice of patenting and 
3) marshalling government support by bringing science int.o 
the public eye. However, academics such as Whewell were 
against state intervention and wanted no part in an 
organization which sought. to influence government policies. 
The "dignity and uti 1 i ty" of science was better served by 
"abstaining from any systematic connection with the 
government of the Country and depending on their own 
exertions" <Whewell in Orange page 166 1972). Academic 
freedom appeared to be more important then government 
intervention. Disagreements between the various parties. 
compromised the aspirations of the Association so that there 
was a modification of the original aims. These were 
transformed into 1) bringing science to the attention of the 
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public 2) promoting dialogue with other scientific 
communities and 3) creating a more systematic direction for 
English science COstram 1972). 
Scientific activities encouraged the f'ormation of societies 
in Britain, as in France, although these were perhaps less 
plentiful and certainly more informal. In the absence of an 
interventionist state i.e. a regulating authority, they 
nevertheless proved to be more influential in determining 
the course of science. An example of such a society was the 
X Club, whose history is documented by Jensen <1970). 1 '"' The 
sway of such informal bodies - if Jensen is to be believed, 
the X club was quite an effective body during the nineteenth 
century - contributed to the unstructured nature of English 
scientific activity. 
Finally, it is pertinent to end with an example which 
illustrates particularly well one of the main points of this 
chapter: how the characteristics isolated as typical of 
national scientific schools were sustained by institutions 
which were products of a particular political system. The 
lack of financial support from the British government meant 
that scientific institutions were at the mercy of wealthy 
patrons, usually merchants and industrialists. Science had 
thus to be both appealing and useful. The London Institut.e 
(1819-1840). funded by merchants and financiers; is a case in 
point. It was created t.o foster bonds bet ween science and 
commerce - the belief behind the enterprise was that science 
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and commerce could derive mutual advantages from a 
collaboration. Without each other "Science loses all her 
utility; commerce all her dignity" CButler in Hayes page 47 
1974). Pragmatic themes were one of the factors which 
governed the content of the lectures. A lecture course by 
Br:·ande in 1835, for example. included topics such as soap 
making, dying. and manufacturing gunpowder and vinegar. To 
attract large public audiences, to make the institution pay 
its way, natural science and zoology were also used as 
lecture topics. Their popularity can be understood in terms 
of intense theological discussions. preceding the Darwinian 
Revolution. Whilst the biological sciences interested the 
spiritually inclined. electricity and astronomy appealed to 
everyone because they were perceptually exciting. Mechanics 
and machinery had the dual advantage of: 
.. . again appealing to the eye - while at the same time they 
were symbols of the Industrial Revolution that very union of 
coJDIDerce and science which the Institution vowed to pursue" 
(Hayes page 161-162 1974). 
Furt.hermore, despite the utilitarian orientation of the 
London institution, it demonstrated "persistent faith in. the 
amateur man of science" CHayes page 160 1974). 
CONCLUSION 
The contrasting scientific approaches provide a particularly 
clear example of the relationship between different thought 
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styles and their socio-political environments. The 
systematic theoretical approach of the "classical" French 
scientist was related to scientific training one of the 
features of a community enjoying extensive state patronage. 
Even before the Revolution. the interventionist stat.e 
policies in France provided a network of institutions where 
science was conducted in an academic environment. protected 
from utilitarian concerns. In England, the "intuitive" 
scientist worked outside institutions, and, in general, 
lacked the scientific training of his French counterpart -
this discrepancy becoming particularly noticeable during the 
nineteenth century. The English scientist's fortes were 
perceptual abilities and the art of experimentation. The 
perceptual aspect of science in England was also important 
because it had to appeal to the patrons who supported the 
scientific enterprise in the absence of public funding. 
Academic French science, on the other hand, had no need to 
compromise itself in the same way since it had financial 
backing from the state. Both the structure of the respective 
scientific communities and the ideals of knowledge they 
advocated were products of underlying political differences. 
Both in this chapter and in the previous one, the thought 
styles have been identified through clusters of 
characteristics: French scientific thinking emerged as 
academic, political and professional whereas its English 
counterpart was perceptual, coupling academic freedom with 
amateurishness and anti-interventionism. It becomes 
particularly clear in this chapter that the multifaceted 
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nature of the thought styles is attributable to their origin 
in thought-environment complexes. 
Finally. one could ask what bearing such hi st.orical 
comparison might- have on science in the twent.ieth cent-ury. 
regarded as a universal ent.erprise, The key lies in 
education. In England, science to this day, is taught in a 
way which emphasizes empirical investigation and discovery, 
retaining to a certain extent, Davy's idea of scientific 
adventure. In France, however. the approach is more 
theoretical and abstract. Experimentation plays a much less 
important role: theory is learnt then applied. Moreover, in 
France, a hierarchy exists in which mathematics, the 
language of science, reigns supreme. Physics comes next and 
experimental chemistry comes lower down on the list of 
priorities. These points will be returned to in a later 
chapter on education. 
' I' 
It is. of 111/ hue1an utivities the sost truJ.v internationt3l, for it is onl.v in a 
tt•irial sense th8t ~te soeai of "English science". Per contra ,;hen we speak of 
"fnglish lt3t<. "French literature•,. 'ltt3lian art" etc.,. 11e may well be noting,. 
indeed emphasising/ significt3nf. differences froltl the prutices of other 
countries t3nd other peoples. But the JanguagtJ in ~thich a scientific mtJmoil' is 
writtetJ is of no ittportt3nce .. it lostJs nothing in translati.,n. Therefore, to a 
gret3ter exttJnt than in the ct3ses of other intelltJctuill activities scientific 
achievt?ments of any one countr.v are a lunction of its neighbours. (Cardllell pt3ge 
J) 
His views are supported by such writers as de Beer in the same volurne. In his article 
"Science was never at War" de Beer quotes Jenner: 
The unity ~,f European ideals and c/Jiture (filS such that France and Britain 
subscribed t1.1 idtJntica/ pr inc J~ol11s of r11spect for truth and independence of 
learninr;. Scientists en.h1yed co11plete freedom in their 11ork and vere above the 
battle [the Napoleonic Warsl. (de Beer page ll in Kaplan 1!16S.J 
De Beer deals with the exchanges which occurred, during this pel'iod, between two famous 
chemists Gay-Lussac and Davy. 
2. Geison 11985) details the methodological problems envolved in conducting historical 
research on aspects of foreign cultures. His volume, "Professions and the French State" 
11985) redresses an important mistake: the neglect of the importance of the nation state 
and centralized bureaucracy in the history of professions in France. This he sees as the 
result of grafting the model of the !Neak/"passive" Anglo-Saxon state onto Cont.inental 
countries. As he notes, Anglo-American researchers have found it difficult to repress 
their "suspicion" IGeison page 3 19851 of centralized political authority and the 
bureaucracy it created. This makes it hard for Anglo-Saxon reseal'chers to understand the 
association bet!Neen "the malign process of bureaucratisation and the benign process of 
professionalization" CGeison page 3 1985), In the past, the Anglo-Americans have adopted a 
Parsonian model of the professions. This entails viewing theu1 as an occupat.ional Ql'oup 
possessing a set of attributes including "an intellectual foundation in the research 
university". Their power lies in their supposed expertise and is not in any !Nay political. 
This model may be appropriate for Anglo-Saxon countries, but it does not apply to those of 
the European Continent, as this chapter demonstrates. Although seriously questioned the 
Parsonian model continues to exert an influence on the Anglo-American conception of the 
free professions. 
The Continentals, on the other hand, have neglected the so-called professions, analyzing 
them within bl'oader social divisions- this is not confined to Mal'Xism, but. is also 
fll 
typical of the Durkheimi~n perspective. The Marxist framework deals with professions under 
the divisions of landowner, capitalist and labourer. They thus become "a subsidiary 
category within the much broader rubric of social stratification" (Geison page 4 1985): 
In French discourse .. t~hether lfarxist or not the concept "professiL,n" lacks sotJe 
ol the distinctions and salience that it holds for English and especiall.v 
lhnerican scholars. In the social vocabulary of the Old Regime •profession~~ 11as 
but one term in a rich and shifting 'corporate idiom• that included such 
culturally specific terms as n1rps, ronfrerie, communauU, titat,, and m~tier. If 
that •corporate idiot~" now sounds archaic, it is nonetheless the case that. 
French discourse wntinues tL, lark precise equivalents for the wrrent Anglo· 
Saxon usage of prL,fession. (ueison page :l /985J 
This is evidence for the different political cultures the thesis is arguing for, As Geison 
points out, tl"'e essays in the volume share a single conclusion, that: 
.. , in the French context by contrast to standard Anglo-American ass/JfJiptions 
professional "autonomyN or success often went hand in hand with dependence on 
the "State" and its bureaurraq, In France, professional groups in search of 
fiscal support, social legitimacy and sONt: Measure of intellectual/dependMct: 
discovered that the most effective way to attain their goals vas through 
cooperation or even "collaboration# 11ith central state and its bureaucracy, 
(6eison page 4 1985) 
In practice members of the professions became salaried civil servants who were recruited 
and financially dependent on the state. 
Geison's remarks not only have implications for historical methodology but also validate 
the discussion in the chapter on thought styles in the Human Sciences. 
3, Many early works in the history of science were lilritten for scientists by scientists, 
documenting the development of individual disciplines. As well as being rather dry and 
unimaginative, the accounts were lacking in other respects, not least their tendency t.o 
give a very nationalist perspective. This is one of the reproaches that Crosland levels at 
them: 
Sosetimes British and filler iran authors seer1 to have presented a distinctly 
"flnglo-~"axon' view of the hish~r.v of clleAiistry, as tile IIL1rks of great men led b.v 
Boyle, Ne11ton, Oalton. Partington refers to "the Jungle of the theor.v of 
Phlogiston" [a Gerrtan invention] (11/lich he contrasts 11ith "the path of true 
discovery opened b.v Bo,vle, HoL~ke and lfayow•, (Crosland page 393 in Porter and 
lfLWSSeau 1980) 
Crosland is one of several historians who have attempted to rerr1edy this situation by 
placing science and scientific ideas within a broader social context. The tendency is to 
focus on biographies and the historiography of scientific professions and inmtitutions, as 
opposed to writing the history of individual disciplines. Crosland's (1978/79) research on 
science in nat.ional context and Gillespie's outline of the differential development of 
ballooning in France and England, proved invaluable, as did a collection of essays edited 
by the American 6eison (1985) "Professions and Lhe French State" 1700-1900". Other useful 
source material included Hahn's (1971) extensive work on the Paris Academy, various 
writings by Schofield (1963,19801, Mckie's (1952) aclairoed biography of Lavoisier, Lesch's 
resear.ch on the development of French physiology < 1984J and works by French historians 
such as Sadouin-Goupil (1977l. 
The introduction to Sadouin-6oupil's volume on the French chemist Berthollet, testifies to 
the large amount of cross-channel cooperation which exists in the field of the history of 
science: 
Notre gratitude va aussi vers les grandes institutions etrangeres qui nous ont 
rendues les !l~mes services: Royal Soc iet.v et Veil come !nstitute de Londres, . , . , 
en nous transmef.tanf. aimablemenf. les phot~'copies des lettres de Berf.hollet, nous 
onf. perAJJ·s d'~tablir Jes catalogues de sa correspondance. (Sadouin-Soupil page 3 
1977} 
Similarly, in the prologue to the same volume, R. raton acknowledges the contributions t.o 
the history of science made by his Anglo-Saxon colleagues. Most of those he mentions have 
been useful in compiling this chapter: 
1/ coU de quelques f.ravaux de chercheurs fran;ais, au premier rang desquelles 
ceux d'Hiline Netzgeret et plus ricemt»ent, ceux de Norris /Jumas, les recherches 
des £coles Americaines ef. Britanniques anis~es notamment par Henri 6uerlac, 
Charles C. 6iJJespie et Roger Hahn et Douglas Nckie, Norris Crosland et. flilliam 
Smeaton ont progressivement pr is une preponderance dans un domaine auquel 
plusieurs historians Sovietiques ont Jgalement apporte d'interessantes 
c~mtril:tutiMs. I'Sadouin-6oupiJ page l 1917) 
Cooperation has the twofold advantage of reducing the danger of nationalism and increasing 
the quality of the research by giving access to a wider range of data. 
4. Crosland (1978) describes 6ay-Lussac's work as displaying the characteristic of clarity 
and completeness. As he also points out, Gay-Lussac's papers were "classic in anothel' 
sense of the term; in the sense in which Ostwald included two of his research papers among 
his Classics of Science i.e. they constituted a standard or model" (Crosland page 115 
1978). Gay-Lussac's work was meticulous, thorough, and a continuation of the work of 
Berthollet and Lavoisier. Crosland, however, st.resses that he did not possess Davy's 
originality. Of interest in Davy's paper on the decomposition of alkali is his cautious 
assessment of Lavoisier's "refined and ingenious" anti-phlogiston theory which he 
employed, even though he was not convinced of its "truth or permanence". 
5. 
Boyle's inability to present his worK in~ succinct cogent form fii~S something rJf 
~ seventeenth century fault, especially among English s,·ientists. One Llnl.v has 
to think of Hooke 11hose /Yicrographia is a mine of ideas and experiments 
tenuously connected vi th microscopical observations thro11n out without any 
connecting link .. and ~hose scattered broadside lectures and essays 11ere L'n such 
a wide variety oi topics that there vas no hope of assembling them into a 
coherent whole. Or one thinks of Vren, W!o seldom bLlthered to do more with his 
brilliant ideas and ex.~:~eriments than describe the11 to others, SL' that file ue 
indebted priturilty to the registers of the Royal Society and to the references 
froN his ft•iends for the possibility of realizing what an important scientist he 
was, (Boas page 20$ 1958) 
6, Crosland also refers to two cur1•ents within French chemistry. Vauquelin's focused on 
salt analysis and the preparation of new compounds whereas Berthollet "did not believe 
that the chemist's WOI'k should rest on the multiplication of species," (Crosland page 80 
1968), 
7. 
Lavoisier's laboratory at the Arsenal, his tL' visitsi111hich Arf.h11r Young records 
~Vith pleasure, 11as indeed, remarkable. lip to that. time, there had been nothing 
to compare 11itl1 it and many years 111ere to pass before such a collection of 
preci si,,n instruments and chemical apparatus ~t~ould be put together as working 
tools of a laboratory, probably not until the rise of the modern research 
institutions. This statement lias not e::<agerated,' for the inventories made by the 
revolution's agents after the confiscation of Lavoisier's property sho11 that his 
laboratory contained 30C100 it~M~s of glass and other chemical apparatus and 
specimens, valued at 1000 livres, together tn'th 250 physical instruments, 111hich 
included three precision balances, one by f,1rtin and two by ffeguJe, valued at 
JOIJ 500 livres.. the historic instruments used in the 11ork of the CofJmission of 
fleights and !Yeasures for the determination ,,f the gramme... (llckie page 195 
1952) 
8, In Lavoisier, we find the incarnation of all French education's aspil'ations. Posessing 
a set of non specific intellectual skills, he applied them71..!:.9, variety of tasks. Hartley 
(1971) describes Lavoiser's ability to apply economic reasoning to chemistry and 
physiology <Hat•tley page 21 1971), Conversely, he applied principles of experimental 
chemistry to improve the agricultural yields at his experimental farm at Fr~chines. These 
general intellectual skills were also cha1·acteristic of Gay-Lussac, ~hose interests, both 
theoretical and practical, extended over the scientific disciplines of physics, chemistry 
and physiology, (Crosland 1978) 
9. Davy's scientific education was continued as an apprentice to a surgeon in Penzanct? 
where he learnt pharmacy. 
10' 
The lkademy ~ill examine, if the King so rules, all marhines for vhirh a 
privilege has been requested from his Ha,iest,v. It 'lill certif,v vhet.ht:r or not 
the.v ue nef!l and useful, and the invent~1r whose work has b11en ipproved will be 
held responsible for l11aving the Academy a model of his invention, (in Hahn 
191!) 
11. The beginnings of the Royal Society were described by Wallis in the following terms: 
About the ,VtW' loJS 11hiie i lived in London i'ilt a time 111hen by our rivil r;ars 
academitlil studies ~¥ere fiJUCh interrupted in both our llnivnsities.l besides the 
conversiltiM of divers11 eminent devin11s as t.o rutters theological, I had the 
opportunity of being licquainted vith diverse worthy persons inquisitive inh1 
natural philosophy, lind other pilrts of human leilrning,' and particululy of vhat 
hit/1 been called the Ne~t Philosophy or Experimental ~'cience. Ve did IJ,v 
agreement, diverse of us, meet. in London on a certain day and hour, under a 
cert/iin penalt.y and weekly contribution for the charge of experiments .. 'lith 
certain rules agreed amongst us to treat and discourse of stHh affairs.,, tin 
Boas page S 19S8J 
12. Frankel (1978) has conducted a detailed study on the secret of J, B. Siot's "early and 
outstanding success", unaccountable, according to Frankel, purely in terms of academic 
brilliance, In considering J. B. Biot's special case, Frankel was part.icL!larly struck by 
his rapid rise to eminence. A mere seven years separated his graduation from the Ecole 
Polytechnique 1796 to his membership in 1803 of the first class of the Institute at the 
age of twenty-nine, The latter was the highest position an academic scientist could aspire 
to. This Frankel sees as a product of hard work, patronage and of the career opportunities 
available after the revolution as opposed to, academic brilliance, (Frankel page 36 1978) 
Ostram (1980) details the mutual benefit of the patronage system, As she points out, not 
only did it benefit the young scientists, but. their patt•ons as well. The system accounts 
for why some scientists such as Berthollet and Laplace became so successful where as 
others, like, Lamarck failed: 
13' 
8oth Laplace and 8erthollet, for exallple, achieved success, reputation al7d 
pupils by estiblis!ling a patronage network based upon their cJWn pers~'nal and 
peruliar acrur1ulation of differtMt kind:r of pot~er thr~,ugh institutional 
aff il iath,ns, through affil fa tions ;;ith Napoleon, through finandal independenc11 
based upon slate employment and power to influence the organs 11hich disseminated 
srientific knofllledge. i'Ostram page 3.2 !.980) 
Mter he had produced his atomic theory Dalton did not go unrecognized in 
England, Oavy offered him a nomination to the R~,J'ill Societ,v in 181(1 but Dalton 
refust:d. This proposed melllbership of 11ha t was not yet the high elite ol toda.v 
cannot be compared to the signal honour conferred by the ~cadeD!I'e des Sc fences 
in tJak ing hin a corresponding men1ber in 18/b". (Greenaway page 5 1958.! 
14. An article appearing in the 236th issue of TaLler October 12th 1910 claimed: 
15. 
There is no study more becQAiing a rational creature than that of natural 
philosophy, /Jut as several ~,f our virtuosi manage it, their speculations do not 
s~, much tend to open and enlarge the mind as to contrast and feed it upon 
trifles. This, in England, is in great. measure Oiling to the 'Horth.v elections 
that are so frequentl,v made in our Royal s~'ciety. They seem to be in a 
confedera(v against men of polite genius, noble thought and diffuse learning,: 
and choose into their tJssemblies such t1s ht1ve no pretence to 'Hisdom.,, &~hen 1 
meet a :;oung fello11 th11t is a humble t1dmirer of these sciences, but more dull 
than the rest of the company, 1 conclude him to be a fello~ of the Royt1l 
Societ,v. 
The,r (scholars of OxbridgeJ (!Jere expected to read a little mathematics, mainly 
Euclid, a little cltJssics and a little religion. PJent,v ,,f time {J!SS left for 
other pursuits, frequently involving dogs, horses and foxes. /lniversif..v lidS 
looked upon as a gent.lemanl.v 11ay of passing from schoolboy to adulthood, (Ruse 
page 20 1919.! 
16. The following anecdote of Huxley's, dated 1894, gives an insight into the type of body 
the X club was: 
1 believe that the •r had the credit of being a sort of scientific corpus or 
ring !lith sese people. In fact, tro distinguished scientific coJJeagues of mine 
onC'e carried ~m t1 conversation (which 1 gravely ignored) 11cross ne, in the 
smoking room of the ~theneum, to this effect.' 1 say, ~~ do you knoll' 11nything 
t1bout the ur Club? Oh yes, 8, 1 have heard ol it. flhat do they do? Vell, they 
govern scientific affairs,' and reaJly on the whole, they don't do it bt1dly. 
(lensen page 12 /.91(1.1 
The aim elf of the Club - composed of influential men of science - was to ove1'COif1e 
conservative scientists and theologians who were hindering the progress of the scientific 
enterprise. Although Jensen compares the X Club to the Societe D'Arceuil - a body geared 
towards organized scientific research- it differed from the society in its infol'mality, 
In this it was reminiscent of the association which gave rise to the Royal Society. 
Despite this informality, the Club seemed to have exerted a considerable influence on the 
course of nineteenth century English science (see Spencer in Jensen 1970) 
In the 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THOUGHT STYLES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
As a partiruJar form of governunt gives a (lrtain 
turn and a rertsin disposition to the [citizen's] 
minds .. , yOIJ rhange the former rithout the latter 
[i ,e, the 11indl foJJowing you, you join the net~ 
government to the manner of thinking 
[characteristic of l the old/ and this produces very 
bad efferts, (lfontesquieu in Stark page 12 li6/J 
previous chapters, both the nature 
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and the 
characteristics of the thought styles have been outlined. 
The different thought styles were even evident in what is 
usually considered to be the universal enterprise of 
science. It is not surprising then to find them manifested 
in the Human Sciences which are more intimately bound to 
culture. Glucksman <1974) refers to two traditions of 
thought when talking about the different definitions of the 
term "structure" in anthropology and sociology. She 
illustrates her points with examples drawn from works 
belonging to the two traditions. The British anthropological 
tradition thought of social "structure" as a convenient 
summary of gathered data: "We cannot study persons except in 
terms of social structure, nor can we study social structure 
except in terms of persons" <Radcliffe-Brown). French 
sociology and anthropology, on the other hand, did not 
define structure in such a specific way. Instead, they 
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conceived of it in more "abstract" <Glucksman 1974) terms as 
"the principles of operations underlying observed data and 
governing relationships" <Page 31 1974): "The entire purpose 
of the French school is an attempt to break up the 
categories of the layman, and group the data into a deeper 
sounder classification" (Levi-Strauss). 1 
The disparity that Glucks1~n outlines can be reformulated in 
terms which relate to this thesis. The two intellectual 
traditions she isolates have provided different accounts of 
social phenomena. The Anglo-Sax:on tradition has preferred 
impressionistic accounts of social phenomena where the 
French have gone beyond these impressions to isolate 
essential social categories. This chapter's argument is that 
this consistent contrast between the two traditions can be 
related to a particular manifestation of the thought styles 
in social discourse: the link between rationalism and 
ontological/methodological collectivism and between 
empiricism and ontological/methodological individualism. 
Quinton reformulates this contrast in terms of sociologism 
versus psychologism, hence the obvious parallel with between 
the differences outlined in the second chapter between the 
two traditions of literature. Like the literary traditions, 
native social discourses render ex:plicit certain implicit 
linguistic constraints: the cultural priorities internalized 
in the thought styles. For ex:ample, French language does not 
possess the ex:tensive reflex:ive terminology of English, nor 
does it possess such a rich vocabulary to describe 
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individual behaviour. There is no noun for the "self" or 
equivalents for adjectives such as self-conscious, self-
control, self-contained or self-educated."'' "Motif" and 
"croyance" 
"belief" 
the literal translations of "motive" and 
are never used in accounting for individual 
behaviour, particularly since "croyance" has much stronger 
religious connotations than "belief". 
The first section of this chapter provides evidence that 
individualism is a property of the empirical thought style 
and that collectivism is a property of the rational style. 
The discussion centres around how collectivism and 
individualism have affected the way social theorists from 
the two traditions have dealt with certain key issues 1) 
early philosophical ideas on the state, justice and morality 
2) the application of the scientific model to early 
nineteenth century social thought 3) approaches to 
morphology and 4) the interpretations of Durkheim. Empirical 
individualism emerges as pragmatic and reluctant to 
speculate about what cannot be documented or verified with 
"concrete" evidence - concrete is used as in Harland C1987), 
when he refers to the level of the individual social agent 
as a concrete reference point. Rational collectivism, on the 
other hand, having accepted the "social" as 
has stressed the need for a systematic 
analyze this realm, independently of the 
existing apart, 
methodology to 
individual. The 
emphasis is on developing general, theoretical frameworks as 
opposed to empirically investigating specific instances, and 
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the analysis is in terms of a priori laws, categories and 
structures. Moreover, empirical individualism generates a 
micro-social perspective with a tendency towards 
reductionism - as when society is seen as a collection of 
individuals by the philosopher Ayer - which contrasts with 
the macro-social, synthetic holism of rational collectivism. 
As Halls <1967) notes when talking about these different 
approaches: 
On one principle, however. both the French traditionalists 
and reformists agree: the English system of specialization 
at the top acade111ic secondary level is not adequate to 
educate an intellectual elite. It does not give 'the ability 
to situate oneself' in relationship to a whole which one 
cannot master in all its parts, to quote Valery's dictum 
(Halls in Capelle page 6 1967) 
A cautionary note is in order here. The historical examples 
discussed make the contrast between the two traditions 
explicit. What amounted to clear conceptual differences have 
been reduced to contrasting emphases and modes of 
expression. The origins of society are no longer attributed 
to hu:man nature and the "motives" and "drives" of 
individuals. However, Anglo-Saxon writers continue to 
emphasize the importance of "social selves", their 
"attitudes", "beliefs", "practices", "motives" and 
"intentions" <Goffman 1983, Macintyre 1977 I 1985). Moscovici 
<1985) refers to this as a difference between tracing how 
psychic mechanisms become social and how social mechanisms 
become psychic. The consequence is that Anglo-Saxon 
discourse tends to view social behaviour as "situated", 
French social discourse as "determined". On the one hand, 
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individuals are presented as taking an active part in social 
life, on the other, they are overwritten by social ideology. 
This should not be misconstrued as a chapter which covers 
all the various schools of social thought within the two 
countries. It is merely interested in what can be considered 
to be two native traditions of social discourse. Therefore, 
most of the social theorists selected to bring out these 
points have been chosen because of their impact on, or 
membership of, what can be considered as two nationally 
specific schools of social thought: British utilitarianism, 
and French positivism. In the section on thinking in the 
twentieth century, reference is made to American social 
theorists in view of 1) their impact on English social 
thought generally and 2) their influence on sociological 
conceptions of madness, the subject of the next chapter. 
This compatibility is explained by a common empirical 
individualistic perspective. 
The second section looks at the continuing existence of two 
thought styles within the Human Sciences. The example chosen 
to illustrate this point is psychoanalysis. The national 
schools of the two countries retain the characteristics of 
the thought styles manifested in social discourse. For 
example, 
pragmatic 
there is a continuing 
individualism and 
collectivism. 
disparity between English, 
French, theoretical 
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TWO TRADITIONS OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE 
1) HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES IN CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL OBJECTS 
The rise of Social Science as we know it today, occurred in 
the nineteenth century, while areas dealing with 
psychological and sociological issues were formalized into 
coherent disciplines (Tennies 1974). 8 Before the nineteenth 
century, social and political thought was incorporated into 
philosophy. Hobbes can be said to have laid the foundations 
for a utilitarian social philosophy through his ideas on the 
state and society, Hobbes believed that an understanding of 
man and his "appetites" was necessary to elucidate the 
origins of society <see Macpherson 1968). Self-interest, he 
concluded, drove men to form a "covenant" which would secure 
a state of peace. This state of peace enabled men to 
safeguard their "natural" rights to "life, limb and 
property" <Hobbes Lev. II chapter 30 1985). What seems 
contradictory, is that while in the convenant individuals 
have to completely submit to the power of a sovereign, yet 
the cement of the convenant is individual self-interest 
there is no specification of any other form of social 
bonding. This becomes less contradictory when it 
understood that: 
The obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood 
to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by 
which he is able to protect them. For the right that men 
have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can 
protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. (Hobbes 
Lev. II chapter 18 page 273 1985) 
is 
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In the end, the individual's "natural" rights were more 
important than the sovereign - in effect only the "means" 
whereby 
rights. 
each member of 
Although the 
the community had protected 
Hobbesian totalitarian state 
his 
is 
sometimes likened to Hegel's <Copleston 1964), there is a 
fundamental difference between the two. For Hobbes, the 
underlying assumption is that subordination was not by 
virtue of the state being the 11 State11 , but because it 
safeguarded individual interests. 
created, but one that could 
A social organism had been 
be disembodied when its 
usefulness was spent. Furthermore, Hobbes' state was liberal 
and non-interventionist: it secured conditions of peace so 
that the individual could make the fullest use of his own 
property <Lev. II chapter 18 1985). The Hegelian idea, on 
the other hand, led to the interventionist Continental 
conception of the state. 
Locke's theory of social contract continued the utilitarian 
slant found in Hobbes' work, but brought the individual and 
his liberties to the fore. Like Hobbes, he believed that 
society's function was to safeguard natural rights of "life, 
liberty and estates": "commonwealths" are "chiefly" created 
to preserve property <Locke page 180 
greater emphasis on the individual is 
definition of "commonwealths" the 
1988). However, his 
highlighted in his 
result of social 
contract - as the "society of men". The legislative power it 
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possessed was "supreme" but not arbitrary, and could under 
no circumstance touch the "natural" right to property: 
Far it being but the joint power of every member of the 
society given up to that person or assembly which is 
legislator, it can be no 111Dre than those persons .had in a 
state of Nature before they entered into society, and gave 
it up to the ca11111Junity ... (Locke page 184 1988) 
Lockean society emerges as a collection of individual 
property owners, agreeing to 1 i ve together for uti 1 i tar ian 
reasons. Again, there was no indication of any other form of 
social bonding. Given this framework, it is understandable 
that morality was interpreted in an individualistic fashion. 
Combining elements of the divine with a nascent ethical 
hedonism, he reasoned that good is what confers pleasure and 
morality is to mould one's actions to the law so that one 
becomes a good law-abiding citizen. As for justice, it was a 
product of experience, a standard, in no way an eternal law. 
This betrays Locke's empirical bias against positing 
hypothetical universals. 
Hume expanded Locke's ethical hedonism. He chose to focus on 
how the mind leapt "illogically" from fact to moral 
judgement. Like Locke before him, Hume avoided an a priori 
moral sense in the Kantian vein. Instead, the key to moral 
sentiment became usefulness, and sympathy the basis of moral 
approbation: 
The .hypothesis we embrace is plain. It .maintains, that 
morality is determined by senti111ent. It defines virtue to be 
wbateyer .mental action or quality gives to a spectator the 
pleasing sentiment at approbation; and vice the contrary. We 
then proceed to exa111ine a plain .matter of fact, to wit, what 
actions .have this influence: We consider all the 
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circuJBStances, in which these actions agree: And thence 
endeavour to extract some general observations with regard 
to these sentiments. If you call this metaphysics, and find 
any thing abstruse here, you need only conclude, that your 
turn of ndnd is not suited to the moral sciences. (Hume page 
261 1898) 
A similar pragmatism governed his idea that society is an 
artifice or convention initiated by individuals when they 
"become sensible of the infinite advantages that resul·t from 
it". Moreover, it is ... "entered into by all Society to 
bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, 
and leave everyone in the peaceable enjoyment of what he 
acquire in fortune and industry ... " <Hume page 265 1898). 
The idea of "convention" embodies a sense of common 
interest, and self-interest became the basis of social 
conduct and of a sense of justice. Justice depended upon 
laws which, in political society, are designed "to be useful 
in that particular situation" <Hume page 167 1898). Hume' s 
thoughts on "convention" betray his Lockean heritage, and 
his emphasis on utility made his philosophy the forerunner 
of nineteenth century Benthamism. 
Meanwhile on the Continent, a pattern of thought was 
developing which stressed the need for new methods of 
analysis which concentrated on the morphology of the social 
realm. The latter was to be conceived as an entity in itself 
i.e. greater than the sum of its constituent members, which 
led to a different idea of society from that of the 
Hobbesian organism. The main tenet of Rousseau's thesis was 
similar to that of Hobbes and Locke: man's salvation lay in 
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forming a collective body. The nature of this collective 
was, however, different. It was an independent entity with 
its own wi 11 or "La vol onte generale" which Rousseau 
distinguished from "La volonte de tous" on which the Lockean 
contract rested - and morality. By stressing the importance 
o:f the :former over the latter, Rousseau's analysis steered a 
different course from Locke's: towards the collective rather 
than the individual: 
"Each one of us puts into the community his person and all 
his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; 
.... " Immediately, in place of the individual person of each 
contracting party, this active association creates an 
artificial and collective body composed of as many members 
as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act 
that body acquires its unity, its common e.ga its life and 
its will. (Rousseau page 62 1968) 
This "being" was the "salutary organ of the collective will" 
and dictated to each citizen the "precepts of public 
rationality" <Rousseau 1968>. The differing emphases on 
"individual rights" and "public rationality" brings out the 
contrast between ideas of social contract as described by 
Locke and Rousseau. The "general will" solved Rousseau's 
greatest problem: how to reconcile his idea that society 
conferred freedom on its citizens while requiring them to 
submit to dictatorial forces. His resolution of the paradox 
differed from Hobbes' in that it involved the re_j ection of 
the concept of "natural rights". By submitting himself to a 
force greater than himself, man became free of the influence 
o:f the other members of society. This freedom was further 
increased in that man was no longer a slave to the selfish 
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natural drives which formed the basis of social living to 
the English philosophers. In society, the laws man obeyed, 
the source of his liberty, were social laws originating from 
the body politic and made for the body of the state. His 
actions were guided by "justice". a product of these laws, 
as opposed to "instinct'', thereby acquiring a moral quality. 
Morality was thus defined in social terms as opposed to 
Locke's individualistic definition CBook I page 18 1968). 
A parallel concept to that of the general will is 
Montesquieu's "soul of the State". His concept of the 
"organic State", was reused by both Comte and Durkheim where 
it emerges as an integral, permanent entity. Both these 
theorists made frequent reference to his work and Durkheim 
,judged Montesquieu's ideas important enough to make them the 
subject of a treatise. In "L'Esprit des Lois", Montesquieu 
was interested in isolating "general" laws of societal 
development: 
J'ai d'abord exandne les hommes, et j'ai cru que, dans cette 
infinie diversite de lois et de :moeurs, ils n'etait pas 
uniquement conduits par leurs fantaisies. 
J'ai pose les principes, et .J'ai vue les cas particuliers 
s'y plier comme d'eux-~:mes, les histoires de toutes les 
nations n'en etre que les suites, et chaque loi particuliere 
liee avec une autre loi, ou dependre d'une autre plus 
generale. (Montesquieu page 5 1973) 
Montesquieu embarked on a comparative, historical study of 
laws and government, proposing second order generalities or 
"principles", which would enable a holistic explanation of 
social development. His speculative laws depended on social 
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and physical factors ranging from economics to climate and 
were used to conceive a priori models of different 
societies: a republican government based on principles of 
civic virtue, a monarchical government based on honour, and 
a despotic government based on fear. Hence the origins o£ a 
morphology geared towards the understanding of what lay 
behind social organization, using theoretical notions such 
as "types" of society. In this "social" framework. liberty 
was conceived as a balance of social forces as opposed to 
something inherent in nature. The importance Montesquieu 
attached to a coherent methodology led him to create "social 
statics" to which Comte later added "social dynamics" ... ,., Like 
his successors, Montesquieu's method was geared towards 
Ii tting data to hypothetical general laws which explained 
social organization without referring to individual social 
agents. 
The difference generated by the contrasting philosophical 
perspectives is perhaps best captured by Hume's concern with 
"general observations" and Montesquieu's with "general 
principles". The former betrays a concern for the specific 
and impressionistic, the latter for the underlying and the 
universal. It is a difference reminiscent of the contrasting 
anthropological definitions of structure isolated by 
Glucksman but also of Dalton's emphasis on "rules" which 
were summaries of data and Berthollet' s desire to isolate 
underlying universal "laws". 
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2) APPLYING THE SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM TO NINETEENTH CENTURY 
SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE CASE OF ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM AND 
FRENCH POSITIVISM 
Both utilitarianism and positivism were the result of the 
nineteenth century's obsession with applying the scientific 
paradigm to the social realm. Both were philosophies of 
reform, occupying similar positions on the political 
spectrum, which makes the comparison all the more 
interesting. English utilitarianism retained the 
reductionist conception of society as understandable in 
individualistic terms. Its underlying biologism and 
psychological hedonism is betrayed by the emphasis on 
"drives" such as pain and pleasure as the basis for 
social action. Despite his frequent allusions to structural 
biology, Comte modelled his sociology on physics with its 
laws and general principles. Indeed, Comte used social laws 
to analyze society in a framework which continued to stress 
its independent identity. Conceived with idealistic aims, 6 
contrary to the pragmatic spirit of utilitarianism, 
positivism was a speculative philosophy which valued theory 
divorced from praxis. 
After Hume, English philosophers had two options open to 
them: they could either give up philosophy and become 
psychologists like Hartley, or respond to Hume's treatise as 
the Scottish did <Quinton 1982>. The first course was the 
one chosen by English utilitarian social philosophers, hence 
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the inherent psychologism and focus on the individual. The 
initiator of the utilitarian tradition was Bentham. One of 
the cornerstones of his thinking was the principle of 
ethical hedonism. derived from Hume and codified in the 
"pleasure principle": man is governed by the motives of 
seeking pleasure and avoiding pain and can do nothing to 
overcome them. The "pleasure principle" and "the principle 
of utility" led to the idea that: 
The only true foundations of societ,y are the wants and the 
fears of individuals. It is the ~ of their weakness and 
imperfection that ~ mankind together; that demonstrates 
the necessity of this union; and that therefore is the solid 
and natural foundation, as well as the cement oz' 
society; ... (Bentham page 425 1977) 
Governments were "necessary" to keep order and to ensure the 
happiness of a community where political life became a 
function of :man's search for pleasure and society was held 
together by self-interest, habit and :fear <Bentham page 426 
1977). In this framework, morality became "the principle 
approving an action which increases the happiness of the 
party in question". Bentham's simplistic reductionism has to 
be understood in terms of his reformist aspirations which 
were more important than formulating a complex social 
theory. 78'~'' 
Despite his admiration for Coleridge, whom he praised for 
his emphasis on culture and history, the main influences on 
Mill's writing remained associationist, hedonistic 
psychology and the utilitarian philosophy with which he was 
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brought up.:"-" This is clear from his view of morality, deeply 
rooted in the "concrete", "commonsensical" approach of Locke 
and Hume: 
It is a fact i11 human nature, that we have moral judgements 
and moral feelings. Ve judge certain dispositions to be 
right, others to be wrong; this we call approving and 
disapproving them. We have also feelings of pleasure in the 
contemplation of the former class of actions and 
dispositions feelings of dislike and aversion to the 
latter; which feelings as everybody must be conscious, do 
not exactly resemble any other of our feelings of pleasure 
and pain. (Nill page 18 1987) 
Although Mi 11 made a qualitative distinction between moral 
feelings and feelings of pleasure, he did not judge it 
necessary to postulate a hypothetical moral imperative. It 
was just a psychological "fact" that we possess moral 
reactions to certain objects. Mill's analysis of justice in 
his essay "Utilitarianism" (repr. 1987) is interesting not 
only from a conceptual point of view, but also in terms of 
the style and approach. Starting from an analysis of what is 
usually understood by the term "justice", Mill concludes: 
The idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct 
and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be 
supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. 
The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be 
suffered by those who infringe the rule. There is involved, 
in addition the conception of some definite person who 
suffers by the infringement; whose rights (to use the 
expression appropriate to the case) are violated by it. And 
the sentiment of justice appears to :me to be the animal 
desire to repel, to retaliate a hurt or damage to one's self 
or to those with which one sympathizes widened so as to 
include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged 
sympathy and the human conception of intelligent self 
interest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its 
morality; from the former, its peculiar impressiveness and 
energy of self-assertion. (Nill page 326 1987) 
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This is an example of an individualistic analysis which 
concentrates on the most immediately intelligible aspect of 
.justice. 
Saint Simon, following Montesquieu and Condorcet, believed 
in the deterministic historical development of society 
through different stages, as a product of certain laws. The 
changes which occurred during the various stages took place 
on both an intellectual and a material level. It is clear 
from his writings that Saint Simon, like his contemporary 
Hegel, 10 was trying to transcend the mind-matter duality, 
and thought that materialism, explaining synchronic changes 
in mind and matter by scientific laws, was the solution to 
his problem. The hypothetical laws making up his positive 
philosophy, the result of historical investigation, were to 
be helpful in constructing the new post-revolutionary French 
society. The latter could only be understood by studying 
these laws. ·• ' 
Saint Simon bequeathed to Comte, the so-called founder of 
sociology, 1) the idea that society could be studied using 
positive laws 2) that these laws would be derived from a 
study of history 3) the idea of a society as an organic 
whole and 4) the link between intellectual and material 
progress. The last point is captured in the law of the three 
states: all societies pass through three phases, the 
theological, the metaphysical and the positive or 
scientific. The corresponding structures of society are ones 
Page 144 
in which the priesthood, the military and the industrial 
administrators successfully rule. Comte was clearly 
continuing the global, morphological analysis of 
Montesquieu, in terms of general, a priori social laws. His 
achievement did not lie in conceptual novelty - many of his 
ideas were derived from Saint Simon - but in the definition 
of a "space" for his social physics and his attempt to 
develop a theoretical methodology with which to analyze 
it. 1 "' His sociological method had to be different from 
psychology and biology, sciences of the individual. 
In a comparison between Mill, Spencer and Comte, Durkheim 
commented that only the latter contributed any 
methodological innovation <Durkheim page 1 1966), 1 '"' This 
judgement is in keeping with the French rationalist emphasis 
on the importance of a theoretical framework within which to 
conduct analysis. Indeed, Comte rejected "naive empiricism", 
which resisted the use of theory in an attempt to be 
impartial, as "thoroughly irreconcilable with the spirit of 
the positive phi 1 osophy" . This rejection was coupled with a 
dismissal of the utilitarian basis of society: 
.. the social state would never have existed if its rise had 
depended on a conviction of its individual utility, because 
tbe benefit could never have been anticipated by individuals 
of any degree of ability, but could only manifest itself 
after the social evolution had proceeded up to a certain 
point. (Comte vol. 4 page 458 1977). 
Comte's sociological method had two components: social 
statics, concerned with the structure of society, and social 
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dynamics. ·1 .1. The latter, following Condorcet, 1 '5 was the 
historical study of society and became the focal point of 
his philosophy. Furthermore, the science of sociology, like 
physics: 
contemplates each phenomenon in its harmony with co-existing 
phenomena, and in its connection with the foregoing and the 
following state of human development: it endeavors to 
discover, from both points of view general relations which 
connect all social phenomena: and each of them is explained, 
in the scientific sense of the word, when it has been 
connected with the whole of the existing situation, and the 
whole of the preceding movement. (Comte vol. 2 page 240 
1977) 
The model of society used in social statics was that of an 
integral social organism whose smallest unit was the 
family. 1 '-'·· Despite his use of a biological analogy, Comte was 
acutely aware of the difference between the social and the 
biological organism, as is exemplified in his discussion of 
social "cementing factors" such as language and religion. 
These contrast with Bentham's "cementing factors" the 
wants and fears of individuals. Morality in Comte' s 
philosophy became subject "to rules, emanating from the 
intellectual unity of the time" <Comte vol. 4 page 831 
1977). As to the individual and his social behaviour, it 
could be understood through social phenomena (Comte val. 1 
page 29 1977>. 17& 1 a 
Although it would be untrue to say that utilitarianism and 
positivism were the only traditions of social thought in 
existence in the respective countries, they were culturally 
specific ways of applying the scientific paradigm. 
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Interestingly, one of Mill's criticism of the Frenchman, 
whom he admired, 
individual. This 
was Comte' s 
difference 
despotism of society over the 
of opinion was once again 
accompanied by the contrast between rationalism's concern 
for the underlying and the universal Comte's general 
relations and empiricism's adherence to more 
impressionistic specifics 
meaning. 1 '·'"' 
Mill's analysis of "common" 
3) MOVING INTO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: APPROACHES TO SOCIAL 
MORPHOLOGY. 
A) CONTINUING THE TRADITIONS 
Spencer, whose philosophy represented the culmination of the 
utili tar ian tradition, presents problems in terms of the 
characteristics isolated as typical of the thought styles. 
He is one of the few Anglo-Saxon philosophers who tried to 
create a systematic philosophy. Furthermore, he used the 
biological metaphor to capture the structure and development 
of society. What Turner (1985) sees as Spencer's emphasis on 
social morphology leads him to make a comparison between 
Spencer and the descendant of the Comtian school, Durkheim. 
However, despite his systematic approach and interest in the 
principles governing societal organization, Spencer's 
thinking differs from that of the Frenchman - as Durkheim 
<1933) recognized in his strict use of the biological 
metaphor, tied to his empirical individualism. Spencer's 
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analysis involved a direct grafting of biological ideas onto 
society, and did not interest itself in new theoretical 
notions to grasp its essential social essence. 
The concepts Spencer used to explain social development 
included the biological ideas of differentiation, regulation 
and coordination. A more extreme example of his biological 
thinking is exemplified in his analogies between 1) the 
merging of cities and the merging of organic tissues 
possessing similar functions 2) industrial monopolization 
-l·'d I and the monopolization of certain tissues by othersA3> the 
concentration of trade in specific areas and an increase in 
spatial closeness between tissues possessing analogous 
functions <Spencer 1878). Spencer's law of social evolution 
was couched in terms of "The integration of matter and 
concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter 
passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a 
definite coherent heteroger/{ty" <Spencer 1898). This clearly 
indicates that natural scientific reasoning was being 
applied to society. In fact, Spencer's biological analogy 
was a concrete way of thinking about "abstract" <Quinton 
1982> social objects. He legitimized the direct grafting of 
what Comte considered a science of man onto society by the 
claims that " ... cardinal traits in societies are determined 
by cardinal traits in men" and that "properties of the units 
determine the properties of the aggregates" <Spencer page 52 
1878). Thus Spencer's biologism was clearly associated with 
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his individualism, the individual being the "concrete" 
CHarland 1985) starting point of his perspective: 
Turn we now from the indirect influence which Biology exerts 
on Sociology, by supplying it with rational conceptions of 
social development and organization, to the direct influence 
it exerts by furnishing an adequate theory of the social 
unit - Nan. (Spencer page 332 1878) 
This individualism led to the conceptualization of a less 
cohesive social organism. The difference between the 
organism <man) and super-organism (society) was captured in 
a principle which stated that all parts of the social 
organism are "independent", "conscious", "goal-seeking", and 
"reflective", whereas "only one unit can potentially be so 
in organic bodies" <Spencer 1878). "In the one, 
consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the 
aggregate. In the other, it is diffused throughout the 
aggregate. II CSpencer page 119 1971>. Hence the idea that 
each structure could be isolated and studied separately: 
As then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the 
aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not 
an end to be sought. The society exists for the benefit of 
its members, not its members for the benefit of society. It 
has ever to be remembered that great as may be the efforts 
made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims 
of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become 
something only in so far as they embody the claims of its 
component individuals. (Spencer page 119 1971) 
By subscribing to a reductionist view of society i.e. the 
absence of a collective "sensorium", Spencer legitimated his 
modelling sociology on biology. His science described a 
social organism which differed from Rousseau's "Being" and 
its Comtian/Durkheimian equivalent. :;;;:oaa 1 
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In keeping with his positivist background, and despite his 
image as an empiricist, Durkheim remained a rationalist 
whose faith in the use of reason to solve society's ills was 
undaunted. Working within the social space created by Comte, 
he continued the call ecti vist morphological approach, 
setting out his methodology in "The Rules of Sociological 
Method" <1933). Like his predecessors, Durkheim reasoned in 
terms of theoretical a priori; an example of a hypothetical 
device which enabled him to think of societal development 
without reference to the individual, was the concept of the 
"horde".~<::;<: Although he used biological terminology 
aggregation and differentiation his analysis revolved 
around the idea of "social facts". These emanated from "the 
collective consciousness" and its representations, another 
hypothetical social entity whose autonomous existence was 
demonstrated by the constraining actions of "social facts"~8 
on social agents. Durkheim shared Rousseau's conception of 
society as a "being" the possessor of the collective 
consciousness. This "being" resulted from "individual minds, 
forming groups 
psychological if 
individuality of 
by fusing 
you will, 
a new sort: 
to give birth to a 
but 
II 
constituting a 
<Durkheim page 89 
being, 
psychic 
1966). 
For Durkheim, there was a "collective sensorium" which had 
"specific characteristics which make it a distinct reality" 
<Durkheim page 79 1933) these specific characteristics 
being translated into the collective representations. The 
existence of this collective "being" society - explains 
why Durkheim had to provide a properly "social" analysis: 
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"The determining of' social t·acts should be sought among the 
social ±'acts preceding it and not among the states of 
individual consciousness" CDurkheim page 111 1966>. Durkbeim 
came to this conclusion after statistical studies bad shown 
that a ''social fact" such as suicide cannot be explained by 
non social factors such as age, race and gender. This, to 
him, contravened Spencer's assumption concerning cardinal 
traits. His "functional" analysis was to help him think 
about these social categories in their social context. For 
example, in his study of suicide, it led him to distinguish 
between anomie and egoistic suicide, underlying categories 
which were "normal" and "general" for the society 
considered. '"' 4 · 
Durkheim's emphasis on isolating general, underlying 
principles/categories is clear from his insistance that it 
was "norms", not their modified forms "mores", which were 
the proper study of sociology. He wanted to outline "moral 
precepts" in their pure, impersonal form, "uncontaminated by 
individual practices". This type of approach was very 
different from Mi 11' s individualistic analysis of morality, 
which concentrated on the individual's understanding of the 
term. Durkheim's collectivism, which precluded such an 
analysis, was coupled with a holism which distinguished his 
social philosophy from Spencer's: 
But, in reality, this activity which he [the individual] 
:manifests is not really his. It is society, it is race 
acting in and through hi.m; he is only the intermediary 
through which they [societies] realize themselves. His 
Page 151 
liberty is only apparent and his personality borrowed. 
(Durkheim page 404 1933) 
No doubt each individual contains a part, but the whole is 
found in no one. In order to understand it as it is, one 
must take the aggregate in its totality into consideration. 
(Durheim page 26 1974J 
The differing Spencerian and Durkheimian perspectives had 
important consequences for their respective morphologies. 
Although Durkheim did use biological analogies, he thought 
of society in social terms. In order to analyze its 
substructure, he defined second order a priori categories 
which he judged to be the proper subject matter of 
sociology. Spencer's individualism precluded this type of 
"social" analysis, and his use of biology to capture 
societal organization and development remained a descriptive 
analogy.~,,,,~, 
B) SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 
Symbolic interactionism has proved a powerful force in 
Anglo-Saxon sociology and social psychology. An outline of 
the assumptions governing this outlook is necessary to 
understand both Anglo-Saxon, neo-Durkheimian functionalism 
and the sociological conceptions of madness it generated, to 
be examined in the next chapter. Furthermore, there are 
interesting parallels to be drawn between Mead's philosophy 
- central to the symbolic interactionist perspective - and 
that of Macintyre, 2 ',;; typified later as characteristically 
Anglo-Saxon. Both Mead and Macintyre emphasize the 
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importance of the social agents in the construction of 
social reality/meanings. For Mead: 
The human experience with which social science occupies 
itself is primarily that of individuals. (.Mead page 309 
1964) 
We have to recall that experience to beca:me aware that we 
have been involved as selves, to produce the 
self-consciousness which is a constituent part of a large 
part of our experience. (Nead page 145 1964) 
Mead was interested in the way meanings were generated 
through social interaction, in particular how the 
individual's self is built up by taking over the attitudes 
of others. According to Mead, social selves were engaged in 
continuous social interaction. They defined social 
situations together, creating a symbolic framework or 
generalized other, the source of social "meanings". For 
Durkheim, social structure was preestablished and had a 
permanence which was independent of individual society 
members. However, for Mead it emanated from social actors 
and formed the basis of joint social actions. The latter 
view of societal structure is more compatible with the 
concept of society characterized as typically Anglo-Saxon, 
namely that society is no more than a collection of 
individuals. Both Locke's idea of "social contract" and 
Hume's idea of society as a "convention" are founded on this 
assumption. The Meadian ideas oi' "structure" and of a 
"symbolic" basis for social action have led social 
psychologists to compare Mead with Durkheim. As in the 
comparison between Spencer and Durkheim, there are, however, 
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disparities between the two philosophies. 
stem from the same source as before: 
These disparities 
the focus on the 
individual as opposed to the social aspect of society. 
Durkheim' s symbols, originating in the collective 
consciousness, were general, cultural a priori guiding 
social interaction. Meadian symbols were endemic <Deutscher 
1985) , agreed meanings 
Deutscher points out, it 
between interacting selves. 
is the opposition of symbols 
As 
as 
"social facts" to "changing interpretations". This once 
again illustrates French rationalism's 
underlying 
contrasting 
universals, 
interest in 
and Anglo-Saxon 
impressionistic 
interest in 
empiricism's 
account which 
reflect the experience of individual social agents. The 
different Meadian and Durkheimian viewpoints have important 
implications for the way issues such as socialization, 
social change and social disintegration are dealt with. For 
Mead, social disintegration was the result of the inability 
to effectively mobilize joint social action, not the result 
of the disintegration of a structure as it was for Durkheim. 
4) NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN NEO-DURKHEIMIAN THOUGHT 
The Parsonian "systems" approach has exerted a considerable 
influence on American and British social thought. Despite 
Parsons claim to a Durkheimian heritage, his functional ism 
differs from that of the Frenchman. This is the result of it 
having been modified by Anglo-Saxon influences such as 
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Spencerian utilitarianism and Meadian symbolic 
interactionism. 
In a volume on American sociology, Parsons (1968) describes 
sociology's task as "the functional analysis of systems", 
outlining their structure and integration. The subject of 
sociology becomes "the institutional aspect" of social 
action, the "norms" and "rules" constraining it (Parsons 
1968). Like Durkheim, Parsons agrees with the existence of a 
separate social reality, but thinks of it in Spencerian 
terms. It is composed of structures or subsystems, to be 
studied separately as opposed to holistically. 
Furthermore, he makes the distinction between "individual" 
and "social systems", to be studied in interaction.~;,., Thus 
he minimizes the importance of the collective. 
Parsons emphasis on "norms" and "rules" constraining social 
action indicates the centrality of social actors to his 
thinking. This is made explicit in his definition of a 
"subsystem", which like Radcliffe-Brown's idea of 
"structure", is a summary for 
actors, individuals as subject 
"the 
and 
relationships 
object of 
among 
social 
interaction" <Parsons page 1968). Furthermore, "there is a 
sense in which all action is the action of individuals" 
<Parsons page 6 1966), and Parsonian collectivities are 
"collectivities composed of individuals" <Parsons page 324 
1968). Clearly the emphasis is different from Durkheim' s. 
Parsons does, however, concede that "both the organism and 
Page 155 
the cu 1 tural system involve essential elements which cannot 
be investigated at the individual level" <Parsons page 6 
1966). Hence the relevance of functional analysis, which is 
an attempt to address the complications introduced by the 
interaction of a multi tude of actors. It is not, as it was 
far Durkheim, the analysis of the function of essential 
second order social categories. Furthermore, Parsons could 
not accept Durkheimian determinism. He modified the 
utilitarian claim that personality was merely the product of 
selfish drives. Following Mead, he argued that it was 
affected, during socialization. by the expectation systems 
of society. It was not "borrowed" from society, as Durkheim 
and his structuralist heirs maintain. 
Moscovici (1985) is aware that the Parsonian "systems" 
approach contrasted with that of his transatlantic neo-
Durkheimian colleagues. 28 He illustrates his point by 
referring to attribution theory, which deals with 
explanations of social causality. Attribution theory, he 
maintains, is limited because of its individual, inductive 
frame of reference and its artificial distinction between 
the two forms of causality it postulates: internal and 
external or personal and situational <Moscovici 1985). ~;;:·a The 
idea of alternatively ascribing causality to internal and 
external factors, he describes as "ridiculous", recommending 
that his Anglo-Saxon colleagues remedy their approach by a) 
switching from the individual to the collective sphere and 
b) re-instating social representations as necessary 
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mediators. These representations are at the centre of 
Moscovici's social psychology: 
Sociology sees, or rather, has seen, social representations 
as explanatory devices, irreducible by any further analysis. 
Their theoretical function was similar to that of the atom 
in traditional mechanics, or of the gene in traditional 
genetics, that is atoms and genes were known to exist, but 
nobody bothered about what they did, or what they were like. 
Similarly one knew that social representations occurred in 
societies, but nobody worried about their structure, or 
about their inner dynaJDics. SOcial psychology, on the other 
hand, JDUst be pre-occupied solely with both the structure 
and the dynamics of representations. (Koscovici in Farr and 
Xoscovici page 16 1985) 
Moscovici's interpretation of Durkheim leads him to focus on 
underlying social categories, rather than on the "norms" and 
"rules" governing the actions of social agents, as is found 
in Parsonian functionalism. Unlike attibution theorists, he 
is not interested 1n individual categories of explanation, 
but those of the "thinking society" (1985), mediated by 
social representation. This globalism not only leads to a 
more complicated conceptualization of the social process -
in terms of what can be understood through experience - but 
also one which is not easily amenable to "concrete" <Harland 
1985) empirical validation. However, the academic nature of 
Continental social science would make this form of 
validation a secondary concern. 
As with previous examples, there is evidence to suggest that 
the properties of the thought styles manifested in social 
discourse are not sui generis. This is best discussed with 
reference to the social scientific methodology used within 
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the two traditions. In the nineteenth century, the 
increasing interest in Social Science was related to the 
need to understand the problems of the newly industrialized 
society. In Britain, social scientific research was born out 
of the necessity to improve the lot of the urban poor. Hence 
its pragmatic orientation and distrust of speculative 
theory, evident in the attitude of The London Statistical 
Society which from 1841 was to advise the government on its 
censuses <Glazer 1959). The Society maintained that there 
was a growing distrust of mere hypothetical theory and a 
priori assumptions. In Social Science, principles are valid 
for application only inasmuch as they are legitimate 
inductions from "facts, accurately observed and methodically 
classified" <Glazer 1959). Shaw <1975), links the pragmatism 
and empirical bias of Anglo-Saxon social science to its 
utilitarian/reformist origins. As he points out, it was only 
codified into a pure academic discipline - sociology - in 
the nineteen sixties <Shaw page 58 1975). On the Continent, 
however, philosophers - Lerner < 1959) cites as examples of 
these, Marx and Comte - were much more inclined to formulate 
large scale, idealistic reform plans, based on "sparse and 
non-systematic selection from the universe of relevant 
observations" <Lerner 1959). Indeed, before Comte, 
Montesquieu had advocated a social methodology which fitted 
data to general principles. 
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The bias in favour of empirical investigation in the Anglo-
Saxon world is most evident today in the form of 
individualistic social survey methodology - England and the 
U.S.A. are the leaders in this area of data collection. The 
importance of social survey techniques in promoting the 
image o!' professional scientific competence and uti 1 i ty is 
particularly important in America, where academics have 
become freelance intellectuals, deploying their skills in 
the service of big business (Rorty 1982). Techniques and 
scientific identity also explain the specialization 
characteristic of Anglo-Saxon Social Sciences: 
This 
The re-division of the social sciences into .more and more 
narrow fields, which continues apace, admirably serves the 
purposes of the academic structure of social knowledge. The 
more narrow the definition of the field, the .more specific 
the technical :t'oriBS of research can be, the .more rigid both 
the formal and the substantive standards which operate. In 
addition, of course, re-division... satisfies the specific 
financial and prestige requirements of rising intellectual 
groups. (Shaw page 53 1974) 
is contrasted with the more academic and 
interdisciplinary aspects of Continental Social Sciences, 
thriving on theoretical doctrines. Here, clever 
philosophical systems are the secret of recognition, 
legitimation by empirical "fact" gathering being of 
secondary importance. 
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THE CASE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 
There seems to be a consensus as to the schools which best 
reflect culturally specific interpretations of the Freudian 
corpus. Rycroft notes that: 
in between these largely, but not quite exclusively 
foreign and German-speaking groups was a third largely 
English-speaking group which was at first definable only in 
negative terms. (Rycroft page 120 1985) 
This was the Independent or Object Relations School. Modier 
(1981)' reviewing psychoanalysis' history in France, 
maintains that without Jacques Lacan " la psychanalyse ne 
serai t j amais ad venue" <Modier page 22 1961 >". Modier' s 
remark is corroborated by Bowie (1979) who claims that 
"Lacan has made Freud properly readable for the first time 
in France" <in Sturrock 1979 page 150). Psychoanalysis 
provides perhaps the clearest example of the expression of 
national thought styles because, as Turkle (1978) points 
out, " psychoanalysis can be a screen onto which a 
culture projects its preoccupation and values. <Turkle page 
48 1978)". 
The British school of psychoanalysis, as represented by 
Rivers, Suttie and Fairbairn has been noted for its 1) 
biological 2) fact orientated 3) individualistic approach 
<Brown 1961). The biological, fact finding approach, an 
ideal of British experimental psychology, was typical of 
British social thought. The biological orientation was 
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evident in Rivers' analysis of the reaction of soldiers to 
danger, described in terms of flight, immobility, collapse, 
aggressive (fight] and manipulative action, i.e. in terms of 
primitive animal responses. Suttie emphasized the importance 
of maternal love, placing the mother/child relationship at 
the centre of his theorizing. The need for a mother was not 
seen primarily in terms of gratification, but "as a need for 
company and as a discomfort in isolation" <in Brown page 64 
1961). 
The empirical individualist inclination described by Brown 
is prominent in the work of The Independents, who also draw 
upon Suttie' s emphasis on the importance of the maternal 
relationship. The biological orientation has been retained 
in Bowlby's work, and to a lesser extent that of Rycroft. 
They both use the insights provided by ethology. A problem 
such as "Woman and her Discontent" <Gillespie 1988), is 
discussed in terms of oedipal relations with the father, 
complexes associated with sexual organs. The use of biology 
is displayed in a reference to fish behaviour. 8 ° Klein, 
however, 
concepts: 
is the source of the school's most important 
the transactional object and the idea of a 
transitional realm. These are concepts which are of 
pragmatic value in explaining individual development and 
implementing therapy. The aim of therapy is to recreate the 
transitional realm and to provide a space where childhood 
conflicts can be mastered. The emphasis on the experience of 
individuation and the importance of therapy explain both the 
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individualistic interactive and the pragmatic clinical 
dimensions o:f the school's work.':''' 
The ability to interact successfully with external objects 
depends on the creation, during development, of a 
transitional realm, midway between ob,j ecti ve <external) and 
subjective <internal) reality. Objects in this realm'"':;" 
such as play, culture and art are both external and 
internal in that they are other, but can adapt to 
conceptions imposed upon them. Interacting with transitional 
objects thus gives a sense of control and security, so that 
the individual is able to initiate a creative relationship 
with the outside world. Following Klein, The Independents 
believe that the individual gradually emerges out of the 
individual-environment complex. The centrality of the mother 
a legacy of Suttie's and of the 
transformational/transactional process to this development 
is captured below: 
In the first place, the JBDther assu.mes the function of the 
transformational object; she constantly alters the infant's 
environment to :meet his needs. That the infant identifies 
the mother with transfor:mation of being, through his 
symbiotic knowing, is not a delusion, but a fact; the 1110ther 
actually transforJIIS the infant's world. In the second place, 
the infant's own e:mergent ego capacities - of perception, 
motility, integration also transform his world. The 
acquisition of language is perhaps the 1110st obvious such 
transformation, but learning to handle an object, to 
differentiate objects, to remember objects that are not 
present, are transfor:mative achieve.ments; they result in ego 
change that alters the nature of the infant's object world. 
It is not surprising that the infant identifies these ego 
achievements with the presence of an object, and the failure 
of the mother to :maintain provision of the facilitating 
environment, through prolonged absence or bad handling, can 
bring about ego collapse and psychic pain. Vith the infant's 
creation of the transitional object, the transfor:mational 
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process is displaced from the 1110ther-environ.ment (where it 
originated) into countless subjective-objects, so that this 
transitional phase is heir to the transformational phase, as 
the infant evolves trom experience of the process to 
articulation of the experience. (Ballas in Kohan page 85 
1988) 
Besides the emphasis an the mather, the characteristic 
features of The Independents' theorizing are a fairly clear 
notion of self/ego as well as an emphasis on the interactive 
framework in which this self develops. An interesting trait 
is the appeal to common knowledge through the use of words 
such as ''obvious". This is linked to another feature of the 
school: a distinct bias against dogmatic theorizing related 
to a strong emphasis on the pragmatics of therapy. Many of 
the papers in a volume edited by Kohan <1986) deal with 
therapeutic problems, such as the issues of 
transference/countertransference. Theoretical ideas are 
illustrated with empirical evidence or appeals to common 
knowledge. Rycroft speaks of Bowlby, a Kleinian by training, 
as favouring simple commonsensical explanations. This has 
the unavoidable consequence that his findings are "baringly" 
straightforward and "precisely what warm-hearted but naive 
non-intellectuals have always thought". Indeed, a reading of 
his trilogy "Attachment and Lass" (1973) leaves the reader 
with the impression that Bowlby is codifying in experiments 
what mothers intuitively know. His conclusions are based an 
a j udiciaus review a:f the relevant 11 terature and his awn 
extensive experimental work. Rycroft makes a similar praise-
criticism of Winnicatt's work, relying as it does an 
intuition and observation, a handicap when trying to 
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formulate ideas and present them in a coherent, systematic 
:form. Winnicott's naivety is even more evident when he 
discusses issues outside his field as some of the essays in 
"Home is where we start :from" (1971) demonstrate 
particularly one on Democracy. Despite these criticisms, 
Rycroft concludes that Winnicott is responsible for the 
"single most important contribution to psychoanalysis in the 
last thirty years: transitional reality". This contrasts 
sharply with his appraisal of La can and French 
psychoanalysis. After admitting that some of Lacan's 
philosophical mentors - Hegel and Nietzsche "are not in 
his bones", Rycro:ft vents his impatience with the Frenchman: 
Apart from the single fact he would like psychoanalysis to 
be rewritten :from the point of view of linguistics I found 
his writings a real load of rubbish. <'Page 5 1985) 
Rycroft's appraisal of Winnicott makes sense in the light of 
the latter's acknowledged approach to psychoanalysis. 
Therapy and the therapeutic relationship were more important 
to Winnicott than abstract theorizing. Theories acted as a 
backbone to the therapeutic enterprise, and were merely 
codified experience. In his "Therapeutic Consultations in 
Child Psychiatry", he warned: 
Dogmatic interpretation leaves the child with only two 
alternatives, an acceptance of what I have said as 
propaganda or a rejection of the interpretation and of me 
and of the whole set-up. Actually I do claim that these 
interviews are dondnated by the child and not by .me. 
('ilinnicott page 10 1971) 
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His consultations are examples of "communication with 
children" where the aim was not to support a theory, but to 
help a child. Rycroft betrays the same pragmatic attitude, 
and states: 
I must at some point abandon the idea that there was I, a 
scientist observing material presented to me by a patient. I 
.must have gone over from that view which see.ms to be 
implicit in Freud to the idea that I was having a 
relationship or an encounter with someone and that the raw 
material or baste data, of .my science was the relationship I 
was having with the patient . .. for a long time .my practice 
was better than .my theory. I always did just simply start a 
relationship with the patient, and explored how the 
relationship developed. If I wrote something in terms of 
psychic apparatus, I was really only .making kow-towing 
.movements towards classical theory. <Rycroft page 11 1985) 
Subsequently, Rycroft dropped Freudian jargon, referring to 
it as "an intellectual masturbating machine". 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is philosophical 1 literary, 
political and theoretical in orientation with a focus on the 
unconscious, neglecting the ego of the English school. 88684 
The emphasis on theory, as opposed to the pragmatics of 
therapy has been noted by many writers on the Lacanian 
school. As Benvenuto and Kennedy <1986) emphasize, the 
British society is much more clinically orientated than the 
French, to which clinical material only makes sense within a 
rigid conceptual framework. '" 5 This remark is born out by a 
reading of Lacan's "Ecrits" (1977) 1 where speculative, 
philosophical/literary reasoning is but rarely backed up by 
his own clinical research. The titles of the chapters in the 
"Ecrits" <1977) point to the difference which exists between 
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the two schools: "The Subversion of the Subject and the 
Dialectics of Desire", "Agency of the Letter in the 
Unconscious". A chapter entitled "On the Possible treatment 
of Psychosis" includes an extensive theoretical discussion 
in terms of Saussurian linguistics and Lacanian symbols, as 
well as reference to the classic Freudian case of Schreber. 
Again, there is a dearth of clinical material - which would 
presumably have figured extensively in an equivalent chapter 
in the English literature. As Bowie <1979) points out, 
Lacan' s systematizing of the discipline separates him from 
Englishmen like Laing and Cooper, who merely exposed its 
:faulty premises. By systematizing psychoanalysis, Lacan 
brought intellectual rigour to the discipline, his original 
aim. Lacan' s obsession with making psychoanalysis into a 
pure science led him to develop "mathemes", the result of 
applying mathematics to psychoanalysis, and an attempt to 
look :for a theory of the human subject based on the science 
of linguistics. The combination of linguistics and 
mathematics offered the possibility of reducing 
psychoanalysis 
:formalization, 
into a series of formulae. For Lacan, 
more than empirical validation and 
usefulness, was the key to the success of a science. 36 
Lacan is known for dictums such as "the unconscious is 
structured like language" and "the unconscious is the 
discourse of the Other", both betraying his overwhelming 
interest in the unconscious. Lacan wanted to isolate its 
laws of operation and underlying structure with the help of 
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Saussurian linguistics. De Saussure's analysis of meaning or 
"the signified" - that it is not an absolute concept to be 
found in the thoughts or the words spoken by the individual, 
but "in the relation of the words to themselves and to the 
system of signs itself" - is grafted onto man. Hence he is 
no longer the absolute ego, but subject to laws and rules, 
in particular those of language reflected in the structure 
of the unconscious. Language is introduced as a social 
component, Lacan's thesis being that by acquiring language, 
the individual is introduced into a pre-existing symbolic 
realm.This then applies pressure on the libido <or desire), 
and structures Talking about Levi-Strauss' 
anthropology, he exclaims: 
Isn't it striking that L~vi-Strauss, in suggesting the 
implication of the structures of language with that part of 
the social laws that regulate marriage ties and kinship, is 
already conquering the very terrain in which Freud situates 
the unconci ous. (La can page 73 1977) . 
To explain the other dictum it is necessary to refer to the 
three orders of the 11 Symbol ic11 , the 11 Imaginary" and the 
"Real" which play a similar role in Lacan's work as the 
"Id", "Ego" and "Superego" do in Freud's. The Imaginary is 
intimately connected with the "mirror phase" and the 
formation of the illusion of the coherent ego. It is the 
stage at which the child of between six and eighteen months, 
as yet neurologically immature and uncoordinated, identifies 
himself with the coherent image he sees in the mirror. This 
process of identification, once initiated, continues 
throughout life, maintaining the illusion of a unitary 
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self/agent, which Lacan rejects. The Imaginary order is made 
up of fantasies whereas the symbolic is constituted by 
social and cultural symbols, including most importantly 
language. It is through this order that a true conception of 
the subject can be derived. The child's entry into this 
realm is made when he accepts the parental metaphor - Le Non 
du Pere, the "non" and the name of the father, is 
alternatively termed the "Other" and internalizes the 
rules of society. Finally, the Real is beyond the other two 
domains. It is what is already there and that which has gone 
before us. It is a chaos, structured by language, "the world 
o:f words that creates the world of things the things 
originally confused in the hie et nunc of all the processes 
of coming-into-being" <Lacan 1977). The Other, the symbolic 
"non" of the father, the speaker of full speech or subject 
of the unconscious, is what the analyst is trying to reach 
in therapy. 
The ego as it is developed by The Object Relations School -
a therapeutic tool, and an idea that helps explain 
individual development has a certain stability as a 
concept. This is not true of the Lacanian ego, which many 
argue does not exist, or if it does, only as a decentred 
dialectical process CBowie 1979>. According to Lacan, it is 
an "intermittent image", where the notion of the ego as a 
fixed reference point is replaced by the notion of a subject 
realizing itself through the symbolic matrix: 
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This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child 
at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and 
nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary 
situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated 
in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the 
dialectic of identification with the Other, and before 
language restores to it, in the universal, its function as 
subject. (Lacan page 2 1977) 
Only through the unconcious which is structured 
language, can the "Subject" realize itself. 
like 
Within Lacan • s Freudian framework, modified by Saussurian 
linguistics, the oedipal drama is not acted out between 
people. Instead, it is described in terms of the interplay 
between general cultural symbols. The oedipus conflict is 
about the child's capacity to enter the symbolic realm 
structured by social discourse, and consequently into a new 
relationship with language and the world. It is resolved 
when repression translated into linguistic terms as a 
process of metaphor formation substitutes the father's 
name < 1 e nom du pere) for the desire of the mother. One 
signifier is substituted for another, yet the signified, the 
phallus, remains the same.:"""' To more politically committed 
analysts such as Deleuze and Guattari, the Lacanian analysis 
is incomplete. Lacan attempts, but fails to place "desire" 
in the social field: to Lacan, "desire" is the key to the 
relationship between the Subject and the Other the 
symbolic "non" of the father. All Lacan does is formulate 
the oedipus complex in more general terms.:::~·,,~ To overcome 
Lacanian familialism, De leuze and Guattari propose to 
Page 169 
replace psychoanalysis by schizoanalysis. The latter would 
lead to a view of the psyche as fundamentally social. It is 
likened to curing rituals in primitive societies, where 
healing requires a political, social and economic analysis 
of the community as opposed to an oedipal solution. It is a 
process of decoding where the aim is to analyse how the 
social field is animated by unconscious desire: 
La schizoanalyse ne se propose pas de resoudre Oeudipe, elle 
ne pretend pas de resoudre mieux que ce que fait dans la 
psychanalyse oeudipienne. Elle se propose de 
desoeudipianiser 1 'inconscient, pour atteindre aux 
veri tables pro bl e:mes. Ell e se propose d 'at t e 1 ndre a ces 
regions de 1, inconscient orphelin, precise:ment 'au dela de 
toute loi' ... Weleuze and Guattari page 971972) 
Desire is the essence of subversion and revolution, that 
which the schizophrenic is in touch with. His privileged 
position stems from the fact that his unconscious has not 
been structured by the process of "oedipization", the 
instrument of capitalist repression and mediated by 
society's agent the family. This enables him to retain 
contact with the primitive truths of society, and as such 
his language reveals the real connections between the 
languages of race, repression and other political forces. 
Deleuze and Guattari' s highly theoretical political ideas 
are again divorced from detailed empirical investigation. 
The language they use betrays their Lacanian heritage. They 
adopt his notion of a "therapeutic text" which must not 
merely transmit knowledge to the reader, but challenge his 
assumptions about the idea of knowledge itself. It is a 
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language which supplies further evidence of rationalism's 
love of intellectual game playing. «~.o 
French psychoanalysis requires a certain kind of literary 
performance, and Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari certainly 
provide it (Bowie 1979). Theirs is a language which is 
specifically designed to speak to the unconscious. This 
explains the word play and abundance of associations, and 
contrasts with the straightforward approach of the pragmatic 
English analysts who are addressing the self/ego. In fact, 
as a discipline, French psychoanalysis differs markedly from 
its English counterpart. It is a clever theoretical 
framework which uses formulae to systematize ideas into a 
concise clear form. Lacan speaks in more general social 
terms, interested not in relationships with the father, but 
in the symbolic entity, 
the Durkheimian sense 
the name of the father - a symbol in 
of a general cultural symbol. The 
fluid nature of all Lacanian structures, not only the ego -
another example being the realm of the Real, conceived using 
the analogy of throwing a dice makes them difficult to 
isolate and study empirically. Furthermore, rationalism 
gives a more conceptually difficult perspective on the 
dynamics of the psyche, just like it did of the social 
process and for the same reasons: its academic orientation 
and disinterest with empirical validation. 
The characteristics of the two schools can, once again, be 
understood in terms of their genesis from culturally 
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speci!'ic 
biological 
thought-environment complexes. For example, 
element in British psychoanalysis can 
the 
be 
understood through its continuing dialogue with psychiatry -
both Winnicott and Rycroft had psychiatric training. Its 
focus on therapeutics relates to the pragmatic origins of 
the discipline. After the Second World War, in Britain, 
psychoanalysis 
having been 
coexisted 
secured by 
with 
the 
psychiatry, its position 
failure of traditional 
psychiatric practice to explain post-war syndromes such as 
shell shock <Stone 1985). 41 • 42 
In France, psychoanalysis was part of a broader subversive 
philosophy structural ism which replaced the post-war 
philosophy of existentialism. •J.::;r It was a tool in a radical 
critique, 
change. 
promoting a left wing political ideology of 
Hence French psychoanalysis' socio-political 
dimension <see chapter six for an elaboration of this point) 
and anti-individualism. ·44 From the point of view of this 
thesis, the most 
institutionalization 
interesting 
in France, 
feature 
was the 
of psychoanalysis' 
pressure on it to 
become an academic discipline. The theoretical nature of 
Lacan's psychoanalysis, whilst it can be related to its 
function as 
therapeutic 
attempt to 
social criticism rather than being 
enterprise 
legitimize 
can also be explained by 
it as a discipline within 
a 
the 
the 
university setting . .o:ts Unlike his Anglo-Saxon counterparts, 
and in keeping with French academicism, Lacan believed that 
a science was not defined by the specifics of praxis, but by 
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the generalities of a theory abstracted from it. The 
emphasis on purely academic theory has been a permanent 
feature of rationalism, and the best place for this type of 
theoretical development was the university. Hence Lacan • s 
desire for psychoanalysis to become part of formal academic 
life. He was seconded in his views by other members of his 
school such as Laplanche, who "hopes that university will 
keep psychoanalysis pure'' <Turkle page 173 1978). 4 ••47 
CONCLUSION 
National features isolated with the help of the artistic and 
scientific enterprises of the countries, have also been 
found in the Human Sciences. For example, there was evidence 
for the continuing disparity between the rationalist search 
for underlying, universal principles to explain societal 
structure, and empiricism's preference for impressionistic 
explanations. Hence parallels exist with the differences 
outlined in the chapter on science. Rationalism was again 
coupled with a theoretical academicism, empiricism with a 
manifestations of The origin a!' these pragmatic emphasis. 
the thought styles was located in culturally specific 
thought-environment complexes. Thought styles internalize 
certain constraints specific to the culture in question. The 
traditions of social discourse the thought styles generate, 
reflect the existence of these constraints. making them 
suited to describe the socio-political structure of the 
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culture considered. The integral concept of the French 
social organism can be linked to the strong bureaucratic, 
interventionist, French State, whilst individualism and the 
disembodied social organism can be related to the weaker non 
interventionist British one. The possibility of interchange 
between American and British thought styles and thus 
social discourse - stems from their emergence from similar 
thought-environment complexes: ones fostered by similar 
political cultures, built on the "liberal" concept of the 
state. 
The different characteristics of the thought styles have 
permeated recent developments in the Human Sciences, so that 
contrasting perspectives of the social process are echoed in 
those of the ego in psychoanalysis. The concepts of the ego 
of the two psychoanalytic schools also reflect the 
underlying social differences. Non-interventionist policies 
have led to a stress on the individual in society and his 
liberties. This is translated into the stable empirical 
concept of The Independents, designed to be of practical 
value: to capture the experience of individuation. This 
concept of the ego is very different from its amorphous 
French counterpart, overwritten by social ideology. 
l, In a survey of the different anthropological definitions of the term "structure", 
Glucksman highlights the difference between the conceptualizations in the British 
functionalist and the French structuralist literature, The French saw structure as 
capturing the underlying social reality ot the societies they were studying, The British, 
committed to inductive scientific investigation, sa'll structures as convenient summaries 
for observable data, a clear sign of their empiricism. The only definition which comes 
close to Levi-Strauss' idea ot an underlying •grammar• or "syntax", structuring social 
relationships, according to Glucksman, 1s that developed by Firth in his "Tikopia", Levi-
Strauss's "structure", in keeping with Durkheim's soc1al morphology, is not a model or 
analogy, but a reality, the proper subject matter of anthropology, These different 
interpretations are the result ot the Anglo-Saxon's selective emphasis on the concept of 
observable "facts", neglecting the existence of the social as reality in itself (Godard in 
Glucksman page 74 1972), Godard refers to the reluctance of the British intellegentsia 
since the nineteenth century to engage in any critique of the totality of social life, He 
links this to their •conceptual blindness" with respect to the analysis of underlying 
structures (Page 62 1972>, The different conceptualizations of the terms are related to 
different anthropological approaches. The English are eclectics, strongly emphasizing the 
practicalities of fieldwork as opposed to theorizing, The greater interdisciplinary 
overlap in French Human Sciences, as well as a "penchant" for theory and aversion to 
fieldwork explains the philosophical and linguistic influences on French anthropology, 
Working lfith data which had already been collected, French anthropologists, such as 
Durkheim and Mauss, produced second level theorizations, capturing "essential properties" 
as opposed to striking empirical descriptions <Glucksman 1972), There is thus evidence for 
a coupling between rationalism's attention to a priori general structures and a 
theoretical academicism, Conversely, empiricism is biased towards practical investigation 
and a focus on the "concrete", individual level of society, leading to a more specific 
definition of the term, 
Zito (1984) commenting on the few inroads which structural linguistics have made into 
Britain offers an explanation: that it was not seen to offer anything above the literary 
analysis offered by modernists such as James Joyce, Its success on the Continent, Zito 
attributes to the fact that Durkheimian collective representations are particularly 
amenable to semiotic analysis, hence the impact of structuralist theory on neo-Ourkheimian 
sociology and anthropology, He concludes that: 
useructuralism. had to confront the Si11e epistetologicil problems thit produced 
the present impuse in the social sciences: the nature of causality and 
intentiomtlit,v, the distinction bettleen social things and things of other kinds, 
methodological procedures and the culture versus structure probJeiJ, It lias able 
to do so 11itl1 considerable eue, aJthtJugh the resuJtg were not sufficiently 
utilitarian to t~arrant its institutionalization at the A11erican and British 
unversities. Jts neglett of the empiritll dimengfon, an unpardonable sin to the 
heirs of pragmatisiJ, sade it •spetulative', and therefore to be ignored as 
unscientific. In addition, the idea of syste11 it employed is so obi{Ufl compared 
to those traditionaJJy employed by the social stientes, that it appeared 
uunsystnatic', if not haphazard. I'Page 6 li84J 
Zito's analysis corroborates my claims about rationalism's emphasis on academic theory 
~hich contrasts Nith empiricism's pragmatic utilitarian slant, 
2. The literal translation of "the self" is "le rBoi" not commonly used, The translations 
of other reflexive terms include self-assertive : authoritaire 
3, 
self-confidence : aplomb 
self-conscious embarrasse, gane 
self-contained independant 
self-educated : autodidact 
self-important : suffisant 
self-possession sang froid 
self-expression libre expression 
self-esteem : amour-propre 
The shift in a great proportion of research effort in the natural sciences 
torards the phenomena of life and of social life has thus deter11ined all 
stientific endeavour in the nineteenth tentury, It hsd to be taken1 once 
co1111erte and communirations 11ere expanding and setropolitan and internal Jiving 
condtions began to predominate. In the protess, large scale phenotJe!1i of 
intrllsing co1plexity had to be mastered1 yet there remained the closer and 
equaJJy pressing husan problems tthich are deeply al Joyed rith ali naive or 
imaginative or religious opinion, For lust this reason the ner development, 
heralding a ner slant on psychology/ signified a need for rene11ed efforts in 
mental and 11ora/ philosophy, fTonnies page 6J 1974) 
4, As a result of his study of human nature, Hobbes concluded that: 1) men had an innate 
aversion to death 2) that they ~r.~ere incapable of behaving to secure their long-term 
interests - rather being motivated to immediately gratify their appetites and 3) that the 
"natural state" of man ~r.~as to be at ~r~ar. 
5, 
locke believed thit Ja111 and constitutions ~ere trllted through a fre1, 
arbitrary agreement of 11ills. /'lontesquieu introdut~d into the study of 
legislation f.he natural flethod 11hich Jinks fatts together in a series so that, 
starting frofl an initial fact - a given historital situation or tertain pllysital 
conditions - one readily recaJJs the others, Here he ~as faithful, to thl degree 
tha& his su/Jiert perfllitted, to the spirit of the century, That is why, to use 
the language of a later era, he created a social statics dealing with the 
siBuJtaneous groupings of facts and the equilibrium of forces in a stable 
society at each given 11011ent,' in the sa11e 11ay Condil lif created a psychologilil 
statics and the authors of natural series a biologilii statics, but lfontesquieu 
had no notion of social dynamics the genetic succession of forns we find in 
1/ico, (Brehier page 68 1930) 
6. Bentham was critical of his idealistic French counterparts, For his criticism of the 
French constitution - he questions the terminology using an analysis of meaning which 
foreshadows twentieth century British linguistic philosophy - see Pareth (1973), 
7, Rights and obligations in society are explained by the idea of services, and expression 
of ho~ dependent individuals are upon each other when they live together, Services 
generate happiness, and it is the task of the government to specify a compulsory system of 
services, i,e, those that are so vital to our social existence that they cannot be left to 
chance, From a view that pleasure and pain were motives of social actions and that the 
pleasure and pain of others should motivate our actions, Bentham moved to the essential 
role of the law and morality (Ryan 1987), 
8; The principle of utility was to provide a standard of good and bad laws, and follo\lling 
this, a simple understandable code which everyone could use, Knowing one's rights would 
prevent injustices and the infringement of the individual's liberties, Bentharn's 
definition of la\lls contrasts with that of his French counterparts; they ~r~ere simply 
"rules" governing actions, 
9. This adding of a qualitative aspect is a feature of Mill's writing, He developed it in 
his discussion of feelings of pleasure, explaining how sometimes qualitative 
considerations can outweigh the quantitative aspects of pleasure - an example of a 
quantitative aspect was the number of people pleased or displeased: 
It is quite co11patible ~ith the principle of utility to recognize the fl(t thit 
soiJe kinds of pleasure are more desirable than others, It 111ould be absurd that 
while, in estimating all other things quality is considered as lfell as quantity, 
the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone, 
("ill Utilitarianism page 279 1987) 
10, Tennies believes in the fundamental compatibility between the French and the German 
"mentalities", He illustrates his points by referring to the cross-fertilization 111hich 
occurred between Berman idealism and French positivism: 
Vhat ~as more Hegel's o11n conte11porary Saint Si11on had beco11e the centre of a 
group of people 11hich were earnestly seeking a more profound vie11 of cultur~l 
development, Slnce it held that norganic" p1riods ilrl of neceuity putting forth 
their oi!Jn negation in a "uiti(ll period", and that the 0Uitical period11 gives 
ttay to a ne11 and heightened •organic period', this vi111 t~ouJd have fitted the 
ffeg1Jian schema 11itll the i11st constnint, rronni1s page 74 1~74) 
Tonnies then analyzes the many parallel conceptions which exist in German idealism and 
French positivism, Markham elaborates on the relationship between Marx and Saint Simon, 
supporting Tonnies case: 
IJt first sight 11arx and ~'aint Sison are poles apart, Saint Si1on did not believe 
in an in1vitable class var bet11een capital and labour. He believed that the 
determining filtor in luJ111an developsent tJIS not merely IJiterial and econ0111ic, 
but the nprogress of ideiSn, But 11hat 11ar:r found interesting in Saint Simon 11as 
a wtplete philosophy of history, e.'(plaining ehe development of the h/JIIan ra" 
in ter11s of the rise and f1JJ of dasses auording to changes in the state of 
society, Noreover, Siint Sison hid 1 conception of a scienre of history based on 
discover~bJe Ja11s, producing inevitable and predictable results independently of 
huMin ri Jis, Wlen 11arx hid substituted the economic fBC tor for ~'aint Si1on 's 
•progress of ideBsn, ind ippJied the Hegelian dialectic to the theory of classes 
he hid Brrired 1t the conreption of ltistoriCBJ mlteriaiiss, fPag~ f£/V 19S2J 
Further parallels beheen German and French thought are drun by LaCapra ( 1972), in his 
comparison of Durkheim and l'larx, Despite Durkheim's rejection of Marxism, LaCapra argues 
that there are many similarities between the two theorists: I) their attempt to integrate 
German speculative philosophy and the French socialist tradition into a theoretical 
frame~ork explaining the genesis and function of society 2l they saw history as the story 
of the genesis of social pathology and 3) they understood the danger of a value neutral 
conception of social science, 
The idea of compatible mentalities has been used to explain the easy integration of 
Marxism into French thought, An alternative explanation given by Geison (1985) was 
outlined in the footnotes to the previous chapter, Geison (1985) maintains that the 
failure of Marxism in the Anglo-Saxon world is due to its inability to explain different 
political structures to the ones on which the theory is based - those possessing a strong 
Hegel ian State, Whetever the explanation, the compatibility of the German and French 
mentalities could be predicted from the proposed concept of "thought styles•: similar 
political structures are linked to similar mental structures (Bourdieu 1979), 
II, Saint Simon's materialism was used by Narx to temper his Hegelian roots, The 
Frenchman's dialectic foreshadowed Marx's, It supported the idea of historical determinism 
while urging individuals to play a part in their own destiny by intellectual improvement. 
12, All soc1eties pass through three phases: 1) the theological ~here causes are 
attributed to supernatural beings 2) the metaphysical where they are attributed to 
abstract forces 3) the positive or scientific, where the search for absolute causes is 
abandoned for the study of laws, 
13, 
Nffill it is true, has dealt r~ith the question at great length,' but he has only 
refined liith his dialectics lihat Comte had already expounded liithout adding 
anything original" I'OurkheitJJ page I I!J66.J 
His positive sociology \lias an important aid to observation, and made it possible to 
estimate social phenomena not amenable to direct investigation by "scientific relation to 
others already known" (Comte vol. 4 page 458 1977>. 
14, Not only did Comte seek a new method for his sociology, but he was also aware of the 
intrinsic difficulties of the discipline and its methodology, Sociology, he realized, 
could never fully imitate the scientific model: 
and: 
Vnlike t./11 sciences, the subiert 11atter to be investigated is determined by the 
theory 11/lich is used to investigate it, No real observation of any kind of 
phenomena is possible except insofar as it is directed and finaJ/y interpreted 
by some theory, (Coste vol, 1 page 242) 
I am not blind to the vast difficulty r~hich this requisition imposes on the 
institution of positive sociology obliging us to create at once, so to speak, 
observation and la111s, on acrount of their indispensable connection, plaring us 
in a sort of virious rirrle; from t1hich r~e ran issue only by employing, in the 
first instance materials t~hich are badly elaborated, and doctrines 111hich are 
ill-conceived. t'Co11te vol. 2 page 149J 
What Comte was stating was a problem which has occupied social scientists ever since: the 
problem of hermeneutics. 
15, Cornte hints at the importance he attributes - like Saint Simon before him, to 
historical determinism and the historical dimension of the study of society, social 
dynamics: 
Condorcet it till liho grBBped the general conreption of the operation fitted to 
raise politics to the rank of the sriences of qbservation, He sat~ clearly that 
civilisation is subiect to a progressive course, every step qf ~hich is strictly 
connected wit./1 the rest by rirtw of natural Iars,' discoverable through 
philosophic observation of the past, and 11hich deter11ined in a positive manner 
for ea'l'l epoch, improvement' adapted to the 1oriaJ 1tate a1 1 ~thole, and to each 
po1ition of it, t'Comte appendix page !()) 
16, The unit of study was a "social" organism whose smallest unit was the family: 
.. , I shaJJ treat the BodaJ organism as definitely 'omposed of the families 
tvhi ell are the true elesentB or ceJJs, next the 'lasses and (IS til rlli'h are its 
proper tiBSUfl, and lastly of 'ities and 'ommunes ttlli'h are its real organs, 
fComte vol. 2 page 242) 
It would be a mistake to liken this to Spencerian ideas~ as Comte uses this biologism to 
emphasize the unity of the social organism, not to enable him to focus on the individual, 
17' 
In aJJ stuiaJ phenomena 111 perceive the rorkingg of the pllysiologi"J Jars of 
the individual,' and moreover something IIIIich •odifies their effl(ts, and "lli'h 
belongs to the influen" of individuals over e"h other - singularly 'omplirated 
in the (Ill of the llu1an r"e by the infJuen" of generations on their 
SUC(IIIOrS, (Comte VOl, I page 21 /ill) 
18, There is interesting link to be made with 11aupasunt's idea, cited in chapter two, 
that psychology is hidden in life 
19, It is pertinent at this point to mention an essential difference between Comtian 
positivism and the Twentieth Century logical positivism of English language philosophers, 
Both Comte and the English philosophers share the idea - or at least Comte did during the 
first phase of his philosophy - that all genuine human knowledge is contained within the 
boundaries of science, Thus there is no need for metaphysics, Comte, used physics as a 
Dlodel to create a theoretical structure, positive sociology, It was hoped that this new 
discipline \llould provide, for the first time in history, a scientific basis of the 
reorganization of society, His priority was to isolate fundamental laws which captured the 
development of society - laws which could not be refuted by empirical experiments or 
experience, Together with this grandiose rationalist aim - which Ayer sees as typical of 
Continental pontiffs - his postivism contains other very Cartesian elements, such as the 
idea of the unity of science, Hence the impossibility of practicing one 'iithout the 
others. 
English ordinary language philosophers use logical and mathematical theory in the hope of 
systematizing empiricism - they have the desire for sytematicity in common 'iith Comte, 
However, not only do they dislike grandiose philosophical systems, their aim is much more 
modest than Comte's and very much ~ithin the Humian tradition, Their priority is to apply 
mathematical propositions to language in the hope of proving that there is no such thing 
as a statement \1/hich cannot be ver1fied by experience, What is quite often rAeant by 
"experience" is sense data, 
20, The utilitarian means-end frame\1/ork of analysis was applied to the social organism and 
its parts: 
, . , the clustered citizens forming an urgan rhich produces su11e commodity for 
national use or Wlich utherrise Sltisfies national rants, has t~ithin it/ 
subservient structures like those of each other organ carrying on each other 
function,,, it has a Jet of agencies thich bring the ra11 materials,,./ it has an 
apparatus of 11aJor and 1inor channels through Plhich the necessities of life are 
drafted out of the general stocks circulating throughout the kingdom,' it has 
appliances, . . for bringing those ispulses by 11hi ell the industry uf the place is 
excited or checked,' it has local controJJing pot~ers, political and 
ecclesiastical, by rllich order is maintained and healthy action furthered ... 
(~'pencer page 59 198SJ 
21. It is pertinent here to mention the case of the developmental psychologist Piaget who 
was influenced by Spencer. However, in his sociological thinking on dialectics and 
structuralism, he voices his broad agreement with leading French sociologists/philosophers 
such as Sartre, Levi-Strauss and Althusser. When discussing Althusser's and Godelier's 
structuralist view of Marx, he quotes a paragraph from Godelier \1/ith which he agrees and 
concludes that: 
for structuralism of this sort, structure and function, genesis and history, 
individual and society are -once the instruments of analysis have been refined 
- inseparable, the more so the more it per fee ts its analytic touls. fPiaget in 
Gruber and Vonech page 779 1917) 
This, as shall show in the following chapter, is the conclusion of Sartre's reading of 
the German philosopher. The thesis has important consequences for the understanding of 
Piaget's work, 
22, Societies are made up of primary social units or hordes - a horde being a hypothetical 
concept, much as Rousseau's state of nature, It was a speculative device which gets rid of 
of the individual in the analysis of the origins of society: 
Once this notion of horde .. ,lias been established - t~hether it be conceived IS a 
historic reality or as a llypothesis of science re have the support necessary for 
constructing our complete scale of social types. rourklleim in Hirst page 132 
1975.1 
23, Durkheim proposed to document the change in society, from mechanical to organic 
solidarity, by using "la~s" which did not originate from the individual, but the 
collective - as Rousseau had thought, "Laws" were examples of "social facts", constraining 
the action of individuals, In mechanical solidarity, the aggregate of hordes is held 
together by a network of beliefs or collective consciousness, and only repressive laws 
exist, With an increase in moral density i.e. population, the change to organic solidarity 
occurs. This entails a differentiation in the social organism and an interdependence 
between its parts, Organic solidarity is also characterized by the appearance of 
restitutive laws and freedom from the collective consciousness, This freedom is generated 
by the creation of a state, generator of restitutive la~s and of morality, Whereas 
repressive la~s are a function of the collective consciousness and as such carry with them 
a certain amount of "moral impulsion", restitutive laws are rationalized and implemented 
by the state: punishment is in proportion to the offence and each side of the legal 
commitment is specified, Of special interest here is the idea that the state confers 
freedom, reminiscent of Rousseau's thinking on the issue, 
24, Egoistic suicide was a symptom of the change from mechanical to organic solidarity, 
and resulted from the disintegration of collective values, Without a properly established 
alternative system of values, this disintegration led to a sense of the meaningless of 
life, Anomie suicide was accounted for in terms of economic changes which destabilize 
people's lives, 
25, English sociology has felt the influence of continental Marxism and of American social 
theory, A hint at a possible difference between the English and French Marx - Marxism is 
usually deemed to be a universal language- comes from an article by Little (1967>, In 
this Marx is an advocate of empiricism, revolting against his idealist background <Little 
1987), a reading of Marx opposed to that of Twentieth Century French thinkers. I do not 
wish to imply that all English Marxism makes the same assumptions, ho~ever, Little's 
article suggests that different thought styles will affect readings of foreign writers, 
According to Little, Marx rejected a priori methods of analysis, To substantiate his 
point, he quotes Marx: 
!vents strikingly analogous IJut taking pi8Ce in different historical 
surroundings Jed to totally different results. By studying each of these forms 
of evolution separately and then comparing them one can find the clue to this 
phenomenon, but one t1ill never arrive there by using BS one's master key a 
general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of ~hirh consists in 
being suprahistoriral, (Page 215 in Little 1987) 
Little recog.nizes that Marx lfas not a naive empiricist relying on inductivism without 
theoretical guide but he emphasizes the sharp distinction between Hegelian a priorism and 
Marx's reliance on evidence to validate his claims. However, as Farr (1987) points out in 
a critique of the article, Marx uses certain categories which do not enter the empirical 
vocabulary, yet are crucial to his multi~layered geological approach. Examples of these 
are "essences" and "appearances", laws of history and social relations. 
French Twentieth Century writers have interpreted Marx 'IIi thin the rationalist framework, 
French social thought continued to emphasize the importance of revealing the underlying 
reality of society, Concepts such as Sorel's diremption, Herleau Ponty's Gestalt and 
structural analysis all strive to achieve this, In formulating these concepts Marxism 
proved a key influence in all French twentieth thought, All of them are primarily of 
academic interest, Empirical validation would have proved difficult, particularly in the 
case of a concept such as Sorel's "diremption", Inspired by Marx with whom he enjoyed a 
some\llhat problematic relationship, Sorel developed new concepts to help social 
explanations, "Diremption&" were models/explanations which were abstractions from social 
contexts. They were ideal types, merely attempts at capturing the "fluid character of 
reality", As such, Sorel warned about taking these explanatory concepts too seriously and 
believed that any rigorous definition would be in contradiction to the fluid nature of the 
realm they were describing, In social sciences, he argued, one should proceed by feeling 
one's \!lay: one should try out partial hypotheses and be satisfied by provisional 
approximations, so as always to leave the door open to progressive correction (see Hughes 
Page 174 1958) 
26, Although Macintyre's thought is compatible with American social thinking - not 
surprisingly since he has lived there for twenty years - it displays a certain 
parochialism which makes it typically British, The distinguishing feature between the 
British and the Americans seems to be that the former have an even less idealistic and 
llore pragmatic outlook, The difference between the two Anglo-Saxon nations emerges more 
clearly through examples such as the one in the next chapter: Sedgwick's critique of 
6offman, 
27, 
lie ~iJJ con1ider social systems in thlir relation• to their 11ost important 
environment•. I ~ill contend that the functional differentiations a11ong the 
three Bub-systems of action other than the social - the cultural syste11, the 
personality system, and tile behavioural organism - and the articulation of t11o 
of them ~tith the t11o environments of the entire action s,vstem, constitute very 
maior references for analyzing the differences among social systems, That is, my 
analysis ~iJ 1 be developed en the basis of the funda11ental systes·and-
envircnment relations, /Parsons page 8 /%6J 
28, Moscovici's ideas of a "consensual universe" could also be related to the Meadian 
"generalized other" - symbolic universes issuing from the social interaction between 
individuals. The difference between the philosophies of Mead and Macintyre and that of 
Moscovici, a.s Moscovici himself recognizes, is a matter of emphasis, Mead and Macintyre 
stress the importance of the individual social agent and his understanding of social 
reality - Macintyre shares with American attribution theorists the idea that man is an 
amateur social scientist. Moscovici's "social representations" are social structures which 
are independent of the individual level of society, They mediate •social" explanations 
specific to the society in question, and thus specific to the individual members of that 
society, 
29, If behaviour conforms to the expectations given by a prototype - the result of a 
correlation between behavioural cause and effect - then the attribution is situational or 
external, if it does not, it is internal or personal, The same problem is addressed in 
more global terms in Moscovici 's theory of social representations, which resulted in a 
different explanation of the internal/external dichotomy, Moscovici sees the different 
attributions in terms of right and left wing causality, which are related to different 
social realities, He then goes on to outline an alternative, bi-causal, view of social 
causality, distinguishing between attribution and inference on the basis that: 
On the one hand, by seeking a subiective order behind apparently obiertive 
pheno11ena, the result r~iJJ be an inference,' en the other, by seeking an 
obiective order behind apparently subiective phenosena, the result ~iJJ be an 
attribution, On the one hand, 111 reconstruct hidden intentions to account for a 
persons behaviour: this is a first-person causality, On the other hand, 111 seek 
invisible f~etors to account for visible behaviour: this is a third person 
causality, (lfoscovici page 48 li85) 
The two types of causality act in concert and transitions continually occur between the 
t'IIO, 
30, 
Vhatever psychological significance, if any, one 11ay be prepared to attach to 
the contrast bet~een a female fish and a ,;osan, it cannot be denied that the 
evolutionary process that produced the 11a111Jals has caJJed for a profound 
internalization of flfl)ale Bl.ltuality1 and that this has had very far-reaching 
psychological consequences, sose of ,;hich take the form of resentment and 
dissatisfaction ~ith the female role, Other consequences, of course, are of an 
opposite kind and can afford intense satisfactions which men cannot share except 
by identification and et~pat./ly, There is clearly a difference of opinion in 
analytic circles bet11een those ~llo 11ould agree ~ith freud that the girl rho 
settles t'or fellinity does so only be{ause she gives up the hopeless struggle to 
be a man, and others 11ho hold that feminity is a primary thing, but has to be 
abandoned for a ti11e out of fear of the mother, and that the girl's aas{u/ine 
{/itoral sexuality is temporarily substituted for it, But it seems to me that 
the meaning of the {/iton·s is still some11hat obs{ure, for Hasters and Johnson 
have de11onstrated /.hat it plays an important part in normal sexual e:aiteiJent 
and orgasas, Does this mean that Freud r;as mistaken in assu11ing that the 
{/itoris is nl{essarily associated 11ith 11185(/JJine, penetrative strivings? 
f6illespie in Kohon psge :161 198) 
31. It is difficult to characterize The Independents as they are an eclectic group of 
thinkers - eclecticism was also characteristic of earlier psychoanalytic figures, Rivers 
and Suttie, However, Kohon <1986) identifies one concept as central to the Independents' 
thinking: the transactional object, This was derived from Kleinian psychoanalysis, Klein's 
theory makes use of the idea of instinct, but unlike the ego psychologists, she focused 
upon Freud's late opposition between life and death instincts, Klein uses these to outline 
the innate ambivalence between the ho emotions of love and hate, 111hich the child 
experiences first towards the mother's breast, The child seeks to introject the good 
securing breast and projects its aggression onto the bad frustrating breast, Through this, 
and similar processes of projection and introjection, the child's ego, a rudimentary 
entity at birth, gradually grows. By introjection, the relationship between the child and 
a real object can be conceived in symbolic terms, The libidinal stages in Klein are 
replaced by two positions: the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive. These positions play 
the same role in Klein's theory as the Oedipus Complex does in Freud's, The paranoid-
schizoid position results froro the process of internalization of the good breast and 
rejection of the bad. The depressive position occurs ~hen the child learns to accept that 
the good and the bad are aspects of the same ~hole i.e. comes to terms with ambivalence. 
The centrality of the processes of internalization and projection have led Independents 
like Rycroft to argue that it is the division beheen inner and outer worlds that is 
central to Klein's theory, not the distinction betweem the conscious and unconscious. This 
idea of inner and outer worlds has been important to their idea of an intermediate, or 
transactional realm, whose formation is crucial to the healthy development of the child 
and its concept of self. 
Although Klein's theory uses instincts, it is not perceived by Rycroft and other 
Independents as exclusively an "instinct theory": 
Kleinian theory is an oiJie{t theory not an instinct theory in as 11/Hh as it 
atta{hes central importan" to the resolution of ambivalen" to11srds the mother, 
the breast and regards the ego developaent as being based prisarily on an 
introiedion of the 111other and/or breast. It differs, horever, from the theories 
of Fairbairn ... and Vinni{ott in attuhing little i11portan" to the infant's 
~~tuil experien~e of sotllering, this being overshido~ed in the KJeinian vie11 by 
the infint 's diffictJities in overcoming its innate illbivilence to~irds the 
breist. l'Hycroft page 16 I'J8S.! 
The stress on the mothering 11 experience 11 should be noted and is the result of Suttie's 
influence, 
32, The individual is considered to be primarily object seeking as opposed to pleasure 
seeking, which leads to the conclusion that the most basic fear is not frustrated oral 
gratification but of the loss of significant persons - Suttie's influence is felt here, 
33, The importance of literature to French Freudian psychoanalysis is partly explained by 
its having spent its early career incubated in literature and art, As Benvenuto and 
Kennedy <1986) explain, the prominence of philosophy can also be accounted for in 
educational terms (see chapter six), 
34, Lacan's theory relied on his extensive philosophical education, Heiddegger is the 
source of two central Lacanian concepts: 11 la parole pleine" <full speech> and "la parole 
vide" <empty speech), These mirror Heiddegger's distinction between "rede" <discourse) and 
"gerede" (idle talk), Rede brings the hearer closer to the disclosure of true being and is 
the way in which we articulate "significantly" the intelligibility of being in the world, 
6erede is just a manifestation of ordinary everyday being, Lacan maintains that, in the 
therapeutic consultation, the analyst has to get beyond everyday speech - gerede - to have 
a dialogue \fith the umonscious, source of "la parole pleine" or rede. The art of the 
analyst is to discover what part of the general flow of speech is meaningful: 
He takes the desuiption of an everydiy event for a fable iddressed to whoever 
has eyes to heir, a long tirsde for a direct interiection or,, ,i single slip of 
the tongue for i highly complex statement or even i sigh or i 11011entsry silence 
for the tthole lyriril development it replaces, (Latin Ecrits page II /'JllJ 
35, Despite the cultural consonance beheen Lacan's theory and the French mind, this did 
not stop an awareness that Lacanianism was becoming an abstract, albeit clever, academic 
theory, This was the opinion of political supporters and patients alike, Turkle quotes one 
young communist: 
I don't. think that any of aJ/ those Lscani.n·trained philosophers knoll anything 
about 11entil iii ness or hospitils or ho~ to run them, and I don't think they 
care, I think they 1re interested in theories ana Wlether you are doing the 
yqung freud or the old freud, the young Narx qr the old Narx, The pirty is a 
serious operatiCin, it needs to lire about people's real problems, It has to 
protect itself from aJJ this theorizing rthen it rofles to ~"~?'!tical political 
sction. (Page /62 /978) 
and a patient of Lacan's: 
t#Jen I began my 1na/ysis, there ~res absolutely no chanre of my going into 
tre~tment rtitll 1 Laranian, I iriS terrorized by the rery idea,., 1fraid f.h1t I 
1111n't of 1 sufficiently high inteJlectual level,,, th1t I ~rouldn't be 
interesting enough,,, I liid to myself: u1 am not an interesting case, suffering 
in iJ/ness is not interesting•, (Turk le page 203 /918.1 
36, The idea of working ~r~ithin a conceptual framework is taken up by Bowie (1979), who 
refers to the importance of Lacan's "loosely moored conceptual mobiles", 'llhich capture 
Freudien theory in a few linguistic concepts, 
37, In his analysis of the unconscious, Lacan applied the Saussurian signifier/signified 
distinction, The algorithm used is S/s, and Lacan argued that the signified or meaning 
slips beneath the signifier, defying our attempts to locate it i.e. that the quest for 
pure meaning is futile, This is reminiscent of the Foucauldian claim that the quest for 
absolute truth is pointless, Instead, we have to look at what he called the signifying 
chain as a clue to structure, Thus the unconscious becomes a kind of multilevelled poetry, 
38, The relationship between the signifier - the desire for the mother - and the signified 
-the phallus- is mediated by the name of the father, The desire of the mother is pushed 
down to an unconscious level, and a chain of signification is built up whereby the name of 
the father becomes attached to the phallus through the invisible mediator of the desire 
for the mother, Lacan's clever use of language and word-play is evident in his 
reformulation of the oedipus complex, He talks of 1) pere-version <father aversion and 
perverse), le nom du p~re <the name of the father and the "no" of the father) 2) le d~sir 
de la mere <the desire for the mother and the mother's desire), The internalization of the 
name of the father leads to the father saying no to the child's desire for the mother, The 
desire of the mother carries the dual implication that the child does not only want to be 
cared for - to be the object for the mother's desire - but also desires the mother to 
complete her, to become her phallus, 
39, 
40, 
... on 1 be~u remplarer Je papa-ma11n tfiditionnel pil' une function-sire, une 
function pire, nous nli voyons pas bien ce qu'on y gagne, saul J fonder 
I 'universaliti d'Oedipe au-dlla des images, fOeleuze and 6uattari page 98 !972J 
Chaptlil' I. The Desiring /'lachine 
It is 1t t~ork neryt~here, functioning sMoothly 1t times, 1t other times in fits 
1nd st1rts. It bre~thes, it he~ts, it e~ts, It sltits and tucks, Vhat a mist«ke 
to hive ever said t.he i.d. £veryrhere 1.1 is machines - real ones, not figurative 
ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, 
with all the necessary coupling and connections, An organ-lachine is plugged 
into an energy-source machine: the one produces a fJo11 that the other 
interrupts, The breast is a mil/tine that produces 11ilk, and the mouth a machine 
coupled to it, The mouth of the anorexic ;;avers betreen sever~J functions: its 
possessor is uncertain as to rhether it is an eating-machine or an anal machine, 
a talking-mllhine or a breathing-mllhine (asthma), Hence 111 are all hant!Jmen 
earn ~ith his little machines, For every organ-machine an energy-flachine: 111 
the time f Iotts 1nd interruptions. (De leuze and 6u1ttari in TurkJe p1ge 148 1978 
for French version see Capitalisme et Schizophrenie Jj!2J 
Unlike Lacan, however, Deuleuze and Guattari do not think about schizophrenia in such a 
rigid intellectual structure, To an even greater extent than Lacan, they emphasize the 
socio-political aspect of the problem, Their ideas have been used by sociologists such as 
Castel (1982), to criticize Lacanian anti-psychiatry, revealing its function in social 
control, Castel uses them to question the psychoanalytic notion of a "continuum" between 
the normal and the pathological ~hich allows a number of behaviours to be judged pre-
pathological, Deleuze and Guattari have also inspired active political, anti-psychiatric 
organizations such as "Les Guardes Foux", The latter was responsible for uprisings in 
asylums during the seventies. "Les Guardes Foux" believed that Western society is in 
crisis and that the political activist would understand his situation better, if he 
compared it to that of the schizophrenic, The latter is expressing social malaise because 
he is the capitalist subject in crisis, To these more pragmatically orientated 
organizations, Deleuze's and Guattari 's philosophy 'l.las a 111elcome alternative to Lacanian 
intellectual poetry, Ho'l.lever, in the eyes of Anglo-Saxon thinkers, their ideas appear 
theoretical and of little empirical value, (Turkle 1978, Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986) 
41' 
Traditional approiihes to mental disorder rere challenged and ne11 ones adopted 
and ad1pted in a ~tedical setting dominated by military soda/ relations 1nd by a 
particulir mode of industrial liarfare, The rriteria governing this refor~t~~lation 
of psyrhi«try did not revolve around 1 set of sc ientifir judgements of an 
uabstrart ideological kind", but around 1 set of practical problems. These rere 
related to the undermining of army discipline, the existence of a large number 
of service men unfit for any kind of t~ork - military or othert~ise - and the 
aauiJu/ation of substantial pension bills,,. (Stone page 265 1~85) 
42, In France, a strongly institutionalized somatic psychiatry precluded any dialogue with 
Freudian psychoanalysis, Noroever, any psychological elements within psychiatry 'l.lere 
catered for by native theorists such as Charcot and Janet. Thus psychoanalysis in the 
Freudian mode became confined to literary and artistic circles, Despite these modest 
beginnings, the nineteen sixties saw a psychoanalytic explosion, which Turkle (1978) 
attributes to the crisis in French society, Lacanian psychoanalysis presented the French, 
who had seen their whole way of life change, with a new philosophy of life, 
43, Existentialism was a product of the war years, and dealt with issues such as 
alienation under extreme situations which were no longer relevant, The new philosophy of 
structuralism criticized all aspects of culture - much as the Ideologists had done in the 
eighteenth century, The philosopher-historian Foucault explained the success of the 
movement in terms of a consonance between their goals and that of the students: 
flhat the students are trying to do,., and 11hat I myseJf am trying to 
acrompiish, • • is oasiraliy the wAe thing,. f!lhat I am trying to do is grasp the 
ispJicit systems ~t~hirh deter11ine our most fa11iJiar behaviour 11ithout our knof!ling 
it, I a11 trying to find their origin, to sho11 their formation, the constraint 
they impose on US,' I am therefore trying to place 11yself at a distance tros them 
and to shor /lor~ one could escape, (foucault in Turkle page 78 1978) 
Foucault then went on to reveal and analyse underlying social power "structures", 
44, French psychoanalysis' critique was levelled at society in general and at medical and 
psychiatric practice in particular, The anarchic and subversive aspects of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis distinguished it from its American analogue which helped Lacan gain student 
support, It also contrasted with the inclination of the Independent school. As far as 
political commitment 11as concerned, the Independents can be best described as moderate, 
left-wing libertarians, Winnicott sowed praise for mothers and deMocracy, Rycroft, a 
Marxist while still at university, describes his early politics thirty years later in 
terms of "what it 11as fashionable to do" i,e, start on the left and move right with age, 
He maintains a socialist commitment but stresses: 
I have come to think of 'ivilisation as a much more fragile thing than I did 
r~hen I ttas young, It could take generations to rerover violent change, (Rycroft 
page 8 1985) 
Radical politics are not of great relevance to their therapeutically orientated 
discipline, 
45, Although academic institutionalization is a prerequisite for intellectual progress in 
French society, it proved to be the demise of psychoanalysis' subversive potential, 
Perhaps Lacan should have learnt from the American experience 11hich, according to 
Bettelheim (1982), demonstrates how psychoanalysis becomes denatured in academic settings: 
AU/tough freud is often quoted todiy in introductory p1ychology texts, his 
t~ritings hive only superficiaJJy influenced the rork of the academir 
psycflologistl t~ho quote him. (8ettelfleim page 19 1982) 
Turkle's (1978) analysis shows how psychoanalysis has been incorporated into the academic 
structure - it is now an option in the philosophy coune taught in schools, and can be 
taken as a subject in the baccalaur~at examination. Turkle concludes that the consequence 
of its introduction into the academic system is that psychoanalysis has been "normalized" 
and "trivialized", so that what began as a radical politic of change has degenerated, This 
she says occurs in all societies: 
Bvt the Pirisian concentration of students, inteJJectuals and ideologists 
cre1tes 1 particult~rly ch~rgfd hothouse 1tmosphere, vhir~ radical thought turns 
easily into radical chic, rrurkle page /6:J /SJ8J 
46, These contrasting interpretations of Freud's work are of interest not least in view of 
a recent book published by one of his last remaining followers, Bruno Bettelheim, entitled 
"Freud and 11an's Soul" (J982l. Bettelheim decided, after years of practising 
psychoanalysis in America, that it was high time to correct the interpretation given to 
Freudian works in Anglo-Saxon countries, He rightly claimed a privileged understanding of 
the latter in view of his shared background with the Master. Bettleheim's argument centres 
around the mistake Anglo-Saxon writers make in translating Freud in a crudely materialist 
and clinical lrlay, They thus neglect his essential "humanism" - meaning both concern for 
humanity and classical culture - and "literary genius". In transforming psychoanalysis 
into an empirical, therapeutic science, they have mistranslated Freud, They have 
transforbed his words into a scientific terminology which fails to communicate the complex 
philosophical meanings of Freud's classical metaphors, For example, Bettelheim says: 
In his t~ork and his t~ritings, freud often spoke of the soul - of its nature 1nd 
structure, its develop/lent, its attributes, hot! it reveals itself in aJJ t~e do 
and dreafl, 1/nfortunately, nobody rho reads him in English rould guess this, 
because nearly all his many references to the goul, and flatters pertaining to 
the soul, have been excised in translation, (8ettelheim page 4 li82J 
The translation of Freud's tripartite structure into "ld", "Ego" and "Superego" is 
inaccurate, and should be read as the "It", the "I" and the "Over-I", a more personal 
terminology, These mistranslations, Bettelheim notes, do not occur in other languages such 
as Spanish and French, Use of commonsense terms is to be understood as: 
llhenever freud thought it possible, he tried to communicate his net~ ideas in the 
most coJJtmon terms, ~ords that his readers had used since childhood. His greatest 
achievement as a stylist 11as to imbue these 11ords rith nuances, meaning ind 
il7sights t.hat have not been part of their everyday use. llhen he could not 
coJJmunicate sufficiently by using re1diJy fBmiliar terfiJs, he would cr11te ner; 
11ords from com11on ones, sosetises by combining tr;o rords 11ftich is st1ndard in 
the 6erman Jangu1ge. fp1ge 10 1982) 
Of his literary genius he says: 
Language is aJJ-important to Freud's 11ork,' it is the supreme instrument of his 
craft, His use of the 6erm1n langu1ge r;as not only sasterly, but often poetic -
he nearly ilfiiys expressed himself with true eloquence. Hermann Hesse praised 
Freud beC~use his 11ork "convin11s both through its very human and very literary 
qualities" and added that his l1nguage tlhile 11completely inteJJectuaJ is 
beautifuJJy concise in its definitions•, (page 8 1982J 
Freud's literary/philosophical influences included Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Schnitzler, 
Furthermore, Bettelheim refers to the importance of Freud's metaphorical writing in 
"arousing emotions" and "touching a human chord", He points out that the Anglo-Saxon 
cultures, no longer in contact with their classical roots, "lose the suggestive and 
ref erenti a 1 richness" of terras sue h as the Oedipus complex and the psyche, These terms 
operate at rnany levels by overt and covert references to the Greek myth and the issues 
dealt with in Sophocles' play, 
Lacan has shown a meticulous attention to conveying the particular meaning behind Freud's 
writings, Lacan remedied the mistranslation of the German "Wo Es \liar, soil Ich werden" -
usually translated into English as "\llhere the Id ~as the Ego shall be", He corrected "Le 
Moi doit dUoger le Qa" to "La ou fut qa, il me faut advenir", Capturing the complex 
multi-levelled nature of Freud's metaphort& is accomplished in Lacan's work by subtle use 
of language and terminology, Not only does this necessitate a command of his own language 
and stylistics, but also a detailed knowledge of the Freudian corpus, which he seems to 
possess, Lacan betrays the same philosophical interests as Freud, Lacan's analysis of the 
link between the mechanism of the unconscious and rhetoric parallels Freud's analysis of 
the link between dreams and hieroglyphic scripts, As Bowie (1979) points out, both Freud 
and Lacan are interested in the comparison between hieroglyphs/rhetoric and the language 
of the unconscious, because t.hey are fascinated by how such a brutish entity can be so 
cunning in the manipulation of its structures, 
Lacan, like Freud, possesses a concise, intellectual language of expression, Philosophical 
speculation and clever manipulation of language does not prove be to a similar central 
concern to the pragmatically orientated English school, We saw what type of analysis an 
issue such as" Woman and her Discontents" yielded, There is a paradox here, Although Lacan 
addresses many of the questions which Bettelheim maintains are neglected by the Anglo-
Saxon writings, I don't think they appear any mol'e "humanistic" than a work such as 
Winnicott's therapeutic consultations with children, If anything, the convoluted 
theoretical philosophical framework in which he works detracts from any intrinsic 
humanism, which Bowie maintains his ideas embody, This is of course if humanism is taken 
in the sense of concern for humanity, as opposed to an interest in classical culture, 
which Lacan undoubtedly possesses, 
47, Structuralist analysis has exerted a considerable influence on art criticism in the 
Anglo-Saxon world, To present an alternative to this school of thought, Fuller <1980), in 
his work entitled "Art and Psychoanalysis", decided to draw on the ideas of the native 
psychoanalytic school - particularly on those of Rycroft. Comparing this approach with 
that of the structuralists brings out the points made in this chapter, For example, when 
analyzing why we are still able to appreciate and respond to paintings of past centuries, 
Fuller turns to an explanation in terms of universal physiological responses, a 
material/biological explanation, It is individualistic analysis which relies on the 
assumption of the existence of an immutable human nature, 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SARTRE AND FOUCAULT: THEIR ASSIMILATION INTO ANGLO-SAXON 
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MADNESS 
/'fental illness is a social construdion,- psychiatry 
is a social institution, incorporating the values 
and demands of its surrounding society. These 
cone lusions and their supporting argument, deserve 
to be placed in the forefront of aJJ teaching 
material aimed to~tards those ~ho seek guidance on 
the problems of mental illness. Foucault and Laing, 
t1off11an and !J'zasz, Scheff and Lemert, should be 
made part of the curriculum for all aspirant 
therapists, nurses and soc iaJ t~orkers in tlli s 
field. (:;"edgt~ick page iS 1982) 
During the nineteen fifties and sixties. the dilapidated 
state of asylums and the deplorable conditions in which the 
inmates lived. led to a widespread critique of orthodox 
medical psychiatric practice. Anti-psychiatry, as the 
movement became known. generated sociological perspectives 
on madness which accompanied a new rationale of treatment: 
community care. These sociological analyses offered an 
alternative to the biological model of mental illness used 
by psychiatry and addressed the social and political issues 
attached to insanity. The concern in this chapter is to show 
how the national thought styles have influenced these 
sociological writings on madness. This is brought out by 
exploring how two French thinkers. Sartre and Foucault, have 
been read by English writers. The first part of the chapter 
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opens with an exposition of Sartre's philosophy. This is 
followed by an outline of the use to which it was put by 
Laing. The second part consists of a summary of Foucauldian 
thought. The model of the thought styles is then used to 
explain the current polemic inspired by his work, as well as 
the modifications which have made it suitable for its new 
users. The 
ob.i ecti ons 
first 
to 
section covers 
Foucault, the 
some general philosophical 
second deals with the 
methodological objections of social-historians together with 
the alternatives they propose. 
Once again Anglo-Saxon empirical thought style is associated 
with an individualistic micro-social perspective and a 
practical orientation. French rationalism, on the other 
hand, shows a preference for a macro-social theoretical 
approach. The anti-psychiatric writings, the subject of the 
first part of the chapter, show a clear coupling between a 
concern with the "stable" empirical self - described in the 
last chapter as characteristic of perspectives concerned 
with the experience of individuation - and a methodological 
localism or micro-social approach. The methodological 
differences and the contrast between the concepts of self 
developed within the two thought styles relate to their 
different aims: attending to individual experience CLemert 
1951, Laing 1964, Goffman 1961> and generating a general 
social critique CFoucaul t 1968, De leuze and Guattari 1972, 
Lac an 1977). This in turn explains why French anti-
psychiatry was interested in the analysis of the underlying 
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socio-political function of madness and generated a 
1982, Busfield political message CTurkle 1978. Sedgwick 
1986). while Anglo-Saxon writers coupled an investigation 
into the experiential aspect of insanity with a moral 
message. The previous chapter indicated that, within Anglo-
Saxon social discourse, morality has been ·treated in 
different terms from the collectivist social French 
conception - leaving it with an individualistic connotation 
which makes it suitable for this "personal" analysis. The 
moral message seems to be a product of Anglo-Saxon 
libertarianism, which, whether right or left wing, conveys a 
distrust of authoritarian, interventionist grand 
systems/structures <Sedgwick 1982>. This distrust of 
interventionism was highlighted in both the chapters on art 
and science and is reflected in British social discourse by 
its emphasis on the individual and his liberties. 
The second part of the chapter emphasizes how different aims 
have affected the historical writings on madness. Foucault's 
macro-social collectivism has been modified to suit the 
demands of a tradition which has been accustomed to 
referring to historical agents, and which is committed to 
detailed empirical research. The latter entails a more 
focused approach on issues that Foucault deals with on a 
grand scale. In some of the historical literature on madness 
the introduction of an "agent" in history deflects part of" 
the responsibility for the treatment of insanity away from 
bureaucratic political structures. This modification is 
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probably appropriate in the light of the political 
difference discussed in previous chapters. 
THE MEETING OF TWO TRADITIONS 
1) SARTRIAN PHILOSOPHY: A BRIEF OUTLINE 
As with Foucault's, Sartrian thinking is usually discussed 
as two separate periods: his metaphysical, dualistic, 
individualistic phase, and his later Marxist thought. 
However, as with Foucault. the distinction obscures the 
underlying continuity in Sartre' s work, both in terms of 
method and theme: the consistent use of a dialectic method 
outlined first in "Being and Nothingness" (1958) and the 
centrality of human freedom. In both cases the continuity 
stems from ·the fact 
working out of a 
practically applied 
that the first period constitutes the 
philosophical system which is then 
to politics a characteristic of 
rationalist thinking, it has been argued, is that theory 
precedes praxis. The concern with politics was necessary for 
the philosophers to fulfill their role as "pontiffs". Their 
philosophical systems, designed to help people live their 
lives. had to contribute towards the power struggle between 
the dominated and the dominating. 
The roots of Sartrian existentialism lie in the idealism of 
Hegel, the phenomenology of Husserl and Heiddegger, and the 
existentialism of Kierkegaard. This Sartre combined with a 
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reading of the works of Brentano and the Frenchman Bergson. 
whose ideas on the primacy of intentional intuition closely 
parallel those of Sartre concerning intentional 
consciousness. His rationalism is clear in both the method 
and aims of his first philosophical period. culminating in 
"Being and Nothingness" (1958). In her account of Sartre's 
philosophy which concentrates on his first period, Warnock 
C1965) characterizes Sartre as an empiricist, obsessed with 
the "particular" and the "concrete" - in this Warnock seems 
to be a typical part.icularizing Anglo-Saxon. Thus she sees 
him as making philosophical overgeneralizations on the basis 
of specific instances <1965). These overgeneralizations 
originate in Sartre's rationalist epistemology. In "Being 
and Nothingness", his aim was to establish the timeless. 
underlying structures of 
systematically deduce the 
"Being" from which he 
consequences for human 
would 
life. 
Sartre' s 1netaphysical speculations generated within this 
framework were subsequently supported by anecdotes drawn 
from "concrete" life situations. In this. Sartre's method 
was identical to Descartes' , who used examples such as 
melting wax to validate his deductive argument concerning 
the unreliability of sense data. 
"Being" was the fundamental substructure to be analyzed. The 
starting point of Sartre's study was that of an intentional 
consciousness which held the key to these universal truths. 
This was because it "derived from being" CSartre page xxxii 
1958). ' Consciousness was thus a necessary reference point 
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for his study and as such is usually related to Descartes' 
thinking "Cogito" (for detailed discussions of this see 
Warnock 1965, Aronson 1980). Intentional consciousness is 
always direct.ed towards something, and is always aware of 
itself. It was to be the origin of man's freedom and the 
source of meaning imposed on the external world. "A Sket.ch 
for the Theory of Emotions" <1962) was devoted to a 
theoretical analysis of the structure of consciousness and 
how it was able to magically transform the world.;;': 
The freedom of consciousness lay in its power of imagination 
- the possibility of going beyond the present - considered 
in "Being and Nothingness". It enables one to make projects 
for the future which if implemented, change one's situation. 
It would be wrong to interpret Sartrian freedom as absolute. 
Even at this stage Sartre accepted a view of freedom that. 
incorporated an element of determinism which was to grow 
throughout his theorizing. The projects man makes are always 
constrained by his situation in the real world - his class, 
race - factors over which he has no control: 
The for-itself ;Ls, in so far as it appears in a condition 
which it has not chosen, as Pierre is a French bot~rgeois in 
1942, as Schmidt was a Berlin worker in 1870: it J..s. in so 
far as it is thrown into a world and abandoned in a 
'situation': it i2 as pure contingency inasmuch as for it as 
for things in the world, as for this wall. this tree, this 
cup, the original question can be posited: 'Why is this 
being exactly such and not otherwise?' It 1..s. in so far as 
there is in it something of which it is not the fot~ndation -
its pr.e_s.ence to the world. (page 79 1958> 
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The "In-itself"I"For-itself" dichotomy was designed to 
capture the distinction between objects which are determined 
by laws and subjects who are free and are defined by 
"lack". ::• The For-itself, or metaphysical self, is nothing 
but a void, originat.ing in the negation of the In-itself. 
The In-itself is the empirical self of which we are aware in 
our day-to-day activities. It is like material objects: 
determined by outside constraints and is not free. The 
metaphysical self, because of its freedom. is that which 
Sartre is more concerned with. To overcome a dualism 
intrinsic in this separation - the parallel has been drawn 
between Descartes' Res cogi tans and Res extensa - Sartre 
makes the for-itself dependent on the in-itself: 
... The For-itself aJJd the In-itself are reunited by a 
synthetic connection which is nothing other than the For-
itself itself. the For-itself, in fact, is nothing bvt the 
pure nihilation of the In-itself; it is like a hole of being 
at the heart of Being. (page 617 1958) 
... the For-itself has no reali(v save that of being the 
nihilation of being. Its sole qualification comes to it from 
the fact that it is a nihilation of an individval and 
particular In-itself and not of a being in general. (page 
618) 
These quotations, drawn from the conclusion of "Being and 
Nothingness" emphasize that what Sartre is interested in is 
the totality of "Being". The For-itself and In-itself are 
merely heuristic devices necessary to reveal its st.ructure. 
They are, however, essential to his dialectic approach 
outlined here and brought to fruition in the "Critique of 
Dialectic Reason" 0976). The dichotomy also enables him to 
translate the Hegelian master/slave conflict into his own 
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terminology. It is presented as a struggle between the 
subject or For-itself and the "Other", who because of his 
consciousness deprives the For-itself of freedom by reducing 
it to an object of consciousness. 4 
"Being and Nothingness" is also the work where Sartre 
defines concepts such as "anguish", "bad-faith", "viscosity" 
and "nausea" which he dealt with extensively in his literary 
work. It is clear :from a reading of "Being and Nothingness" 
and his theory of emotion that Sartre is not an empiricist 
in the Anglo-Saxon sense. His ideas on emotion were a 
product of philosophical reflection and as such only work 
well when applied to negative emotions, such as anguish and 
fear, which dominated his thinking. As for "Being and 
Nothingness", although it includes anecdotal evidence, its 
function is merely to support convoluted philosophical 
analyses of the structure of "Being", using the a priori 
concepts mentioned above. Although perhaps "anguish" and 
"bad faith" are i ntell igi ble through experience, "nausea" 
and "viscosity" are not. "Anguish" and "bad faith" manage to 
capture the moral dilemmas which may be experienced by 
social agents. These agents may indeed experience discomfort 
in choosing between alternative courses of action 
" 
"anguish". They may resort to the options of "bad faith~: 
for example behaving as an "in itself" i.e. as if determined 
by uncontrollable outside laws, or a "for others", taking on 
assigned roles. What is rationalist here is not Sartre's 
concepts but his method of expressing them: using specific 
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"trademarks" (Lamont 1987) and complicated metaphysical 
arguments. The "viscous" and "nausea" are metaphysical 
descriptions, to be understood intellectually. Viscosity is 
designed to capture man's relationships with "things in 
themselves" and sometimes his projects. He wants to control 
them but they elude him; sometimes even cont.rolling him. 
"Nausea" is the expression of what man feels when he 
realizes his contingency in the material world which he can 
only escape through imagination. Unlike anguish or bad-
faith, it cannot be maintained that either viscosity or 
nausea are actually experienced. 
The "Critique of Dialectic Reason" <1976) has been the 
subject of similar polemical discussions as Foucault's 
"Madness and Civilization", and for similar reasons: it is a 
long work whose style is difficult and convoluted to Anglo-
Saxon audiences. Again like "Madness and Civilization". many 
criticisms have been made of the "Critique" both in France 
and Britain, although it has not been widely read in this 
country. What Sartre says in the "Critique" is often 
contradictory, and is best understood in con.j unction with 
the "Search for a Method" and his later biography so 
called, although it is perhaps better described as a work in 
psychohistorical speculation of Flaubert. The "Critique" 
is best seen as an application of the dialectic developed in 
"Being and Nothingness" to a Marxist study of history. 
Sartre's Marxism has to be understood as a reaction against 
the stark material ism of Stalinist Russia and the objective 
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determinism of French positivism. the "Search" and t.he 
"Critique" are attempts to modify both by introducing "Human 
praxis" as subjective component. This does not make him 
guilty of the individualism which Aronson (1980) accuses him 
of. Two things at least have to be remembered which go 
against Aronson's accusation: 1) on page 36 of the 
"Critique" Sartre pronounces that man is dead and 2) he 
l~intains that his ideology of existentialism was only 
possible within a Marxist framework. More to the point, 
Sartre acknowledges that, as "consciousness" was before it. 
"human praxis" was only a heuristic device, an alternative 
inroad into the problem of history. The real object of the 
work was to examine the interaction between "human praxis" 
and "Totalisation" an equally a priori concept. "Hu1~n 
praxis''. the source of creativity in history was analyzed in 
similar terms to consciousness, the source of "human 
freedom". Human beings find themselves in specific objective 
situations. These they interpret subjectively which enables 
them to transcend the immediate situation to a new objective 
situation. What is, however, crucial is that the projects an 
individual 1~kes are dependent upon "the totality" i.e. 
determined by living in the world at a particular time. Man. 
the author of "human praxis" is a creative force in history 
but is determined by it: 
Onl_v the project, as a mediation between two momeJlts of 
obJectivity. can account for history; that is. for human 
creativity. It is necessary to choose. In effect: either we 
reduce every thing to identity (which amounts to 
substituting a mechanistic materialism for dialectical 
materialism) - or we can Ilh."ike of dialectic a celestial law 
which imposes itself on the Universe, a metaphysical force 
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which by itself engenders the historical process (and this 
is to fall back into Hegelian idealism) - or we restore to 
the individual man his power to go beyond his situation by 
means of his worlr and action. This solution alone enables us 
to base the movement of totalization upon the real. (page 99 
1963) 
At no time did Sartre want t.o separat.e the individual and 
society. and he was even critical of American sociology for 
doing so. The need was for a "totalising" perspective to 
understand historical meaning, which properly revised 
Marxism would be. In essence, he agreed with the Marxist aim 
of giving a single meaning to history in. which a unified 
proletariat would bring to an end the class struggle. 
However, the Marxist dialectic as it stood was inadequate 
because it became obsessed with the material "mode of 
production". Sartre' s argument. retaining the distinction 
between the "In-itself" and "For-itself", was that man was 
mediated by things just as things were mediated by man. 
However, the "practico-inert", !E.' is a concept which 
symbolizes how men in society are dominated in the 
capitalist world of "scarcity" by a product which is the 
work of all. The repository of meanings and actions, the 
"practico-inert" the equivalent of the mode of production 
with a subjective component added - determines the activity 
of a collection of "serial" individuals. i.e. individuals 
living side by side. The Sartrian analysis culminates in a 
view that holds that man's salvation i.e. the overcoming of 
scarcity, lies in the activity of the "fused group" which 
requires complete identification with the "Other" the 
enemy in "Being and Nothingness". This group forms a new 
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self-conscious "being" with a capacity to achieve a common 
goal. Although freedom is ever present in human action. 
because of its power to overcome capitalist alienation . the 
"fused group" is the ultimate symbol of freedom. After the 
introduction of the fused group, Sartre' s study is given 
over to developing a priori concepts to describe "the movj_ng 
totality of the working class" <Poster page 100 1975). The 
focus is no longer "Human praxis", which further contravenes 
claims of individualism. In effect, the "Critique" was a 
theoretical understanding of history using the dialectic of 
"Being and Nothingness". It was to provide categories which 
would reintroduce subjectivity into history. Poster in 1975 
argued that their validity still had to be established 
through empirical investigation.,; 
In the 11 Critique". Sartre was still resisting positivism's 
rigid determinism. In his last work on Gustave Flaubert. an 
encounter between an individual and history, this had been 
replaced by a more positive statement of determinism. 
Flaubert was portrayed as being produced by a particular set 
of historical conditions, exteriorising them in his work. It 
is an idea which is familiar to Hegelian idealism and 
Comtian. positivism, and foreshadowed structuralism. Thus 
Sartrian "individualism". if it exists. is of a different 
kind to that found in Anglo-Saxon literature. The clearest 
demonstration lies in the concepts of "self" generated at. 
different periods. As mentioned above. Sartre first tried to 
isolate the struct.ures of "Being" or Etre. The key tool in 
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this process was consciousness which is not "self". The In-
itself. what man is aware of in his social dealing - the 
equivalent of Mead's social self is nothing but an 
illusion. The For-itself, or metaphysical self, is defined 
by nothingness. There are no words to describe it as it is 
an epist.emological category not an experient.ial phenomenon. 
The concept of "self" thus becomes a myth: 
Selfness represents a degree of nihilation carried further 
than the pure presence to itself of the pre-reflective 
cogito - in the sense that the possible which I a.m is not 
pure presence to the for-itself as reflection to reflecting, 
but that it is absent-presence. (Sartre page 143 1958) 
Sartre gives credence to t.his non existence by making 
consciousness which is not self the centre of his analysis. 
and the For-itself, the real self, a void. The definition of 
the "subject" or author of individual praxis - in "The 
Search for Method" a preliminary to the "Critique" 
forshadowed that later used by structuralists like Lacan. It 
is defined in linguistic terms, emphasizing that the real 
meaning of the "subject" lies in culture and common 
"praxis": man has become both the signifier-signified and 
signified-signifier CSartre page 156 1963). 
2) LAING: A CASE OF TRADITION TRANSCENDED? 
Laing aimed to use Sartre's radical philosophy to provide an 
alternative to the biological model of schizophrenia used by 
orthodox psychiatry, which he judged as dehumanizing in its 
reductionism. Interestingly, at the beginning of "Reason and 
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Violence", written by Laing and Cooper in 1964, Sartre 
praises them for their accurate interpretation of his 
writings. Despite this, Sartre's thinking appears in a 
modified form in Laing's writings: Laing interprets Sartre 
:from within an empirical tradition which emphasizes 
individual experience. Thus he concentrates on the personal 
experiential component of madness using a clinical empirical 
method to capture the "mad" experience. This methodology, 
appropriate to his aims, generates a micro-social 
perspective which also betrays his confessed distrust of 
macro-social systems (Sedgwick 1982). In this way he arrives 
at a different position to that of his critics, Deleuze and 
Guattari, similarly inspired by the French philosopher. The 
argument is that. despite his accurate interpretation of 
Sartre's thought and his use of phenomenological 
terminology, the emphasis of his work and its methodology is 
more closely related to that o:f his American colleagues who 
possessed similar interests. 
Laing attacked psychiatry's objective scientific framework 
which would never allow communication with the patient. This 
was because it t.reated the patient as a biological object 
not as "a whole person". Laing used existentialism to 
contextualize schizophrenia and make it intelligible: 
The mad things said and done by the schizophrenic will 
remain essentially a closed book if one does not understand 
their existential context. (Laing page 18 1960J 
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In "The Divided Self" C1960). Laing used the philosophy of 
"Being and Nothingness" 0958) to develop the concept of 
"ontological insecurity". According to Laing, a 
"ontologically secure" person: 
. . . wi 11 encounter all 
spiritual. biological, 
ow.n and other people's 
1960) 
the hazards of life, social. ethical. 
from a centrally firm sense of his 
reality and identity. (Laing page 38 
sane 
Failure to develop ontological security results in a split 
into an internal and external self. The internal self, which 
may be experienced as nothing more than a void, perceives 
the body and its actions as external, The behaviour of the 
external self is a defense mechanism against "engulfment" of 
the internal self. At this point, Laing steers a different. 
course to Sartre. Laing is int.erested in the breakdown of 
this stable identity which leads to schizophrenia, not the 
metaphysical void which does not relate to experience. An 
important consequence of Laing's focus on personal 
experience is that the individual and society are separated. 
The schizophrenic is rendered "mad" by the "bad" world. He 
is retreating from the threat of a society, which Laing 
depicts as a unitary and "out-there" concept CJaccoby 1975, 
Banton et al 1985>. It is society's "out-there" nature which 
makes the Laingian "radical trip" (Sedgwick 1982) possible. 
The idea that the schizophrenic is sane on a voyage of inner 
discovery and that society outside is mad is impossible in 
Sartrian ontology. For the Sartre of "Being and 
Nothingness", there is no inner universe: man and society 
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are fused into "the universe of human subjectivity" <page 55 
1948). In the "Critique", the individual and his actions can 
only be understood in terms of the "·totality". Thus. where 
Sartre pro_j ected the individual outwards, Laing turned him 
inwards. 
Evidence for Laing's empiricism, lies in a tendency he 
shares with his psychoanalytic colleagues to simplify 
te:t-·minology (Sedgwick 1982). A comparison of Laing's account 
of the development of self-consciousness and Sartre's 
analysis of consciousness in "Being and Nothingness" 
illustrates this point: 
. . . an awareness of oneself by oneself. and an awareness of 
oneself as an object of so.meone else's observation ... These 
two forms of awareness of the self as an object in one's own 
eyes and as an object in the other's eves are closely 
related to each other. (Laing page 106 1965) 
Consciousness is the revealed-revelatioll of existents. and 
existents appear before consciousness on the foundation of 
their being. Nevertheless the pri~ry characteristic of the 
being of an existent is never to reveal itself completely to 
consciousness. An existent can not be stripped of its being: 
being is the ever present foundation of the existent: it is 
everywhere in it and nowhere. (page xxxviii 1958) 
By simplifying terminology. Laing makes Sartre's ideas 
amenable to empirical validation i.e. verification. using 
case hi stories. For example, in "The Divided Self", his 
ideas on self-consciousness are illustrated with reference 
to the case history of the schizophrenic Peter. 
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That Laing's clinical empiricism was tied to his focus on 
the experiential, comes to the fore in "Sanity, Madness and 
the Family" 0964). Here, he moves from the personal to the 
interpersonal. analyzing the problem of schizophrenia in the 
broader context of the family. In the introduction. he 
maintains t.hat his ideas on group interaction were derived 
from Sartre' s "Critique of Dialectic Reason" <1960). Sart.re 
helped him to conceive of the fami 1 y as an independent 
structure or "nexus". not bearing to the individual a 
relationship of whole to part <c. f. Sartre' s idea of the 
"fused group">. Such an analysis. would. according to Laing, 
require a methodology which would allow 1) the study of each 
person in the family 2> the relation between persons in the 
family and 3) the family itself as a system. However, the 
clinical method that Laing eventually uses, relying on 
interviewing family members in groups and individually 
does not capture the independent nature of the family system 
which he has argued for. Instead, it details the experience 
of the patients and the other family members, making the 
"nexus" equivalent to a complex set of interpersonal 
relationships. as he himself admits: 
As such. the focus remains somewhat on the identified 
patient, or on the mother-daughter relationship; on the 
person in-a-nexus, rather than on the nexus itself? This we 
believe to be historically unavoidable. That this study is 
transitional is both its weakness and its strength, in that 
we hope it will constitute a bridge between past and future 
efforts in the understanding of madness. (Laing page 27 
1964.> 
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Despite realizing this methodological failure, Laing and his 
colleagues, Cooper and Esterson, did not conceive of an 
alternative, as Esterson' s "The Leaves of Spring" (1970), a 
study identical in format, demonstrates. That the clinical 
empirical approach is perhaps unsuited to the study of 
nexuses, would not be a problem if Laing had not assumed 
that his st.udy proved that "the behaviour of schizophrenics 
is much more socially intelligible than has come to be 
supposed by many psychiatrists" <Laing page 27 1964). By 
introducing the word "social" in a study focusing on family 
interaction, Laing left himself open to the reproach of 
"familialism". i.e. of not addressing the broader issue of 
the role of the family in society, voiced by the two French 
authors Deleuze and Guattari CGuattari 1972) 7 and echoed by 
Anglo-Saxon Marxists (Jaccoby 1975, Sedgwick 1982). Laing's 
strong leaning towards a familial explanation of madness can 
be accounted for by several factors. It was certainly 
partially the result of his work with Americans such as 
Bateson (1956) who advocated this type of interpersonal 
analysis. However, 
Scottish heritage. 
Laing's case is complicated by his 
In view of the moral nature of his 
message, the pull towards a familial explanation might have 
been accentuated by the centrality of the family to the 
Protestant morality of his upbringing. Whether the family or 
society is the critical unit of study is a matter of debate 
that has transcended national boundaries. Indeed Deleuze and 
Guattari likewise accused Lacan of familialism. What unites 
Deleuze and Guattari with Lacan against Laing is the primacy 
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of political and epistemological concerns - also Sartre's -
which contrast with Laing's experiential and moral ones: in 
other words. they have different goals. 
Laing shares his cmnmi tment to the personal and the 
experiential with his psychoanalytic colleagues of the 
Independent school. Like them, Laing was int.erested in the 
empirical self - of pragmatic use in explaining the success 
or failure of individuation and not the Sartrian 
epistemological category. Furthermore, in his later work, 
"Conversations with Children", he adopts an approach 
reminiscent of Winnicott's by its emphasis 
uncontaminated, naturalistic observation: 8 
After pondering over it a 1 ot. I ha. ve decided not to 
introduce their conversations with a theoretical essay on 
them nor to footnote them in the IIJany places where I have 
felt tempted to do so. The best order I think is to let them 
stand on their own, and for them to be read, in the first 
place with the fewest possible theoretical presllppositions. 
(Page viii 1978) 
on 
Laing's work also shares features with American authors on 
the subject of mental illness authors whose works have 
been popular and influential in this country. These include 
methodological localism <Jaccoby 1985, Sedgwick 1982, 
Busfield 1985) or a micro-social perspective which is 
associated with the detailing of individual experience. 
Followers of Sullivan located mental illness in 
interpersonal relationships. The functionalist thinkers, 
following Mead, developed operational definitions of self in 
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interaction with society. Goffman. like Laing. focuses on 
the subjective. experiential component of madness. Again 
like Laing. his definition of self is of empirical value in 
capturing the "mad" experience and contrasts with those of 
the macro-social French. referred to in the last chapter in 
the section on Lacan. 
Bateson (1956) and Lidz (1958/1960) influenced Laing's 
analysis of schizophrenia. They adopted Sullivan's approach 
of looking at the disorder in terms of interpersonal 
relationships. Sullivan had read the German phenomenological 
psychiatrist Jaspers, and credited him with a perceptive 
insight into the schizophrenic problem. He. like Laing. 
refused to treat schizophrenic patients as just so many 
incurable cases. Instead. Sullivan felt. he, and psychiatry 
more generally: 
. . . must deal with disordered living of subject-persons in 
and within their personal complexes. It is not an impossible 
study of an individual suffering mental disorder; it is a 
study of disordered interpersonal relations nucleating more 
or less clearly in a particular person. (Sullivan page 258 
1962)'"' 
This is the point that Laing tries to make in all his key 
writings, the interpersonal relations he chooses to focus on 
are those of the family. Bateson concentrated on the role of 
disordered communication, the genesis of the illness. His 
concept of the "double bind" refers to ambiguous 
communication situations where the verbal and non-verbal 
communicat.i ons are discrepant. Lidz focused on the "schism". 
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generated during parental conflict, and the "skew'', when one 
partner dominates the other. The double bind, schism and 
skew situations result in family conflict and a concomitant 
neglect of the child's development. 10 
Academic sociologists of the functionalist school or 
affiliates to it - such as Parsons <1951), Lemert (1951) and 
more recently, Scheff <1966/1984), have chosen to focus on 
"social selves in interaction" in their analysis of the 
genesis of madness hence their methodological localism. 
There are two slightly different perspectives on the 
issue. 1 1 However, in both cases, the authors are trying to 
analyze how meanings are generated or acquired through 
social interaction and the way in which the individual self 
is affected by taking on the attitudes of others. In the 
introduction to the second edition of his "On Being Mentally 
Ill", Scheff C1984) praises Laing, Goffman, Lemert and Szasz 
for developing an approach that "gives more emphasis to 
social processes than does traditional psychiatric theory 
yet does not neglect the individual aspects" Cpage 8 1984). 
Although his research is centred on the social processes, 
this is merely to complement the individualistic approaches 
of psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Scheff argues that 
individual and social systems act in concert t.o generate 
madness. Thus, like Laing, Scheff clearly distinguishes 
between the individual and society. There is "interaction" 
as opposed to "fusion" implied in the dialectical methods of 
Sartre and Foucault. Social action is, once again, 
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"situated" not "determined". There have been many criticisms 
of this form of social reductionism. More recently the 
writers of "The Politics of Mental Health" <1985> have 
accused Scheff of transforming people into judgemental dupes 
by his over simplistic analysis. However, labelling theory's 
continued attractiveness lies in its amenability to 
empirical verification. The empirical studies that have 
tried to establish the validity of the labelling theory 
include l!lost notably West's <1973) on a group of deviant 
London boys .. , ~;" 
In a more literary narrative vein, Goffman shared the 
concern of academic functionalists namely the effect of 
social interaction on the self concept. He combines a 
greater emphasis on the individual's experience of mental 
illness with an analysis of face-to-face interaction or 
"interaction orders". The preferred method of study of these 
"orders" is microanalysis CGoffman page 2 198.'3). Goffman's 
reason for promoting research into face-to-face interaction 
is not only that such encounters can have a profound effect 
on social structure <page 10 1983), but also "that in them 
and them alone we can fit a shape and dramatic form to 
matters ·that aren't otherwise palpable to the senses" Cpage 
9 1983). Goffman openly acknowledges the subjective. 
experiential dimension that this type of analysis entails. 
In "Asylums" C1968), face-to-face interaction is analyzed in 
the context of the workings of a total institution. Goffman 
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develops the concepts of a "moral career", and "primary" and 
"secondary" adj ust:ment. Primary adjustment refers to the 
internalizing of an "insti·tutionalized" self, secondary 
adjustment, to the stage ·.-~hen t.he individual can stand apart 
from his alloted role.''"'' "Asylums" is typical of Coffman's 
mastery of micro-social, contextual analysis. 
"Stigma" <1970) is specifically orientated towards studying 
how interpersonal interaction affects concepts of self. Of 
particular note in this passage are the ideas of individual 
"will" and "psychological integrity", akin to Laing's idea 
of identity, and the focus on "norms" constraining 
"individual action" typical of American functional ism. 'c. The 
idea of psychological integrity is particularly important in 
the light of Macintyre's C1985) comparison between Sartre's 
and Coffman's concepts of the "social self". 
argues that they are fundamentally equivalent: 
Macintyre 
both are 
defined in terms of a collection of roles. However, 
Macintyre also draws our attention to the fundamental 
difference between the Frenchman and the American when he 
says that "in Coffman's anecdotal descriptions of the social 
world, there is still discernible that ghostly "I" the 
psychological peg to whom Coffman denies substant.i al 
sel fhood" Cpage 32 1985). Sartre' s metaphysical language of 
"Being" is more successful at dismantling this 
"psychological peg". 
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Goffman's success lies in his descriptive abilities and 
attention to detail which explains his continuing 
popularity. despite his work being dated.'"" He has been 
influential in inspiring two Englishmen, Wing and Brown 
(1970), to carry out similar studies. Their efforts are 
described favourably by Sedgwick <1982). who considered 
their "focus on the minutiae of specific patients lives" 
counting underwear in backwards as a bet.ter pointer to 
hospital theory or policy than Goffman's "tragic eloquence". 
This "hard nosed" investigation, even more empirical in 
orientation, appeals to Sedgwick's Englishness. Evidence for 
Sedgwick's and Wing's similar outlook on the problem of 
mental illness can be :found in Sedgwick's "Psychopolitics" 
C1982), and Wing's "Reasoning about Madness" C1978). Both 
considered mental illness as a crippling reality, and were 
not prepared to dismiss it as the result of labelling or 
social construction while empirical evidence and personal 
experience suggested to the contrary. 
Goffman' s eloquence is not his only failing, according to 
Sedgwick. Oddly, after praising the focused approach of Wing 
and Brown, he criticizes Goffman's "methodological localism" 
and "individual ism" which preclude him from attaining the 
status of a critical theorist. Ironically, Goffman does not 
pretend to talk about broad social issues, and blatantly 
states his interest in the individual and experiential 
component of mental illness. Goffman's excuse for this 
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orientation resembles Laing's for his interpersonal analysis 
of schizophrenia: 
I am not addressing the structure of social li:fe but the 
structure of experience individuals 1uzve at any mo.roent of 
their social lives. I personally hold society to be first in 
every way and any individual's current involveJDent to be 
second; this report deals with IIJatters that are second. 
(GoffiiJan in Sedgwick page 65 1968) 
Society may be "first", but individual experience is what is 
most important, precisely the message conveyed by Laing's 
writings. Besides, deep structural analysis of social life 
may be inappropriate because "From the perspective of the 
physical and biological sciences it [social life) is only a 
small irregular scab on the face of nature, not particularly 
amenable t.o deep systematic analysis" Cpage 17 1983). 
HISTORICAL TRADITIONS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
1) FOUCAULT 
Although recognized as influential by Anglo-Saxon 
historians.''"' Foucault's work has not met with unqualified 
praise. Foucault has to be understood against a tradition of 
Continent.al thought CRajchman 1985, Harland 1985). ''·'·'' His 
roots in Hegelian philosophy appear in his concept of the 
episteme, usually related to that of the Zeitgeist <Harland 
1985). His Durkheimian heritage, on the other hand, is 
evident in the continuing emphasis on the unthought, a 
priori foundations of society. Foucault's thinking is also 
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firmly rooted in the French tradition of the epistemology of 
science, developed by Cavailles. Bachelard and Canguilhem. 
When Foucault's mentors have been studied in this country. 
they have been interpreted from within a different thought 
style, an 
philosophy 
additional reason 
remains somewhat. 
perhaps 
alien to 
why 
his 
Foucault's 
Anglo-Saxon 
audience. ·;;::o To complicate matters, besides his very 
different intellectual background, Foucault's philosophy is 
judged to be incoherent due to the split between his 
archeological and genealogical periods, a discontinuity 
which is more apparent than real Csee section on Sartre). 
Whereas in the Archaeology, the focus is on the "episteme" 
governing the formation of discourses, in the Genealogy, the 
notion of the "power-knowledge" complex, another 
hypothetical concept. is developed to articulate his 
the episteme is retained in the critique. In fact., 
genealogical study, "Discipline and Punish" <1977), where a 
distinction is made between the different forms of power 
deployed at different historical stages. ::': 1 Moreover. both 
periods use the notion of historical discontinuity and are, 
in keeping with his rationalist, Durkheimian heritage. 
characterized by being histories of categories and terms, 
not of people. In fact, Foucault moves even further away 
from the idea of a subject or agent than the social 
philosophers referred to in the chapter on social discourse. 
Like other members of the structuralist movement. Foucau 1 t. 
believes that. one can only talk about individuals in terms 
of social beings overwritten by social ideology. 
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The problem has been for many readers that Foucault goes 
beyond "abstract" collectivist structures such as the state 
and class, focusing on a deeper level in his attempt to 
avoid the crucial stumbling block of social science 
methodology: the subject-object dilemma. Foucault's aim -
like Lacan's is primarily to develop a coherent 
theoretical framework for social criticism: 
The use of concepts of discontinuity, rupture. threshold, 
limit, series. and transformation present all historical 
analysis not only with questions of procedure, but with 
theoretical problems. It is these problems that will be 
studied here Cthe questions of procedure will be examined in 
later empirical studies - if the opportunity, the desire. 
and the courage to undertake them do not desert me). These 
theoretical problems too will be examined only in a 
particular field: in those disciplines - so unsure of their 
frontiers, and so vague in content that we call the 
history of ideas, or of thought, or of science, or of 
knowledge. CFoucaul t page 21 1972) 
Thus Foucault's critique of psychiatry in "Madness and 
Civilization" 0967) was only part of a larger critique of 
. 
social power. "Madness and Civilization" belongs to his 
archaeological period, devoted to the analysis of 
discourses: the conditions of their emergence and their 
!'ield of operation. :;;:~2 Foucault isolated the concept of the 
episteme or underlying structure of discourse, a 
hypot.hetical concept and the cornerstone of his 
archaeological thought. In "The Order of Things" <1970)' 
Foucault explicitly distinguished between a) the Renaissance 
episteme built around resemblance b) the Classical episteme 
built around the principle of classification c) the Modern 
episteme, conceptualized as a volume defined by three 
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dimensions, namely mathematical sciences. philosophical 
reflection. and the science of language and production: the 
era of positivism and d) the Post-Modern period of 
structuralism, the period of abstract :forces of 
signification. That discourses are governed by different 
epistemes at different periods was important to Foucault, 
because he believed that they are what shape and control 
social life. Assumptions such as the existence of a 
universal "human nature" ignore the power social forces 
exert over individuals. For example, what are usually 
considered as biological entities. sexual desires, are not 
merely the product of physiology and choice, but are 
structured by systems of discourse that develop a certain 
aim, shape and content for the desires <Foucault 1978). 
Furthermore, epistemic differences were also important 
because they stressed discontinuity in history 
eliminated the necessity to refer to a coherent subject: 
On the contrary, my aim was tiJI show what the differences 
consisted of, how it was possible for men, within the saiDe 
discursive practice, to speak of different objects. to have 
contrary opinions, and to make contradictory choices: ~v aim 
was also to show in what way discursive practices were 
distinguished from one another: in short, I wanted not to 
exclude the problem of the subject, but to define the 
post ti ons and functions that the subject could occupy in the 
diversity of discourse. (Foucault page 100 1972) 
and 
After "The Order of Things", Foucault went on to define the 
"archive" in "The Archaeology of Knowledge" (1972). In the 
same work, he outlined the conditions of existence of the 
"statement" and its practical field of application the 
archive being a collection of such statements which exist in 
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a particular period of history. and in a particular 
culture/society. This is in keeping with his aim of 
isolating a "general theory of production" Csee footnote 
22). Finally. in "The Birth of the Clinic" <1973), Foucault 
analyzed how discursive and non-discursive factors interact 
to form disciplines such as psychiatry and scientific 
medicine, which look at human beings in terms of objects of 
knowledge over which power can be deployed. "The Birth of 
the Clinic" armounced the Genealogy. 
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche's influence became more 
important and Foucault's attention was turned to the 
relationship between power. knowledge and the body: 
'Effective' history differs from traditional history in 
being without constants. Nothing in man - not even his body 
- is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-
recognition or for understanding other men. The tradi ti anal 
devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and 
for retracing the past as a patient and continuous 
development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily. 
we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage the 
consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge, even under the 
banner of history does nat depend on 'rediscovery' and it 
emphatically excludes the 'rediscovery of ourselves'. 
History becomes effective to the degree that it introduces 
discontinuity into our very being as it divides our 
emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and 
sets it against itself. 'Effective' history deprives the 
self of the reassuring stability of life and nature ... It 
will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly 
disrupt its pretended continuity, This is because knowledge 
is not :made for understanding: it is m<-"tde for cutting. 
(Foucault in Rabinow page 89-90 1984) 
Foucault is still interested in discourses as instruments of 
power. but looks at how these interact with non-discursive 
factors. in the generation of subtle and diffuse repressive 
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strategies, deployed throughout the social system. A typical 
argument is t.hat found in "The History of Sexuality" (1979) 
where "sex" is discussed as a cultural object, created by 
psychological discourses, and subsequently deployed as a 
strategy of bio-power to control bodies. Hence the idea of 
the knowledge-power complex, another hypothetical social 
concept, and a better way of capturing the link between 
discursive and non-discursive factors. Like madness analyzed 
in the Archaeology, sex is only part of a wider social 
critique of Foucault's power is another non 
empirical. a priori entity, not equivalent to the idea of 
law or "droit", emanating from a sovereign figurehead or 
state. It is described as a series of strategies deployed in 
a variety of subtle and diffuse ways throughout the social 
system. which are inextricably linked with knowledge and 
were embodied in buildings such as the panopticon: 24 
... 'police' is the enseEble of Eechanisms serving to ensure 
order, the properly channeled growth of wealth and the 
conditions of preservation of health 'in general'. (Foucault 
in Rabinow page 277 1984)''-·s 
It is interesting to compare Foucault's account of the 
sequestration of the insane with that of Szasz, of lasting 
popularity in Anglo-Saxon countries.;;,,~, Szasz combined Rylian 
philosophy and Spencerian sociology to provide an 
alternative method of challenging the orthodox progressive 
model of psychiatric practice in "The Manufacture of 
Madness" C1972). He agreed with the Foucauldian idea of 
psychiatry as a form of power. However, his critique depends 
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on a human motive - that of scapegoating - the reason for 
its existence remaining unexplained <Szasz 1972>. Psychiatry 
is a new form of inquisition where the scapegoat is no 
longer t.he witch. but rather the mental patient. Foucault. 
by his negation of a historical agent could not accept such 
an analysis. His challenge to progressiveness 1 ies in the 
episteme. The treatment of the mentally ill at each 
historical period has its own form of rationality and has to 
be understood as a function of the episteme of the period. 
In this epistemic analysis, madness becomes the prisoner of 
the classical episteme which is dominated by the value of 
rationalism. The conditions under which it is imprisoned are 
those of the emerging bourgeois capitalist society. The 
Foucauldian analysis is aimed at discovering the strategies 
of power of contemporary society. Not being as blatant as 
those of 
message 
the 
is 
past, they 
in keeping 
are all the 
with his 
more dangerous. 
political aims 
His 
and 
consequently different from Szasz's moral one. Furthermore, 
Foucault's political aims contrast. with those of a theorist 
such as Goffman who focuses on the personal dimension of 
individual experience. This is why Foucault wanted to create 
a theoretical system in which social events can be analyzed, 
instead of meticulously describing and contextualizing them 
as Goffman did. 
2) SOME OBJECIONS TO FOUCAULDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
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Sedgwick's (1982) criticism of Laing, of not locating 
schizophrenia within a historical context, is dealt with by 
Barham C 1985) in "Schizophrenia and Human Value". Having 
\'larked with Laing, Barham set himself a similar task: to 
making the schizophrenic's experience intelligible by 
contextual:lz:l.ng it and isolating a suitable discourse t.o 
capture it. Such a discourse, Barham belie,Tes, can only be 
formulated with a thorough understanding of the "historical 
embedding of the lives of the scientists who studied 
schizophrenia and the schizophrenics themselves". Hence the 
relevance of Foucault's work. New scientific terns are 
needed "in which to articulate the enterprise of 
schizophrenic lives and thus to extend the bounds of 
community so as to help 
forms of tribulation 
us grasp schizophrenia as one 
with which in any actual 
of the 
human 
community schizophrenics and non-schizophrenics alike have 
to contend" <Barham page 48 1984). The pragmatic orientation 
of Barham's work - he is interested in the problem presented 
by schizophrenia in everyday life in the "community" 
steers Barham away from an impersonal, sociological 
analysis. The importance of pragmatic and experiential 
components influenced Barham's choice of a strategy for this 
pro.iect of historical understanding. While recognizing t.he 
value of Foucault's approach, Barham follows Rorty's (1980) 
recommendation of adopting an approach to social science 
which "emphasizes the utility of narratives and vocabularies 
rather than the obj ecti vi ty of laws and theories" <Barham 
page 54 1984). According to Barham, what: 
Page 224 
... the concept o[ narrative can do is to help give us our 
bearings, to further our understanding of the terrain within 
which hu:man lives are 11 ved and e[forts at hullltln 
comprehension are carried out, and to grasp the connection 
between the form o[ hu:man action and the appropriate form 
for the understanding of human action. (Barham page 55 1984) 
The "structures of culture" approach of Macintyre and Rorty 
is favoured over the impersonal "structures of power" 
approach to social science used by the Frenchman. The latter 
emphasizes how power structures use the social sciences as 
disciplinary forces and fails to capture individual 
experience, Barham's interest. The "structure of culture" 
approach, however, acknowledges that scientific 
understanding " is more closely connected with ordinary 
human understanding than has generally been supposed" <page 
7 1984). It allows a description of life. life "in the sense 
of "getting to know someone" across a range of circumstances 
and settings, or of t.he "coming-to-grasp" of a situation 
from within as it is lived" <page 77 1984). 
His interest leads him to develop a concept of self which 
combines t.wo Anglo-Saxon ideas: the narrative and 
Winnicott' s dynamic emergence of self. It is a concept 
designed to capture the "historical continuity o:f human 
life" CBarham page 88 1984) and to be o:f use to Barham in 
his empirical investigation of the lives of schizophrenics. 
Following Winnicott, the failure in early childhood to 
develop personal narratives - a set of narratives with which 
to interact with the larger narrative of life - necessary to 
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a conception of self, accounts for the origins of 
schizophrenia. More generally, the narrative allows us to 
recognize " the interplay between individual and setting. 
agent and story, separateness and union. we can no longer 
rest content with simple-minded conceptions of "the 
individual"" <Barham page 99 1984). It could be argued that. 
this is a dialectical notion of ego, equivalent to Lacan's-
indeed Barham refers in detail to Lacan in his chapter on 
selfhood. The difference lies in that Barham, like Laing. 
focuses on the individual/experiential component of the self 
and madness, La can on the political/social aspects. 
Foucault's similar emphasis to Lacan's governed Barham's 
dismissal of his structures of power approach. Barham's 
different viewpoint generates a clear notion of the self. 
designed to help understand the actions of "agents" in their 
social context. and contrasts with the amorphous, 
transcendent. self generated by the French perspective of 
Sartrian and Lacanian ontology. 
Barham (1985) chose to articulat.e his analysis using 
Macintyre's concept of the narrative in preference to 
Foucault's "structures of power" approach, of limited value 
when trying to understand the experience of individuals. 
This is because Foucault is not interested in this, but is 
concerned with general social criticism. The Maclntyrian 
narrative is both more sui ted to Barham's project and more 
accessible to his audience. Macintyre provides an 
alternative to Foucault's discussion of complex theoretical 
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categories/structures. He maintains that an understanding of 
the beliefs of individuals, as well as the setting in which 
these beliefs arise, is essential to the understanding of 
social action. ;' 7 Macintyre starts from the premise that man 
is a storytelling animal. constructing narratives to 
understand his behaviour and that of others. The individual 
in interaction becomes an amateur social scientist also 
the premise of attribution theory who constructs 
narratives to understand social action. The concept of the 
narrative involves the idea that social agents do not 
interact with individuals but with histories of 
"intersecting actions and beliefs" Csee Barham 1985). Like 
Mead's "generalized other". the idea of "intersecting 
narratives underlines the importance of the consensus 
between individual social agents as a basis for social 
action. This emphasis on the beliefs/practices of social 
agents was explicitly rejected by Durkheim. However, for 
Macintyre, they are essential to our understanding of the 
nat.ure of social objects: the conception of social ob,j ects 
is intertwined with "the beliefs and practices informed by 
belief of its members" Cpage 5 1971). 
The narrative is used to undertake a critique of the Natural 
and Social Sciences. Science becomes another form of story 
telling. resolving in different ways, at different times, 
certain crises of understanding. Natural science, Macintyre 
argues, ie. used as a model by social scientists in their 
efforts to get rid of amateur social theories an 
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enterprise doomed to failure (Macintyre 1970). Instead, the 
social scientist should refrain from social objectivity. 
questioning instead the categories used in social 
explanation. Making t.he self understanding of individuals 
the subject of research, as the social sciences do, has to 
include the idea that it is "deeply interwoven with their 
understandings of the social settings of their lives, with. 
that is to say, their amateur social theories ... (Macintyre 
1977)". 
Macintyre's framework is one in which Anglo-Saxon thinking 
is com£ortable. It strives for meaningful explanations which 
refer to some kind of agent/self in interaction. The 
difference between the Foucauldian and Macintyrian style of 
criticism aids the understanding of some of the 
philosophical objections which have recently been levelled 
at Foucault. Hacking (1986), who is not unsympathetic to the 
Frenchman. points to what he considers to be the circularity 
of Foucau 1 t' s arguments. When discussing, his new type of 
bourgeois power, Foucault isolates its various components: 
two of these are the disciplinary aspect and the manufacture 
of new kinds of truth. Truth is the ordered procedures for 
the production, regulation and operation of statements, and 
is linked in circular relations with the system of power 
which produces and sustains it. It is an "abstract" (Hacking 
1986) element which takes its place alongside Foucauldian 
knowledge and power: 
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lie are specifically enjoined not to think of all this in 
ter11JS of ideology and Narxian superstructure... the truth. 
knowledge and power are on the contrary conditions of 
possibility for the bourgeois 111Dde ... most readers have a 
hard enough time making sense of Foucault's anonymous 
knowledge, discourse with a life of its own. Unlrnown power 
is even more mysterious. (Page 35 1986) 
This is a problem with the Foucauldian style which is the 
result of his negation of a subject. It is also the aspect 
of Foucault's work with which Taylor <1986) finds :fault. 
maintaining that "purposefulness without purpose", as found 
in Foucault's work. requires explanation in terms of an 
agent of some sort: 
'"''"· .... It is certainly not the case that all patterns issue 
from conscious action, but all patterns have to be made 
intelligible in relation to conscious action. (Page 87 1986) 
... of course you don't explain it by some big bad man/class 
designing i-t, but you do need to explain it nevertheless, 
that is relate this systematicity to the purposeful hu:man 
action in which it arose and which it has come to shape. You 
cannot evade this question by talking of the priority of 
structure over element. of language over speech act. ~at we 
want to know is why a language arises? (Page 88 1986) 
What Taylor doesn't. seem to realize is that. Foucault is not 
interested in the why, but the how question. Taylor wants an 
explanation in the Macintyrian vein. of past actions in a 
way that is meaningful to us. in other words, referring to 
some form of agent. Foucault wants to get at the 
substructure of our society and alert us to the dangers of 
the subtle deployment of power, using a historical analysis. 
Disagreement.s with the Foucauldian style are a consequence 
of the meeting ot' two traditions of thought with different 
methods of explanation. These traditions are linked to 
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different sociological discourses which more generally 
reflect the differing value systems of the social milieus to 
which they pertain. It is a good example of a rhetorical 
misunderstanding as defined in the introduction. 
2) THE CRITICISMS OF THE HISTORIANS 
In modifying their historical methodology, Anglo-Saxon 
historians of Science and the Human Sciences have been 
considerably influenced by Foucault. Here, the focus will be 
on the latter.,;,,.,,> Certain philosophical objections to his 
concepts have already been mentioned. What historians focus 
on are methodological issues, particularly the lack of 
"hard" empirical research - usually concerning the lack of 
detailed archival work. The editors of the recent "Anatomy 
of Madness" <1985) praise Foucault's "magisterial" "la Folie 
et la Deraison" <translated and abridged as Madness and 
Civilization). However, they caution, "it would be a mistake 
to assume that, as many topics, it's roots in historical 
evidence are very secure" <Bynum et al. vol. I page 4 1985). 
Stone makes similar criticisms to these, referring to his 
"abstract" and "metaphorical" expression, "unconcerned with 
historical detail and documentation" <page 174 1985). 
Sedgwick C1982) refers to his goals as "purely intellectual" 
and because of this his explanations give priority to ideas 
over historical events. These criticisms have been 
attributed by Gordon <1990) to one important factor: most 
English critics have concentrated on an abbreviated form of 
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the original work. They would. he maintains, be considerably 
enlightened by a reading of the full work. What is not taken 
into account by Gordon's article is that both Sedgwick, who 
relied on a reading of the abbreviated work. and Porter who 
has read the whole of the "Folie". reach the same 
conclusion. This is because as the thought st.yles model 
predicts- both the style and the content of Foucault's work 
is unacceptable to its Anglo-Saxon readership. A reading of 
the whole of the "Folie" would make Anglo-Saxon historians 
more convinced of this. 
Concerning matters of content, the universality of the 
"Grand Renfermement", as implied in the "Folie" is certainly 
doubtful. The model may fit the happenings of' Continental 
Europe. but it is questionable in Anglo-Saxon countries with 
their different political structures. Because of the 
political differences outlined, the "Grand Renfermement" - a 
universal phenomenon according to Foucault may not have 
occurred to the same extent in England. The laissez-faire 
ideology. "The Trade in Lunacy" CParry-Jones 1972). 
governing mental health practice in eighteenth. and to a 
lesser extent. nineteenth century Britain, made it difficult 
for an equivalent governmental control. 
Criticisms of style and content are linked. Foucault's 
global, macro-social approach, which was responsible for 
misconceptions such as the above. have led to accusations of 
"totalization": indiscriminately applying concepts, 
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formulated as part of his philosophical framework. 
irrespective of appropriateness. This, historians argue, is 
no real advance on Whiggish history <Stone 1987, Bynum et 
al. introduct.ion to vol. I 1985>. The indiscriminate use of 
global concepts blinds the researcher to aspects of the 
problem not incorporated in the philosophical outlook <Stone 
1987). The analysis of disciplinary methods presented in 
"Discipline and Punish" is found wanting by 0' Brien (1982). 
due to the Foucauldian obsession with "normalization" and 
the "power-knowledge" complex. Her work extends that of 
Foucault. highlighting omissions in his analysis. As she 
points out, Foucault does not consider how the nature of the 
prisoner caused variations in the technology of power. 
Children, for example, were not isolated in cells. but sent 
away to penal colonies. O'Brien also considers how the 
prisoners' reaction to authority, revolting against the 
governors. contradicts the Foucauldian passive submission 
theory. Foucault does not claim that prisoners were 
compliant. however. neither does he examine their behaviour 
in prisons to make sure his assumptions are correct <Post.er 
1985). This is because Foucault's macro-historical 
perspective does not allow him to consider the fate of 
particular groups. His approach has to be understood in 
terms of his aim: doing history for the sake of the present. 
essentially a political one: 
What we need is a new economy of power relations - the word 
economy being used in a theoretical and practical sense - to 
put i t in other words: si nee Kant the role of ph 11 osophy is 
to prevent reason fro:m going beyond the limits of what is 
given in experience: but from the same moment - that is 
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since the development of the modern state and the political 
management of society - the role of philosophy is also to 
keep watch over the excessive powers of political 
rationality. Which is a rather high expectation. (Foucault 
in discussion with Rabinow in Dreyi'uss and Rabinow page 210 
1982) 
Essentially. Foucault applies a theoretical analytic method. 
which he has developed through structuralist discourse 
analysis to undertake a radical critique of society a 
rationalist approach to the problem. 
Anglo-Saxon social historians set themselves a more modest 
task. Like their anti-psychiatric colleagues, they want to 
contextualize madness, this time in an accurate historical 
context. For example. the recent publication "The Anatomy of 
Madness" is conceived around a similar criticism as 
O'Brien's C1985) and Stone's, namely that Foucault's large 
scale analyses make over-generalizations about psychiatric 
history, not supported by detailed research. They follow 
Stone's recommendation i.e. to concentrate on 1) histories 
of institutions 2) detailed archival research and 3) 
documenting the history of ideas about madness. All the 
pieces concentrate on specific issues, in accordance with 
the aims of the volumes: 
Taken together. the score or so essays printed here do not 
aim to draw IIJorals from key events in the history of 
psychiatry, but rather to present a sequence of encounters 
in which scholars grapple !"'ith different kinds of often 
unfamiliar evidence and ponder the hermeneutic problems 
cluttering up the crossroads where the sufferers and their 
experiences meet the physicians with their savoir-pouvoir. 
The history of madhouses, mad-doctors and madiiJen still needs 
opening up. above all. on new flanks. further detailed 
information. continuing pluralism in approaches. and well 
inforiiJed, concentrated discussion, all of which we hope. 
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will be stimulated by this c.r:J11ee'6:!fsil Qif original and wide 
ranging collection of essays. (Bynum et al. val. I page 20 
1985) 
The value of the essays in this volume lies particularly in 
the variety of new empirical detail which they present. They 
offer no sweeping generalizations but deiDOnstrate the 
profusion of sources touching on the history of psychiatry. 
As always. they uncover new questions in answering the old 
ones, but they also show the value of patient historical 
inquiry in understanding the roots of psychiatry's 
contemporary dile1D1llas. <'Byntlm et al. val. II page 131985) 
The authors are conducting detailed empirical investigations 
qualifying Foucauldian ir:sights. The quality and the value 
of the presented research is not in question. but it has to 
be understood as the reaction of British historians to 
Continental large scale, speculative history. 
The historians writing in "The Anatomy of Madness". and 
Anglo-Saxon historians more generally. can be classified 
into two broad categories, differing slightly in their 
perspectives. Writers such as Scull. Ignatieff, Donelly and 
Rose adopt a more sociological orientation, trying to apply 
a Foucauldian type analysis to their own, more empirically 
orientated research. Others such as Porter, Digby and 
Allderidge recognize the value of Foucault's work, 
correcting inaccuracies with detailed archival research. 
Their work is less overtly political. but both types are in 
fact realizing Agassi' s 0964) hopes for the history of 
science. within the human sciences: providing an accurate 
historical context for the events studied. Of the two, the 
second is more interesting, because it is more crit.ical of 
Foucault., perhaps because of firmer roots in British 
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historical empi ri ci sm. Jones (1972) reflecting on t.he 
latter, concludes that it has led to a hundred years of 
"arrested intellectual development, and conceptual poverty". 
During the era of positivism in the nineteenth century. 
history had become a science studying "facts" analogous to 
scientific "facts", Where the scienttst used tools such as 
microscopes, test tubes and experiments, the historian had 
at his disposal those of philology, archaeology and textual 
criticism. That English positivism was different from the 
French equivalent is evident in Comte's poor reception 
across the channel. His large scale historical accounts of 
society, using deterministic laws as explanation of societal 
development, was unsound and not grounded in "facts": 
"events" or the actions of individuals within institutional 
"frameworks". Both men and institutions were manageable 
units which could be subjected to empirical investigation. 
The focus on individuals found a home in the dominant 
nineteenth century ideology of liberalism <Jones 1972). 
Hist.ory thus became the story of great men, while intangible 
social and political forces, inaccessible to empirical 
investigation, were neglected. 
The heritage of the writers in "The Anatomy of Madness" is 
evident in the focus on 11 individuals" and their beliefs in 
volume I and institutions and their socio-political context. 
in volume II. It is a distinction which parallels that made 
by Schef·f ( 1984) between "individual" and 11 social" syst.ems 
in his anti-psychiatric writings, and is associated with a 
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more localized, micro-social approach to the issues dealt 
with by Foucault (val. II page 8 1985). The concept of a 
historical agent is reintroduced, and with it a dimension of 
moral responsibility: the treatment of the insane was also 
the result of the work of individuals in society as well as 
of impersonal bureaucratic pol i ·tical structures. The writers 
of "The Anatomy" subscribe to an "externalist" position. 
which Foucault's teacher, the French historian Canguilhem 
C1978):'' 0 criticized as "impoverished marxism".''"' From their 
side, the English historians argue that, although Foucault 
has launched the work of criticism, he has not addressed the 
task of "actually finding out". Consequently, we remain 
ignorant about most aspects of "madhouses, mad-doctors and 
madmen" - t.his being what they seek to remedy. Allderidge' s 
witty essay on Bethlem, sets itself t.he task of destroying 
the wild exaggerations conjured up through the ages about. 
the mistreatment of patients at Bethlem. She dismantles the 
false impression that Bethlem's history is well researched, 
claiming that the reason why there have never been any 
substantial inquiries in this direction is because Bethlem 
is more useful as a cliche.'':" In the same volume, Digby's 
archival work qualifies the Foucauldian perspective on moral 
treatment as relentless oppression. She remedies his failure 
to consider the link between religion and moral treatment .. 
crucial to the case of the Quaker Tuke the recognized 
initiator of this form of treatment in Britain. 
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MacDonald's "Mystical Bedlam" <1981) is work which has been 
received as a welcome alternative to the Foucauldian 
approach (Stone 1987). MacDonald makes use of Foucault's 
idea of discontinuity in history, and agrees that the 
medicalization of insanity during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century was a disaster. However, MacDonald 
chooses a different approach, relying on extensive archival 
material. He acknowledges Foucault's "Madness and 
Civilization" as being of great value, however, its major 
weaknesses are that "abstractions confront abstractions" and 
his description of "how real men and women thought and acted 
is oft.en fanciful" <MacDonald page xi 1981). MacDonald's 
arguments parallel 
philosophically and 
those of Foucault, 
methodologically at odds 
but 
with 
are 
the 
Frenchman's approach to history. Whereas Foucault "focuses 
his attention on the ways in which madmen were perceived and 
treated by intellectuals and officials" (MacDonald page xii 
1981), MacDonald looks at popular beliefs and what insanity 
meant. to the populace. He does this by placing their 
experiences in a historical context, reconstructed by means 
of diaries, religious writings and imaginative literature. 
The manuscripts of the physician Napier, allow him to depict 
seventeenth century mental health practices. MacDonald's 
book is foremost an empirical study - including such details 
as maps of Napier's practice dispensing with the 
philosophical complexity so often present in works of French 
historians. His conclusions. however, are very similar. 
although stated in a much more straightforward fashion. "":'' 
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Whilst the work ment.ioned above specializes in redressing 
the erroneous conclusions drawn from Foucault's work, that 
of the sociologically orient.ated historians is an empirical 
complement to it. Their's is a modified Foucauldian 
analysis. using his ideas as a background to their own more 
empirically orientated research. A reading o:f texts such as 
"A just Measure of Pain" Ugnatie:ff 1978). "Managing t.he 
Mind" C:Donelly 1982) and "The Psychological Complex" <Rose 
1985) points to differences between the English writers and 
the Frenchmen whose influence they recognize. The subtitles, 
"The Story of English Penitentiaries", "A Study o:f Medical 
Psychology in the Early Nineteenth Century" and "Psychology, 
Politics and Society in England: 1869-1939", respectively. 
indicates the more focused nature of the works, useful for 
purposes of empirical validation. but precluding a general 
historical analysis in the Foucauldian vein. The importance 
o:f accuracy for the Post-Modern Anglo-Saxon historians is 
evident l'lhen these works are compared to the much longer 
"Histoire de la Folie a L'.Age Classique" <1972). It is 
mani:fest.ed by the greater number of direct quotations from 
primary historical sources set aside from the main body of 
the text. In the "Folie". they are incorporated into the 
body of the work and seem secondary to the general 
philosophical analysis. Moreover, in "The Psychological 
Complex", Rose o:ffers a Foucauldian conclusion. after a 
detailed description 
elaborat.es the point 
of asylum practices. :::)..-, He 
using further empirical details. 
then 
This 
practice is found in the writings o:f both the other authors 
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mentioned, necessary it seems to deflect criticisms of the 
type levelled at Foucault. However, Foucault's forte is his 
speculative style of analysis, which includes the abundant 
use of philosophical ideas and literary and artistic 
allusions. blended into the socio-political framework. There 
is an impression that a comprehensive knowledge of 
philosophy. politics, and literature is being used to 
formulate new ways of thinking about as opposed to 
documenting social issues, however conjectural these may 
be: 
La dewaison. c'est tout d'abord cela: cette scission 
profonde, qui releve d'un age d'eJltende.ment, et qui aliene 
l'un par rapport a ]'autre en les rendant etrangers 1 'un a 
1' autr-e, le fou et sa folie. 
La deraison, nous pouvons done 1 'apprehender deja dans ce 
vide. L'interne.ment, d'ailleurs, n'en etait-11 pas la 
version d'exclusion, ne regnait-11 pas entre le fou et la 
folie, entre la reconnaissance immediate, et une verite 
toujours differee, couvrant ainsi dans les structures 
sociales le me.me champ que la deraison dans les structures 
du savoir. (Foucault page 223 1972.> 
Dans l'oeuvre de Shakespeare, les folies qui s'apparentent a 
la mort et au .meurtre: dans celle de Cervantes, les formes 
qui S I 0rd0nnent Cl la preSOmptiOD et d tOUteS 1 eS 
complai sances de 1 'imaginaire. Nais ce sont la de hauts 
modeles que leurs imitateurs inflechissent et desarment. Et 
sans doute sont-ils, l'un et ]'autre, plus encore les 
temoins d'une experience tragique de la Folie nee au steele, 
que de ceux d'une experience critique et morale de la 
Deraison qui se developpe pourtant a leur propre epoque. 
(Fouca u 1 t page 49 1972.> 
This passage. typical of Foucault's style, helps explain 
MacDonald's accusation of "abstractions11 confronting 
"abstractions" in his work. Interestingly, the stylistic 
difference between the "Folie" and the English works ci t.ed, 
is akin to that between Hogarth and Greuze. Foucault is 
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relating the "drama" of madness' imprisonment., the 
Englishmen are recounting a factual story, paying attention 
to the accuracy of historical details. 
That Foucault's Anglo-Saxon disciples apply a prethought-out 
intellectual approach, ta.i loring it to the requirement.s of 
the empirical thought style, is perhaps best exemplified in 
the collection of essays entitled "The Power of Psychiatry" 
(1986), edited by Miller and Rose, and "Decarceration" 
0977). by the American Scull. also widely read in this 
country. The debt to Foucault is particularly clear in the 
:former, where the editors write that: 
This contemporary psychiatric system extends far beyond the 
medicalized institution. It comprises a widespread but 
loosely related assemblage of practices that seek to 
regulate individual sub}ectivities and m.::mage personal and 
social relations in the name of the minimization of mental 
disorder and the promotion of mental health (Xiller and Rose 
page 3 1986) 3 s 
The issues dealt with in the volume include psychiatry and 
racism, psychiatry and sexism, psychiatry in prisons, and 
the psychotherapy of unemployment, themes with practical 
implications. 
This approach can be contrasted with that of the French 
pupil of Foucault, Donzelot. He retains the French macro-
historical orientation which accords priority to conceptual 
novelty - a requirement for intellectual success within the 
rationalist tradition <Turkle 1978, Bourdieu 1979, Benvenuto 
and Kennedy 1986). Talking about the conceptual fluency of 
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French thinkers such as Foucau 1 t, Lacan and now Donzel ot, 
Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) note the benefits of French 
philosophical education which fosters certain thinking 
skills and provides a vocabulary with which to argue 
elegantly. Furthermore. it encourages critical thinking and 
stimulates reflection. Philosophy II tried not to be a 
technical speciality, but a general survey of the whole of 
life" (page 199 1986). Donzelot locates himself firmly in 
the French tradition of social thought, acknowledging a debt 
to Foucault. Aries and Flandrin. '~·;·;. The a priori analytic 
category he develops, "the social", is a term sufficiently 
alien to a foreign readership that, in the English edition. 
it necessitates a preface "In order to make the reading of a 
book like this easier for a public :far removed from its 
milieu of origin" <Donzelot page xix 1980>. Donzelot's 
method is described in the introduction by Deleuze: 
Donzelot's method consists in isolating pure lines of 
mutation which acting successively or simultaneously, go to 
form a contour or surface, a characteristic feature of the 
new do:ma.in. The social is located at the intersection of all 
these little lines. But the milieu on which these lines act, 
investing and transforming it. still needs to be defined. 
(Deleuze page xi in Donzelot 1980). 
The whole of the study "The Policing of Families" 0980) is 
aimed at bringing to the fore this complicated, albeit, 
:fundamental realm, families acting as a useful vehicle to 
help the reader grasp concepts: 
By and large. the procedures of transformation of the family 
are also those which implant the forms of modern integration 
that give our societies their particularly well policed 
character and the celebrated crisis of the family. setting 
the stage for its liberation. would appear then not so much 
inherently contrary to the present 
condition of possibility of that 
Wonzelot page 8 1980) 
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social order as a 
order's emergence. 
This is perhaps one of ·the best examples of the political 
conception of the family which exists in French social 
literature, and helps to explain the Lacanian political 
familial ism which was contrasted with Laing's moral 
approach. Family and society are inextricably linked. Thus 
the crisis of the family and the rise of the social are 
products of the same underlying social discourses/forces. 
The purpose of analyzing the "crisis" or the "rise" lies in 
making history " ... tell us who we are" (Donzelot page 8 
1980), the same macro-social concern - doing hist.ory for the 
sake of the present - as Foucault. 
THOUGHT STYLES AND TALK ABOUT MADNESS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
1) DATA 
So far this chapter has dealt with written material. But. 
were the differences found between academic texts mirrored 
in the way members of the two academic communi ties thought 
and expressed themselves verbally on the subject of madness? 
To answer this question. I conducted a short empirical study 
using two small groups of English and French students. The 
interviews were to illustrate how the two thought styles 
influenced or did not influence the thoughts about 
mental illness expressed during the conversations. The 
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interviews were not designed to be representative of the 
population at large. At the very least they represent the 
views held within the two academic circles remembering 
that the thesis is concerned with academic/intellectual 
thought. 
The group of English students was composed of ·three male 
second year undergraduates, and one female first year 
undergraduate: D T, R 0, B C and S D. The French group 
consisted of three young French lecteurs who had just 
finished university and were teaching in this country for a 
year, one male and two females: J-L D, H F and D C. Any 
advantage the French students possessed in terms of age 
should have been outweighed by the fact that the English 
undergraduates were doing a subsidiary course in psychology 
and should thltS have had better command of the vocabulary 
needed to discuss the ·topic of mental illness. I prepared a 
number of questions on the issue. However, not all of them 
were used, as they were merely a precaution to ensure that a 
group discussion was initiated. The discussions revolved 
around the topic of mental illness - what is mental illness, 
how do we define it, what are its causes - and the care of 
the mentallly ill. At the outset, I asked the students 
whether they had read any of Foucault's work: none had. This 
was because one of the questions I asked concerned 
Foucault's idea of psychiatric discourse as a form of power. 
In general, after having asked a question, if the discussion 
was going well, I did not interrupt. The pattern in both 
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cases was that someone put forward a point and the other 
members of the group qualified it. Below are the essent.ial 
points which emerged from the two 40 minute discussions. 
A> THE ENGLISH GROUP 
The group held th•2 view that when discussing the idea of 
mental illness, it should be born in mind that there was no 
such thing as normality. Normality, was defined in terms of 
society's norms. The members of the group differentiated 
between the "incurably" ment.ally ill, those who had organic 
disorders. and those who had been rendered mentally ill by 
the "environment". They also thought that the treatment 
should be lnatched to the disorder, in other words, that it 
was legitimate to use physical techniques with those who had 
an organic illness, but that. psychotherapy was preferable 
for the other category of disorders. When asked how one 
could differentiate between the two categories, B C proposed 
that one should be able to identify the nature of the 
disorder by administering physical treatments and seeing 
whether they worked. If they did not, one could infer that 
the disorder was psychosocial. An interesting question then 
arose, as to how one could differentiate between criminal 
and mentally ill behaviour. The case of child abuse was 
considered, and I asked them what they thought of the idea 
that offenders could not help reoffending. D T thought that 
this was an explanation that the individual used to excuse 
perverted behaviour. This excuse, when used often enough. 
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led to "self-belief that the offender could not stop 
offending" . The topic then moved to i nst i tut. i onal versus 
community care. The group favoured care within the 
com..lllunity. The reason D T and R 0 gave was that the outside 
environment provided more "stimulation", thus encouraging 
people to make an effort to get better and to "problem 
solve" for themselves. R 0 then made the point that 
community care should be awarded to those who made an 
"effort" to get better and the other members of the group 
agreed. There was unanimous agreement that people were too 
readily institutionalized. There was also agreement that the 
state should subsidize the care of the mentally ill. whether 
in the family or in institutions. I then explained to them 
the Foucauldian idea that psychology and psychiatry could be 
used as forms of controlling power. They were not convinced 
by Foucault's analysis. If this was the state of affairs. it 
had not consciously been created. The members of the group 
held a very positive view of the medical profession. They 
agreed that it had special powers which were liable to be 
abused. However. they had gained these through lay people. 
Through the government, lay people could influence the laws 
which invest the profession with various powers, including 
the power to commit people. They were quite happy t.hat 
medical professionals were the best people for the job. What. 
the group was less happy about was that the individual might 
lose some of his "individual" rights. The only right they 
thought he should lose was the right to leave the 
institution. if he was dangerous. 
Page 245 
B> FRENCH GROUP 
Again. t.he conversation opened with a discussion of t.he 
nature of mental illness. They mentioned several works that 
they had read Bettelheim' s "Regard sur la Folie" about 
autistic children and the account of an anorexic's struggle 
against her disorder, "Le Pavillon des En:fants Faux". They 
were less willing than their English counterparts to 
distinguish between physical and social causes of mental 
disorders. To illustrate the intimate link between the 
physical and the mental, J-L D cited Freud's discovery that 
physical symptoms had psychical origins. They were also very 
concerned that di:fferent types o:f disorders should be 
distinguished. There t.hen followed a discussion of "le 
snobisme de la depression". concerning the social 
acceptability of mental illness among certain social strata. 
What was surprising was bow conversant they were with 
psycbiat.ric ·terminology which they said encompassed "toute 
une rangee de troubles nerveux" les psychopates, les 
nevroses, les troubles affectifs. They were particularly 
intent on classifying disorders when it came to considering 
the care locus. H F thought community care within "le milieu 
securization" was a good idea, then immediately corrected 
herself, saying "attention il faut savoir de ce qu'on parle. 
carla famille peut-etre la cause des problemas". J-L D. who 
had visited two English residential schools for the mentally 
handicapped, was in favour of residential care. State 
finances were better utilized in this environment t.han in 
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the family. Teams of specialists could work with the parents 
for the child's good. The inst.itutions also had "des moyens 
techniques" which fami 1 ies did not possess. Furthermore. 
residential care did not preclude fully experiencing 1 i fe. 
the patients received regular visits from provided 
outsiders. J-L D cited the example of how a mother was 
breastfeeding a baby in the middle of the corridor. H F then 
decided that institutional care was preferable. even in the 
case of non organic disorders such as depression, which she 
thought could be contagious: it might exert a negative 
effect over the rest of the family members. J-L D then made 
two interesting remarks concerning the institutions he had 
visited. He said that he had had the impression that the 
parents and the carers were learning as much as the 
handicapped children. He then went on to mention "le 
renversement des roles" which occurred in this environment.: 
the mad were those who fitted, the visitors were those who 
were abnormal. This, he maintained, demonstrated how the 
judgement. of mental illness was dependent upon a particular 
frame o:f reference. J-L D also stressed ·the importance of 
the role of the untrained worker. They were probably even 
more crucial to the wellbeing of the child than the 
professionals. As to how to determine who should receive 
institutional care and what rights the mentally ill should 
have, they all said that that was the province of "la loi" 
and could not co:rrunent on it. They, however, agreed that. 
abuses of "la loi" could be counteracted by "des formations" 
or offical bodies. representing the parents and the patients 
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themselves. When I asked about the Foucauldian idea of 
psychiatry as power, although they specified that they were 
not qualified to elaborate on it, they agreed that his was a 
plausible analysis of the abuse of psychiatric powers. 
2) COMMENTS 
The discussions did not only differ in content, but also in 
style and emphasis. The English group seemed dissatisfied by 
psychology's inability to establish whether mental illness 
was physical or psychological. Quite a long period. 10 
minutes, was spent discussing how psychology could 
conclusively prove the nature of mental illness by 
experimental means. The French group much more readily 
accepted the difficulties attached to psychological 
diagnosis. They spent less time deciding whether to ascribe 
the causes to the incli vidual or the environment.. and were 
more interested in discussing social aspects of the problem, 
such as the "snobisme de la depression". What was also quite 
striking was the onus the English group put on the 
individual's responsibility to get better. The French were 
more qualified in their praise :for this form of care. Aft.er 
J-L D had described his visits to British institutions, the 
group seemed to agree that good institutional care was 
preferable because it represented more effective use of 
"public resources". The discussion concerning the rights of 
the mentally i 11 and the Foucau ldian idea of power raised 
some interesting differences. The English group did not 
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agree with the Foucauldian idea, and thought that if there 
was abuse of power, we were all responsible for it. This was 
because we were all responsible for the laws which affected 
the mentally ill. The government. was merely carrying out our 
wishes this seems a Lockean idea. The Foucauldian idea 
seemed to make sense to the French group, particularly D C 
and J-L D. J-L D had made several philosophical points 
before -the discussion of Foucault which were in agreement. 
with the Foucauldian analysis. For example the idea of role 
reversal - that in institutions we were the misfits we were 
"malalaise", "les :faux". Despite their disagreement with the 
Foucauldian analysis, the English group was concerned about 
the loss of rights which the individual 
French group was less so, and thought 
safeguarded against by the collective 
might suffer. The 
that this could be 
action of certain 
bodies. The French group did not hold such a positive 
attit.ude t.owards the "helping professions". At one point, 
the discussion drifted a little, and turned towards 
"psychology". Although the group had quite an impressive 
knowledge of psychoanalytic theory, they confessed to not 
knowing much about "les psychologues". H F said that 
recently a friend of hers had tried to get a .i ob as a 
"psychologue du travai lle" an industrial psychologist 
but had met with a bad response because in France there is 
as yet no such thing. The group felt that this was a 
desirable state of affairs. as the psychologists would be 
working for political ends and not for the workers' good. 
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The French group was more sensitive to the social and 
political aspects of mental illness. They were also more 
conversant with psychoanalytic theory and the psychological 
jargon used to describe various types of disorders. This was 
suprising in view of their confessed ignorance of the 
subject they were about to discuss. The English, who were 
doing a subsidiary course in psychology, quite often used 
slang words such as "nutty" and "mad" to describe t.he 
mentally ill. It has to be said that they were, in general, 
less eloquent and not as good at putting forward an argument 
and making a case for it. The French group seemed to be more 
intent on using examples drawn !-rom the 1 i terature they had 
read and the films they had seen to make their arguments 
coherent.. Whereas, the French group's perspect.ive on mental 
illness was influenced by a philosophical reading of Freud, 
the English group had quite obviously grafted the 
nature/nurture dispute onto their analysis of the nature and 
causes of mental illness. The importance the English group 
ascribed to individual rights and their view of society was 
in agreement with what was discussed in chapter four. 
Finally, the validity of my interpretation of the data is 
questionable at. this tentative stage. However, the results 
obtained, even with such small groups of students. seem to 
be in broad agreement with the thesis. It is important to 
emphasize that the data is illustrative: it illustrates the 
way the differences generated by the thought styles might 
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emerge in spoken discourse, rather than showing a clear 
contrast between st.rictly comparable groups. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the anti-psychiatric and historical writings on madness 
betray consistent differences in approach to the problem, in 
keeping with national differences in social thought. The 
contextualization of madness in both its social and 
historical contexts - by the Anglo-Saxon writers contrasts 
with the theoretical framework developed by the French. in 
which madness acts as a vehicle for social criticism. This 
difference stems from the dichotomy discussed in the 
previous chapter: the micro-social versus macro-social 
treatment of social issues, resulting from the thought 
styles of empiricism and rationalism respect.ively. 
Furthermore, the disparity between a style of thought which 
emphasizes the impersonal and general, and one interest.ed in 
the individual and impressionistic, is again prominent in 
this chapter in the 
analysis o:f madness 
difference parallels 
when discussing the 
form of an impersonal socio-political 
versus an experiential one. This 
those isolated in the first chapter 
two traditions o:f literature. The 
experiential component of the Anglo-Saxon anti-psychiatrist.s 
and the interest in recording of lived experience of English 
authors betray the same concern for explaining the 
individual's sentience. This contrasts with the more 
Page 251 
impersonal French approach in both areas. which :focuses on 
general social/philosophical issues. The contextualization 
o:f madness by English historians which has been 
distinguished from the more speculative French treat.ment of 
the issue. is reminiscent of the different treatment the 
French revolution received from the authors Dickens and 
Balzac. These parallels suggest that thought styles generate 
a cultural pool of resources on which writers draw, to a 
greater or lesser extent one resource which they are 
:forced to use is a language which embodies a given set of 
priori ties/constraints. This pool of resources. or cultural 
"toolbox", explains why writers such as Laing and the post-
modern historians retain the design o:f their intellectual 
heritage. 
In the. anti-psychiatric literature, the empirical 
interactionist perspective is associated with the 
development of a stable, empirical notion of self which 
contrast.ed strongly with the fluid. amorphous, rationalist 
structures. This difference has already been hinted at in 
the previous chapter. but becomes more obvious here. It is 
related to the contrasting functions o:f the concepts: those 
of the Anglo-Saxon are designed to capture experience rather 
than being purely theoretical constructs. 
The empiricism of the British historical tradition may have 
been modified. but there remains a difference between 
English and French historians o:f the Human Sciences, even if 
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this is only in terms of their relative strengths. The 
English are masters o:f empirical investigation and the 
contextual i zati on of madness. The most interesting research 
qualifies existing theoretical concepts, drawing attention 
to their shortcomings. In many cases, this results in 
detailed narrative of events. French theorists, on the other 
hand, give priority to developing general frameworks for 
purposes of socio-political analysis/critique. They accord 
priority to theoretical development in keeping with their 
rationalist biases. 
The empirical data gathered suggests that the influence of 
the t.hought styles is not 1 irni ted to academic writings, but 
a!'tects the ways in which student members of the community 
think and express themselves on the subject of mental 
illness. 
I. 
Setore consciousness there was nothing except "a plenum of being ~?f which no 
element can refer to an absent C~?nsciousness" (page xxxi I'JSS.I. 
2. This occurs when the paths to our goals, prescribed by the "Hodological map" we have 
made, are blocked. We then fulfil our desires by magic instead of by ordinary means. 
3, 
But the peculi~r possibility of being - that 11hic.~ is revealed in the nihilating 
ad - is of being tM foundation of itself as c~?nsciousness through the 
sacrificial act 11hich nihilates being. The for-itself is the in-itself losing 
itself as in-itself in order to f~?und itself as consch?usness. (page 82 I'JS9.1 
4. It is presented as a st1•uggle between the subiect or "for-itself" and the "Other". 
Unlike material objects, the "Other" possesses freedom as the subject. The subject becomes 
an "in-itself" or ob.iect in its phenomenal field. In this field, the sujett becomes aware 
of itself as object: 
. . the Other has not only revuled to IJe what I 11as.' he has established me in a 
nell type of being fllhich can support new qualification. This being t~as not in me 
potential l,r before the appearance of the Other, for it could not have been f~?tifld 
an.v place in the for itself. (Bartre page 222 /'J58) 
Having lost his freedom, the sub.iect wants to regain it. By regaining it however, it is 
the Other who becomes an object and attempts to retrieve his freedom. 
5. 
The meaning of human labour is that man is reduced to inorganic materialit.v in 
order to act materially on matter and to change his material life. Through 
trans-substantiation, the project inscribed by our bodies in a thing takes on 
the substantial charateristics of the thing 11ithout altogether losing its 
original qualities. (page !19 /'JS8J 
6. The group is a living body of practices, whose ob.iectives need to be stated and 
restated with an internal threat from the individual freedom of each member of the group. 
This is overcome at the price of the oath which destroys the spontaneous nature of the 
group, It differentiates, and eventually becomes a hierarchical institution like the 
Stalinist communist party 
7, 
fie t;ould 1 ike us tt~ become one t;i th the cosmos,. break out of the humdrum of 
everyday life. But his method of reasoning cannot detach the subject frolfJ the 
fa111ilial grasp: though he sees it only as the starting point, it catches up ttith 
hill again at every turn. fie tries to resolve the difficulty by taking refuge in 
Eastern style meditation, but that cannot 11ithstand the intrusion of capitalist 
subjectivity, 11hose liethods are nothing if not subtle. !Page 5£1 1'184.1 
8. "Conver~ation with Childt'en" is a work written when Laing had moderated his radical 
left wing position. 
9, Sullivan, like Laing, was crltical of biologism. Of psychobiology he says: 
Psychobiology, if it. is ill,Vthing but i body of inteJJeduBi ized absurdities a!1d 
sel f·contradictor.v rationalizations, misnamed neurology or endocrinology, or 
various philos~lp!Jizing 11it!J eAtpt,v fiords, is a study of human persons in dynamic 
interrelation with other persons and with personal ent i ti ties <culture, 
tradition, roan made institutions, la1r1s, beliefs, fashions, etc.l (Sullivan page 
258 1962) 
10. Bateson's double-bind theory has stimulated a wealth of empirical laboratory research 
into disordet'ed family communication (see Sedgwick 1982l. Hirsh and Leff (1975) conducted 
a t'eview of the ernpit•ical work that had been done on the "double-bind" theot'y. They 
concluded that double-binds were not exclusive to the families of schizophrenics. They 
also found that it was difficult for investigators to agree on when the double bind was 
occurring. (see Wing 1976) 
II. Parsons and Lemert argue that mental i !!ness is another example of deviancy or rule 
breaking, and describe it. in terms of "primary" and "secondary" deviation, Prirnat'Y 
deviation refers to the deviant behaviour, secondary deviation, to acting in accordance 
with a "role". The latter is alloted by society as a result of the initial deviance. 
Scheff and Becker (1963) focus on the "labelling process", arguing that. deviancy, and 
consequently mental illness, is not the result of rule breaking, but is an action to which 
a !abel has been successfully applied. Once he is labelled as mentally ill, the individual 
knows how to behave as if he is mentally ill because of the availability of cultural 
stereotypes, These stereotypes provide evidence that mental illness is a social role which 
reflects the status of the insane in the social structure. 
12. West (1970) studied a group of delinquent boys living in South London, 20% of which 
were prosecuted. This 20% belonged to a "vulnerable group" which could, at an early stage, 
be identified as potential court cases. The crucial determinants in a susceptibility to 
"recognized" deliquency were factors such as family size, low intelligence and poor 
parental behaviour. This susceptibility became a career through a process of social 
network socializing, supporting the deviancy, as opposed to direct labelling. 
13' 
Vhen an individual rooperat.ively contributes required activity to an 
organizatiM and under required conditions - in our society tlith the support of 
institutionalized standards of lieifue.. with the drive supplied through 
incentives and joint values, and with the prompting of designated penalties - he 
is transformed into a cooperat,,r.: he becoAJes the "normal", #programmed•, or 
built-in member ... I shall speak in these circunJstanres of the individual having 
a primary adjustment to the organization and overlooK' the fact that it would be 
just as reasonable hl speak of the organization having primary adJustments hl 
hill, 
I hBI'I constructed this clumsy term in order to get to a second one, namely 
secondary adjustments, defining these as any habitual arrangement by vhicli a 
n1ember of an organiution employs unauthorized means.. or obtains unauthorized 
ends, or both, thus getting around the organization~ assumptions as to what he 
should do and get and hence 11hat he should be, Seconduy adJustments represent 
wa.vs in r~hich the individual stands apart fron the role and the self taken for 
granted for him by the institution. (tJoffDJan page 198 /96/J 
The reference to clumsy terminology should be noted, as it is in agreement with Goffman's 
self-confessed aversion to needless theol'izing, ln fact, Goffroan~'s stl'engths are his 
outstanding observational powers and sensitivity to individual experience. 
14. The asylum is an institution which reinforces any forms of existent pathological 
behaviour, creating a vicic•us circle whereby once inside people may never get out. 
Everything a patient does that conforms to hospital requirements is labelled "treatment", 
anything attempted independently, i.e. not specified in the rules, is correspondingly a 
sign of disturbed behaviour: 
, , , the more inadaquate the equipment to convey tile rnection of the hospital., 
the more the act appears to be a psychotic symptom, and the 11ore likely it is 
that management feels justified in assigning the patient to a back l!lard. 
(Goffman page 2/S 196/) 
Inmates are thus completely controlled, 
15. Goffman describes how the apparently "deranged" patients in asylums use secondary 
adjustments to flesh out theil' drab life, giving at the same time a picture of the 
flourishing hospital underlife: 
In order t,, ~r~ork a system effectively, Me 11ust have an intio1ate knot~ledge ~1( 
it,: it ~tas eas.v to see this kind of kno'llledge put to work in thi hospital. For 
example, it t~as widely known by the parole patients that, at the end of 
charitable sho11s at the theatre hall, cigarettes or candles ~r~ould probably be 
given ,,ut at tile door, as the patient audience filed out, Bored br some of these 
shot~s, some patients liould come a few minutes before closing time in order to 
file out ~tith the others,' still others 11ould AJanage h, get bark into the line 
several tifles and make the t~hole occasi,,n fiore than ordinarily IIL'rthiihile. Staff' 
were of "'urse a;~are of these practices and late co11ers to some of the hospital-
16. 
wide patient dancers were locked out, the assvsption being that they timed their 
arrival so as f.o be able to eat and run. (6offman page 201 1961) 
Persons !Vho have a particular stigAJa tend h1 have similar lt}arning experiences 
regarding their plight, and similar changes in conception of self - a siMilar 
•moral career• that is both cause and effect of commitment to a similar sequence 
of pusonal adjustments. 11/le natural hist~1ry of a category of persons "ith a 
stigma must be clearlr distinguished from the natural history of the stigma 
itself - the history of the origins, spread and decline of the capacity of an 
attribute t,; serve as a stigma in a particular society, for example, diV~71'ce in 
1/mer ican upper middle class society . .I 
.. , the norms dealt ~tit.h in this essay concern identity or being, and are 
therefore of a special kind. Failure or success at maintaining such norms has a 
Vt'ry direct effect on the' psychological integrity of the individual. /It tM saru 
time, mere desire to abide by the nortl - mere good Ifill - is not enough, for in 
manr cases the individual has no immediate control over his level of sustaining 
the riOfm. It is a question of the individual's conditf~;n, not his will:' it is a 
question of confor11ance, not compliance. (aoffman page 152 /.'17cJJ 
17. More accurate recent accounts of institutional life inside mental hospitals are to be 
found in the "The Politics of Mental Health" (1985). One of the descriptions of 
institutional life, based on first-hand experience of a mental hospital, is a portrayal of 
the depressingly flat atmosphere which sometimes characterizes these establishments. There 
is no evidence of the dehumanization of patients or of their loss of individuality. 
Instead, the emphasis is on the mutual dependence which developed between patients and 
carers, 
18. In the nineteenth century, the diffe1'ences in thought. which existed in the 
philosophical and social discourses of the two countries, spread to history: 
Bet~teen the 1890s and the IJ2cls, europe experienced an intt}Jlectual revolution 
in the human sciences. The significance of the {;Ork of Freud, Veber, Ourkheim, 
Pareto, Croce, Simmel, Oilthey and Sorel for the study of history hardly needs 
co11ment. IU tile very least, it made a decisive reiection of the more simplistic 
assusptions of mid-nineteenth century p~1sit.ivist methodology, and raised history 
once /lOre from the 1~1{;ly ideographic status to ~thich historians themselves had 
consigned it. Significantly england did not participate in this movement, it in 
fact remained virtually unalfected by it, !Plant Page 101 19!2) 
Perhiips this e:~plains why, in t.heir search for conceptual renewal, English historians of 
the Human sciences turned to the Frenchman Foucault. 
19. 
The reference is t~, t.~to maior de•·elopments in French history gL;fng back to tile 
early part of this century, each in its ot~n {;a.v linked tL; Narxism, and both have 
been brought h1gether by Fouw;lt 's teacher, Louis Aithusser: /.1 a rich 
tradition in the history of sciences.. in which Bachelard and Canguilhem are 
inf /uential figures. This tradition, 11hi ch influenced Foucault, sought to 
challenge the universal obiective and progressive io1age of a unified science 
inherited fr~?!J the fnlightenment through the attempt to cover an irreducible 
plurality of •territories~~ and uobiects" of kno11ledge, characterized by 
anonymous tacit procedures, and succeeding one another through breaks and 
ensuing ruptures - a disc~1ntinuous history 2J the "new l'tistor.v" identified 11ith 
the annales, which tried to put "battle treaty• narrative to rest .. ,, thus 
opening up nell areas and ne11 kinds of SL?UNes, (Raichman page SS /.985.! 
Additional influences have succeeded in rooting him firmly in the Continental tradition of 
social thought: 
Frolt Veber he inherits a concern iiith rationalisn and obJectification as tile 
essential trend in our culture and the most important problem of our time, But 
by converting Bavarian science int,, genediogical analytics, he develops a nethod 
of rigorous anal,vsis 11hich has a central place h1r pragmatic concern and 
presupposes, rather than pa!'adoxically opposes, it as a necessary part of the 
intellectual enterprise, Like ffeiddegger and Morno, he emphasises that the 
historical background of prartices, those practices 11hich /')ake objective social 
science possible cannot be studied by context free, value free, obJective 
theory,' rather, those practices produce the investigator and require an 
interpretation o{ hiiJ and his world, Having learned from /ferleau-Ponty that the 
knolier is embodied, Foucault can find the place from which to demonstrate that 
the investigator is inevitably situated. roreyf/Js and Rabino11 page !66 1%'2) 
20. As Harland points out, the philosophy behind Foucault's genealogy is at odds with the 
Anglo-Saxon interpretation of Nietzsche. For example, the Nietzschian concept of desil'e 
used in "The History of Sexuality", is at variance with Anglo-Saxon thinking about the 
body. To the origins of se>,uality, lodged in our biological desires and repressed by 
bourgeois society, Harland juxtaposes Foucault's desire: 
, , , lodged in ,1ur most secret nature, "demands# only to surface,- that if it 
fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of 
a power 11eighs it do11111, and it can finally be articulated Mly at the price of 
so11e k il7d of liberation, Ve believe in the full constancy of individual life, 
and imagine that it continues to exert its foNe indiscriminately in the present 
as it did in the past, But a kno~;ledge of history easily disintegrates this 
unity, depicts its 11avering course,,, 11e believe, in any even(. that the bo~v 
obeys tilt: exclusive la11s of physiology and that it escapes the int'luence of 
his tory, but this too is false. The body is moulded by a great many dis tine t 
regirus. <Harland page !58 !9,'1.~) 
(see the discussion of how the thought styles have affected t.he interpretation c•f Marx, 
oultined in the footnotes to the previous chapter). 
21. During the Renaissance, punishment relied on the display of power by the sovereign in 
the form of torture and public execution: "for all to see the power relation that gave the 
sovereign his force to the law". During the Classical period, punishment depended much 
more upon representation. There was a correspondence between the crime and the 
retribution, The representation of the crime thus became more important than its corporeal 
reality, 
22. The agenda of the Archaeology is best captured by Foucault himself: 
23. 
The {!lOrd archeaology JS not supposed to carrr any suggestion of anticipation,- it 
simply indicates a possible line of attuk for the analysis of verbal 
perlorAJances.' the specification of a level - that of the analysis of the 
statement and the archive/ the determination and illumination of a domain - the 
enunciative regularities, the positivities: the application of such CL,ncepts as 
rules of forf.'lation, archaeological derivation, and historical a priori. But in 
illJJost aJJ its dimensions and over almost all its crests, the enterprise is 
related to the sciences, and to analyses of a scientific type .. or to theories 
subJect. to rigL1rous criteria. 
1'/oreover, in their deployment and in the fields that they cover, archaeological 
descr ipth1ns are articulated upon other disciplines,' in seeking to de line, 
outside all reference to a psychological subiec t or constituent subjectivity, 
the different positions of the subJect that may be involved in statements, 
archeology touches on a question that is being posed t~1day b.r psychoanal.vsis,· in 
trying to reveal the rules of formathm L1f concepts, the modes of succession, 
connexion, and c~1e.dstence of statements, it touches on the probleM ~1f 
epistemological structures: in studying the for11ation of objects, the fields in 
which they emerge and are specified, in studying too the conditions of 
appropriation of discourse, to touch on the analysis of social formations. for 
archaeology, these are so 11any correlative spaces. Lastlr, in so far as it is 
possible to constitute a general theory of productions, archaeology, as the 
analysis of the rules proper to the different discursive practices, wil 1 find 
what might be called its enveloping theory. (foucault page 2rJ7 1972J 
flhat is at issue, briefly, is the overall "discut•sive fact", the 11ilY in vhich 
sex is "put into discourse". Hence too, flY main concern vii 1 be t~' locate the 
forms of po11er, the channels it takes, and the discourses it permeates in order 
to reuh the 11ost tenuous and individual /lodes of behavior, the paths that give 
it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire, h011 it penetrates 
and contr~1Js everyday pleasure - all this entailing effects that may be those of 
refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement and intensification.' in 
short, the •polymorphous techniques of por~er. " And finally, the essential ai11 .. 
wi 11 these effects of po{ller lead one to formulate tile truth about sex or .. on the 
contrary, falsehoods designed t,1 conceal that truth, but rather t~' bring out the 
",;ill to kno11ledge• that serves as both their support and their instrument. 
!'Foucault "the History of :,"exuality vol, I in Rabino11 pages 299-3{11> 1984.1 
24, The surveillance implemented in the panopticon enabled a system of data collection on 
the individuals within its walls. The system provided the information necessary for the 
creation of new discourses to manipulate and control them, 
25. FoucaulVs concept of power is not "negative" and "repressive" but "positive" and 
"constructive". He argues that sexual repression in the nineteenth century was 
"constructive", in that it generated rnore discourses on the subject than there had ever 
been before. 
26. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that much of Szasz's 'iork has been 
severely challenged and discredited, his book, "The Myth of Mental Illness", is still more 
widely available than Foucault's works. 
27. Barham captures the difference between the Foucauldian and Macintyrian approaches: 
28, 
lfnothlir way to say this is that, 11/lereas t~riters rYho emphasire "structures of 
pover' help us to identif,v and understand a histor.v of abuse, the.v fail t~' 
locate their criticisms against an adaquate countervailing conception of human 
1 i ves, (Barham page 76 1984 J 
The undesignt?d s.vstenaticit,v has to be related to the purposeful action of 
.sgents in a vay ~e can understand.,. the reason for this requirement is that the 
text of hist.or.v, vhich lie are trying to e:~plain, is m.sde up of purposeful human 
actions. /lhere there are patterns in this acti~'n r~hich are not a purp~1se, tre 
have t,, explain why actions done under one description or purpose also bear this 
other, undesigned actf,,n. Ve have t~' sho~;; hov the til~' descriptions relate.' a 
strategic pattern c.snnot just be left hanging, unrelated to '''Jr conscious ends 
and proiects, It is a mistake to think that the only intelligiblt? relation 
betr~een a pattern and our conscious purpose is the direct one rvhere the pattern 
is consciously willed .. , tTayl~,r page 87 in Courens-lloy 1987J 
29. The negation of the subject - leading to a focus on abstract structures - as well as 
the idea of discontinuity embodied in the episteme, have become the hallmarks of 
Foucault's historical analysis, Neither of these central articulating strands have gone 
without criticism. Merquior <1985) argues that the model Foucault proposed for the 
deve 1 opment of the Human Sciences, does not app 1 y t.o the Hard Sciences i . e. physics and 
chemistry, Using examples drawn from both these disciplines, he demonstrates the existence 
of "epistemic lags" and "dialectic returns" to previous ideas. Their existence is 
inconsistent 'lith the idea of successive episternes which come and go, each b1•eaking 
sharply with the other, In fact, examples of epistemic lags can be found in the arts as 
well: music always lags on the visual arts, although proceeding through similar 
developmental stages. 
30. For Canguilhem, Foucault's mentor, the appropriate approach to the history of science 
was to see it as: 
untl prise de conscience expiic ite, expostie com11e t.Morie, du fait que Jes 
sciences sont des discours critiques et progressifs pour Ja deten1ination de ce 
qui, dans I 'experienL"e doit ,jtre tenue pour reel. L 'ob.fet de 1 'histoire des 
sciences est done un obJet non donnti U, un objet J qui l'inactellent est 
essentiel. fn atJCune faf''n est-elle histoire naturelle d'un objet cvlturel, Trop 
s,,vvent, elle est faite comme une histoire naturelle, parce qu 1elle indentifie 
Ia science 1vec les sav1nts, et Jes s1vants avec leurs biographies civiles et 
iCidemiques, ou bien parce qu'elle identifie Ia science 1vec les resultats 
ptidigogiques aL"tuels. (Canguilhem page 18 19.78.1 
This is Lhe approach which Foucault grafted onto the Human Sciences, 
31. Canguilhem was critical of Anglo-Saxon historians. He saw their discussions as centred 
around whether to adopt the "internal ist" or the "external ist" approach to history, The 
externalist. position, according to Canguilhem, is a kind of impoverished Marxism. It 
isolates the social and economic factors which might affect scientific development. The 
internalist position, on the other hand, is a form of naive empiricism: 
L 'externBiiste voit J 'histoire des sciences comme une explicition d1un phenoll~ne 
de culture pir le conditionl!ent du milieu wlturel global, et1 pu const§quent 
J 'assimile J une socioJogie niturBiiste d'institutions, en negligeant 
entihement I 'interpretation d'un discovrs J pretension de veritJs. 
L 'internalisie voit dins Jes flits de d~couvertes simultinees i'Cilwl 
infinitesil!il, conservatf,,n d'energie.l des faits dont on ne peut faire 
1 'flistoire sins t.Morie. lei par cons~quent, it: f1it d'llistoire des sciences est 
trait~! co11me vn flit de science selon une position tipisttimologique qui consiste 
J priviligier Ja tM,,rie relativement au donn~ empirique, rcanguilhell pagt: IS 
1918.1 
32, The only two works ~based on research from primary sources are: 
. , . the practiCilly unreadable Story of Bethlem Hospital by £. G. Donohue, 
published in 1914, 1nd the practicilly unknown Bridevell and BethletJ section of 
the Charity CoMmissioner's Report of 18:,'8 by F. 0. Hartin, (/Jilderidge page 17 
198,1i.l 
The throwa~;ar nature of the Bethlem reference puts it firmly in the Citeg,,ry of 
"ttell knottn facts•/ not to be lingered over, but dropped in for good measure .. 
since everybody knolls it 1 the scene will look more convincing if it is there: 
1nd I doubt whether m1ny people would think it 11orthvhile even to question its 
acrurae,v, (1/Jlderidge p1ge 19 1985) 
33. 
34, 
35, 
the governing elite. , , treated insanity t1s a medict1/ problem. ~sylums 
pro1ifert1ted t1JI over the country in the centur.r t1fter the english Revoluti,,n, 
This phenoD!enM 11as the consequence of a nev cMsensus t111ong the governing 
clt1sses about hot~ pt1uper 1unt1tics should be treated. for the t1sylum movement lias 
begun t1nd sustt1ined largely by privt1te Mtrepreneurs vith very little direction 
from the government. The dominance ot' medical therapies over other kinds of 
psychologict1l healing t1t1s embodied in the regi11ens of privt1te and public 
madhouses, and as their Membns grev more t1nd more, mad people were subjected t,, 
physical restraint and confinement, (lfacOonald page 2;)cJ 1981.1 
The domination involved in fAt'ral treatment 11as thus the most poverful of all -
not t'orce ensuring submission but authority assuming mastery - a contestation in 
a 11ort1l spue in 11hich the madman is bent to the vill of the doc tor t1nd comes to 
accept this liill as his own, (page 25 /995) 
Such t1n analysis vould not vie~t po11er as so11e kind of monolithic and 11t1lign 
presence, to Iiilich ve must oppose ourselves t1nd 11hich r~e must strive to abolish. 
Rather, it would analyse the power of psychit1try in terms of t~hat it allo11s us 
to aspire, the new types of problem it allo'ls us to conceive, the ner~ types of 
soluti,,n it inserts int,, our reality, This broadens the focus of anal,rsis from a 
concentration upon medicine and the mental hospital t,,, a consideration of tile 
develop!ttent of techniques of social regulation animated b,r psychiatric themes. 
(lfiJJer and Rose page 2 !986.i. 
36, Like Foucault, Donzelot aimed to get away from: 
The epic register, that narrative loftiness ;;htre tile inscription of meaning in 
history proceeds through the recounting of f'lanichean confrontations,,, (Oonzelot 
page 1 1980J 
As Bourdieu 
CHAPTER SIX 
ON 1\rATIO:IiALIS:M: IN EDUCATION 
"lie remain for the most part, however, 11oefvlly 
ignorant a!Jovt the adult edvc~tion activity in 
Fr~nce,. ovr ne11rest neighbour. It is perft11ps 
generally true that the basis of French thinking 
11nd 50( ial Jiving i5 more different froli ovr Otfn 
th~n fllany ro!Jntr ies f!Jr tiler a111ay» rTi tfiiJ5 page I 
1967) 
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(1979) emphasizes, education is a cultural 
practice. In a study of the effects of social class on 
student life, he describes how the assimilation of knowledge 
is tied to "cultural values". This chapter will concern 
itself with an outline of the different academic systems and 
their goals. Subsequently, the differences between the 
systems will be related to political factors. It begins by 
exploring t.he properties of the curricula which foster the 
two thought styles. The French interventionist Stat.e, 
practicing a politic of intellectualism,' has created an 
educat.ional system geared towards the development of the 
intellect and the ndnd, perpetuating the rationalist thought 
style. Conversely, the non interventionist English State has 
promoted a system which fosters empiricism. 
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Education is crucial to an understanding of the properties 
of the national styles and how these are perpetuated. This 
is why it is central to this 1:hesis as a whole. The t.heory 
and practice of education is one of the most important 
machines society possesses. Through its ideological 
institutions. education attempts to inculcate certain 
qualities valued by the culture in question, by 
intellectually "shaping" individuals. What exactly is meant 
by such shaping is difficult to define. The definition most 
fitting to this thesis would be the creation of a symbolic 
system <Moehlman 1965), a "thought framework" which the 
individual uses to understand, and communicate about, the 
world around him. The case of education is interesting as 
every aspect of the French and English systems seems to 
cultivate the national thought styles of rationalism and 
empiricism respectively. The educational systems are 
structured by the societies in which they are embedded. 
Consequently. they embody certain cultural ideals, specific 
to their respective socio-cultural environments. This 
ensures that they provide t.he intellectual training 
necessary to perpetuate the thought styles, which are 
likewise a product of the different milieus <Bourdieu 1979). 
The factor responsible for the different structures of the 
French and English educational systems is the contrasting 
political structures of the two countries: a strong 
interventionist. nation state in France and a weak non-
interventionist one in England. This persistent disparity. 
the thesis has argued, helps account !'or the existence of 
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the two national thought styles and suitable institutional 
environments to sustain them. Although I have written myself 
out of this chapter, the discussion - particularly that part 
of it concerned with curricula is based on my personal 
experience of the two systems: I have been educated in the 
English and French systems. In this way. the following 
chapter is a fitting end to a thesis which examines 
academical! y, 
experience. 
a phenomenon best understood through 
A LOOK AT CONTRA,STING EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS: THE CURRICULA AND 
THEIR AIMS 
Education in the Western world has changed through the ages 
according to universal trends. The Middle Ages were 
characterized by scholasticism and the Renaissance by 
classicism. The seventeenth century, however, marked the 
beginning of a period of modernization, leading to the 
creation of national syst.ems of education in the eighteenth. 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 2 Although differences 
between t.he systems existed previously. it is in the later 
centuries that they became pronounced. That these trends are 
universal within the Western world is not disput.ed, but the 
argument. is that with this synchronic movement across the 
centuries, there has been a diachronic cont.rast in each 
culture: specific codes of practice, promoting national 
features of thought. Culturally specific codes are a product 
of local socio-political factors and of the thought styles 
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generated by these milieus. The codes are consensual in that 
they are agreed sets of practices and values between those 
who teach and those who are taught <:Bourdieu 1979). These 
local codes. unlike the general trends, have remained 
relatively stable over the centuries, perpetua·ti ng a 
national mind in the Durkheimian sense, and a concomitant 
national thought style. 3 
Rationalism. it has been argued, is a style of thought 
chat~acterized by a structured. syst.ematic and t.heoretical 
approach to knowledge. It goes beyond i:mmediately available 
(perceptual) evidence to general underlying principles, 
symbols and structures. This is accompanied by an interest 
in language and rhetoric, necessary to express 
complicated ideas rationalism generates. Empiricism, 
the 
by 
contrast. manifests an aversion to formal academicism and 
theoretical speculation. Intuition and imagination are two 
fortes of a more perceptual form of intelligence, favouring 
:impression:istic explanations and concerned with the 
practical aspects of knowledge. Educational strategies with 
different goals and values. translated into curricular 
differences. are responsible for perpetuating t.hese 
features. That of the French is geared towards cul ti vati ng 
the intellect and the mind and thus is rationalist in the 
tradi ti anal philosophical sense of the word. A consistent 
:feature of its English counterpart has been the holist.ic 
development o:f persons which. Dancy argues. has had an 
adverse effect on English education: 
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The whole stress on character has inevitably been at the 
expense of intellect. and has resulted i11 an amateur. 
empirical and anti-scientific approach which is out of place 
in a technical age. (Dancy in Halls page 5 1967) 
The contrasting goals of the two systems is a frequent 
discussion point in the education literature. French 
education i<= based upon the belief that every-thing is a 
:function of the mind: 
It is not the function of secondary education to prepare 
pupils who have a definite pr-ofessiOil in mind nor even to 
point them towards one or other of the great intellectual 
roots ill which the activities of :man deploy the.mselves. It 
does something more and better: its task is. without 
preparing for anything specific. to make pupils apt for 
everything. It forges in them, with the care and diligence 
of the artist. conscious of the surprising difficulty of his 
taslr. the powerful and delicate tool for their :future 
conquests, that is, a vigorous and fine intellect. ready for 
all the beautiful adventures of the mind... <'Kandel page 19 
1931) 
Education, [in France] i11deed, has been almost exclusively 
an intellectual adornment. but it has consistently developed 
praiseworthy skills in the use of words and in self 
expression, a realm of accomplishment in which the French 
have no peers. <'Kneller in Moehlman page 192 1965) 
The English stress is on the "whole man" and on "character". 
Indeed, English educational goals have never been conceived 
uniquely in terms of nurturing "intellectual qualities": 
We have always so far seen education as being chiefly 
concerned l'li th the all round development of persons and not 
merely as a matter of instruction of classes. The survival 
of this vi tal and fundamental idea is something in which we 
can take an i111111ense pride. (Hiller page 60 1951) 
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The aim of the new national curriculum is still to provide 
an all round education furnishing the individual with the 
necessary skills to take his place in society. 
These different educational patterns have historical roots, 
dating back at least to the seventeenth century with 
philosophers such as Locke and Condillac. 4 Furthermore, 
educational differences appear to be firmly established in 
the top educational institutions of both countries - public 
schools and Lycees. Public schools embody: 
The good old tradition oi godliness and good learning was 
overlayed in Victorian ti:mes by the cult of Nuscular 
Christianity which laid stress on character training (which 
:mainly meant organized games to the detriment of hard work). 
(Norrich page 52 1963) 
Academic work was, and still is, conceived as another "form 
of discipline". the implicit assumption being that a pupil 
"should work hard:.,. that he should play hard; ... that he 
should attend Chapel" CWilson page 75 1961). The Lycee2. 
implement a policy o:f rigid academicism, where: 
The function of the teaching staff. by contrast, is solely 
to teach... intellectual discipleship, the devotion that 
Alain for example, inspired in his pupils, most certainly 
exists. But the 'pastoral relatioJJship' that exists between 
:master and pupil in :many English academic schools is 
conspicuously absent. This :may be no bad thing, for it 
concentrates attention. particularly in the top forms. on 
study. The highly qualified "agrege". who enters his 
classroom, delivers a brilliant lesson, and departs again as 
the next hour is striking - for he is not obliged to stay 
on the school premises beyond the fifteen hours actual 
teaching he is committed to give - (Halls page 118 1965) 
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In England, the attention to pastoral activities goes hand 
in hand with a focus on charact.er. That these differences 
are entrenched in the top institutions is important because, 
as Bourdieu (1979) notes, all teaching of culture <even 
scientific culture), presupposes a body of knowledge, 
skills, and modes of expression \---!hi c.h constitute the 
heritage of the cultivated classes CBourdieu page 21 1979). 
The French curriculum stresses the study of non-utilitarian 
disciplines such as the classics and philosophy which are 
thought best to develop the highly valued thinking skills. 
It embodies both Cartesian and classical ideals, giving it 
the necessary properties to foster the rationalist thought 
style (Prost 1968, Bourdieu 1979). Its rationalism is 
manifested in the form of an emphasis on abstracting general 
principles/types from specific instances, as well as an 
interest in universals as opposed to specifics. The 
encyclopaedic nature of the curriculum is designed to 
produce a hol ist.ic perspective and generate the impression 
of unity in knowledge, another Cartesian ideal <Halls 1965). 
The classical legacy can be seen in the importance given to 
expression. rhetoric and the ability to structure and 
present a good argument. Practical sub.j ects, such as ·typing 
and woodwol-k domestic sciences and other crafts play no 
part in the French curriculum - were offered as GCE subjects 
in England. In France, they are reserved for those unable to 
cope with the more demanding academic subjects who are 
isolated in a separate stream at sixteen. The English system 
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guards against a rigidly academic approach to knowledge. The 
newly i1nplemented national cur-r-iculum not implemented 
unt.il recently because of fears that it would curb 
"creat 1 ve" teaching has introduced the GCSE exam as an 
alternative to the more theoretically orientated 'O'levels.s 
It emphasizes to an even greater degree the importance of 
guided discovery and the practical aspect of knowledge. This 
is manifest.ed by the centrality of original project work to 
the exam. Furthermore, suggestions to parents as to how they 
can help with their childrens' education included 1) for 
primary school children, buying plants and animals so that 
children can learn about "the conditions necessary for 
healthy living" and 2> discussing health matters with 
secondary school children and allowing them to take 
decisions concerning their families' diet. and recreation. •· 
It is more important. for a French child to learn his times. 
·tables and his g-rammar than to explore what. constitutes t.he 
healthy living conditions of plants and animals. Finally, 
the compart.mentalization of the English system, or the 
pigeon-holing of knowledge - which contrasts with the French 
encyclopaedic approach is another feature promoting 
empiricism CHalls 1965, Capelle 1967). 
French education is founded on the Cartesian assumption that 
any problem can be solved using the power of reason. 
Children are thus taught 1 'art de bien penser i. e. how to 
reason correctly using abstract principles CHalls 1965, 
Prost 1968). This art de bien penser is merely one of the 
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"arts" that a child must master. The others are 1 'art cle 
persuader. l'art de bien dire et de bien ~crire. the 
classical emphasis on rhetorical prowess. L'art de persuader 
refers to t.he correct and :fine usage o:f the French tongue. 
These various arts are part. of the more general culture de 
1 'esJxrit and, recently. culture g~nerale. an intrinsic part 
of French educational philosophy. The definition o:f culture 
generale, according to Georges Duhamel, was "a totality of 
notions not susceptible to immediate application". and to 
Herriot (1927) was "what remains when all else has been 
forgotten" i.e. general intellectual powers or learning how 
to learn. This brings to mind the difference between 
expression and conceptual manipulation which has been 
stressed by English authors when writing about their French 
colleagues <Harland 1985. Bowie 1979. Benvenuto and Kennedy 
1984. Turkle 1978). and also explains Mckie's (1952) 
reference to the chemist. Lavoisier's mastery of the French 
language. A theory like Lacan' s requires a certain kind of 
literary performance, and indeed Lacan' s discourse is full 
of clever word play and other literary devices <Bowie 1979). 
I·t also helps to explain the conceptual fluency I was trying 
to capture when comparing Foucault and his English 
:followers, as well as the eloquence of the French students I 
interviewed. These arts are best cultivated by what are 
collectively known as Les etudes desinteressees or non-
utilitarian studies which includes classics, philosophy and 
nowadays languages also grouped under the alternative 
heading of Les lettres. They were. and to a great ext.ent 
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still are, thought to be better for the development of 
"l'esprit", than empirical sciences such as physics and 
chemistry. Against these various "arts". one can juxtapose 
the pragmatic English approach of the 3 R' s reading, 
'riting and 'rithmetic- t.o which the 3 A's have been added 
age, aptitude and ability. Pragmatism in educational 
knowledge has been a feature of English education, even in 
elitist instit.utions such as public schools. The importance 
of useful learning and of giving a good all round education, 
was stressed in ·the nineteenth century by the Headmaster of 
Rugby and educational reformer, Thomas Arnold-7 (in Kandel 
1931). Intelligence is cultivated in accordance with this 
pragmatism (Morris 1951). ,,,, 
The emphasis on disinterested studies was codified by 
Napoleon. During the Napoleonic era, classicism was at its 
height because of the political analogy bet.ween the French 
and Roman Empire. Although he "liked" the Physical Sciences, 
they represented a partial application of the mind. The 
study of "letters", however, was a complete education. 
Philosophy nurtures the powers of thought and expression, 
promoting the ability to "synthesize and arrange material 
verbally into new and interesting ways" (Benvenuto and 
Kennedy 1986). As Bowie 0979) points out, Lacan's genius 
lies in his ability to capture using only a few linguistic 
concepts what Freud needed several models for. In recent 
years. there have been moves in France to reduce the number 
of hours that pure philosophy occupies in the curriculum. 
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However, this has been done by integrating it into the study 
of the French language through the writings of men such as 
Pascal, Voltaire and Baudelaire. This has meant that 
children from ·the age of fourteen become acquainted with 
their phj.losophical heritage. It should be noted that the 
philosophy syllabus does. hov<ever, encompass German writers. 
most recently Freud. Hence the French students use of 
philosophical/psychoanalytic explanations in their 
discussion of mental illness. Through textual analysis. 
pupils become aware of the underlying philosophical 
structure of the text as well as the core ideas, an approach 
differing from the study of literature in England which 
centres around revealing the logic of the narrative drama. 
In depth analysis tends to be psychological in nature. i.e. 
character analysis. Taking into account what was said about 
the differences in literature. both approaches seem 
appropriate to their respective subject matter. It is 
interesting to speculate to what extent this training 
develops a predisposition towards explaining issues in 
individualistic/psychological 
broader/social terms, 
social discourse. 
typical 
terms as opposed to 
of the two traditions of 
The classics in France and Britain are, to a certain extent. 
retained as status symbols. In this capacity, they are now 
only taught extensively in the top British institutions. The 
English ultilitarian approach abandoned them much earlier as 
part of general secondary education. The sciences were 
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favoured over .humanities, because of their pract.ical utility 
in an increasingly industrial age. This change occurred 
without any of the heated debates on "modernization" which 
took place on the Continent \.Pros·t 1968>. In the new English 
national curriculum. sciences assume an even great.er 
importance. The "core" subjects to be taught in secondary 
schools are English, mathematics and the sciences .. ,,, In 
France, classics have been more importan·t both because of 
their potential in the "education of the mind11 and because 
classicism has become ingrained in French culture through 
its past use as a political tool. Interestingly, Bourdieu 
0979 > comments that: 
Mckie 
It is known, for example, that educational achieveroent is 
strongly dependent on the (real or apparent) ability to 
manipulate r:ne abstract language of ideas and that the 
students most successful in this area are those who have 
studied Greek and Latin. (Bourdteu page 14 1979) 
(1952) remarks on how classics were an excellent 
preparation for a scientific mind like Lavoisier's, and 
Hartley (1971) refers to his general intellectual skills 
which were a product of this education. 
The tendency towards analysis initiated by the study of 
Latin and the classics, is now retained in t.he very French 
notion of expl i cation de textes, the drawing out. of general 
ideas f'rom a mass of detail, a characteristic of rational 
thought mirrored in French educational principles: 
L'enseignement tram;ais, d'autre part, ne se propose que des 
buts uni versels: les verites generales sont seules objets 
d'enseignement. Derriere les cas particuliers. on cherche 
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les lois et les types. et il est vrai qu'abstraire et 
gtweraliser sont deux operatlons fondamentales. (Prost page 
339 1968) 
These have been consisten·t features of French thinking and 
were particularly well illustrated in the chapter on the 
Human Sciences in rational collectivism, although they were 
also a fea·ture of Lamarck's approach to biology. The 
importance of general, universal laws, governed Comtes' 
choice of physics as a science on which his sociology had to 
be modelled. The analytic tendency is evident. in areas as 
diverse as nineteenth century science and twentieth century 
Foucauldian archaeology. 
Classicism is manifested in a more subtle way in the 
teaching of French essay writing. The ~:::t.udent is t.aught 
precise rules of composition, to construct an argument and 
present his ideas in a coherent, logical form. Great stress 
is put on the structure of the essay, and when the student 
is beginning to master the art of writing a dissertation, 
half the marks are awarded for structure and organization, 
the rest is devided between original i t.y. 
spelling/punctuation and any other factors which the teacher 
deems important. This kind of training enhances the capacity 
to present a coherent verbal argument which again 
contributes to the conceptual fluency of the French. In 
England, teachers are, at. the GCSE stage especially, given 
to emphasizing ·the importance of creative, imagi na t.i ve 
thinking in essay writing. Before being crea·tive, the French 
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child has to have a near perfect grasp of the language and 
the structural principles of composition. The importance of 
structure is also evident in the overwhelming concern for 
the gl-ammatical principles of the Fre.nch language, a subJect 
sadly neglected in Britain. It is taught so rigorously. that 
by the end of the first three years of secondary school, the 
child has learnt the cord ugations of all French verbs by 
heart, even those which are no longer in use. 
Although Napoleon classified mathematics alongside the 
Physical Sciences, in practice it has persistently been 
judged more important, since it nurtures clear logical 
thought, 1 'esprit Pascalian. In the final year of the 
scientific stream, baccalaureat C, mathematics was awarded 
nine hours a week as opposed to the six alloted to the 
sciences of chemistry and physics. ''' Maths and classics may 
seem an extremely dull and dry combination, but interest is 
considered secondary to training, and anyway, it can be 
derived from deep understanding of the subject matter in 
question <Halls 1965>. Capelle 096'7) - a high official in 
the Ministry of Education - elaborated on the significance 
of the "three communicators" mathematics, the mother 
tongue and foreign languages. Mathemat.ics was important 
because it was the symbolic language of science. All foreign 
languages, ancient and modern, provided an essential insight 
into other cul t.ures French children now start learning 
another modern language from the age of six. Languages, 
whether scientific or otherwise, are important because ·they 
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are the symbol systems within which thinking occurs. Hence 
Lavoisier's emphasis on finding t.he suitable language t.o 
structure chemistry. 
As mentioned above and previously in chapter three, 
mathematics as the language of science is accorded priority 
over the more empirical sciences - chemistry is the lowest 
ranking of all the physical sciences because it was the 
least systematic and most. experimental. Furthermore, when 
practical scientific disciplines are taught, they are 
moulded to suit rationalist ideals. Taking the example o:f 
technology, children do not acquire this :form o:f knowledge 
by linking it to a specific occupation as one would expect 
in a more empirical approach. When the teaching o:f 
technology appeared in French schools in the nineteen 
sixties, it was taught as a collection o:f general concepts 
with a 1 imi ted amount o:f practical work. It was an approach 
which demonstrated foresight: as industrial practices were 
changing so rapidly, there was little point in extensive 
applied study. The thinking behind it was that: 
... technology no longer belongs to the training or 
empiricism of an out-ot'-date artisan system. It has a rich 
and active potential both in the scientific training of 
young people and in their education as human beings. 
(Capelle page 98 1967) 
Capelle goes so :far as to state that technology is the new 
:form of humanism, infinitely creative and proof of great. 
genius - he cites Leonardo da Vinci to illustrate his point. 
In technology, as in other areas of the curriculum, the 
Page 277 
French educational system has been conuni tted to combating 
empiricism and utilitarianism: 
L'enseignment technique, par example, n'imagine pas qu'on 
puisse passer ala pratique avant un cours. qui l'eclaire et 
la Ionde. Dans le secondaire, 1 'enseignement du latin se 
refuse a la methode empirique qui bornerait son ambition a 
lire sans relache des t:extes: il va, dans sa forme ancienne, 
des regles a la langue par le tlu~me, puis, apres la re:torme 
de 1880, il remonte des textes aux n?gles: dans un cas coiiJllJe 
dans l'autre, la mediation rationelle est necessaire. La 
meme methode est transposee a 1 /ecole priJJJaire dans 
1' enseignement du frantrais, et justiiie 1 • importance 
accordee a 1 'analyse grammaticale ... <Prost page 339 1968) 
Prost's remark betrays the fami 1 iar stress on theory over 
practice found in all rational thinking. The differences 
between English and French scientific education have a 
bearing on what was discussed in the science chapter 
particularly the non-pragmatic orientation of French 
scientific knowledge and the stress on creativity and 
imagination in science in England. The new English science 
GCSE's stress creative, imaginative thinking which contrasts 
with the French praise of disciplined, ordered, logical 
reasoning using principles - a disparity which was evident 
in the chapter on science. Summarizing the differences 
between the old and the new exams, a student of the English 
public school Charterhouse claims that, in 1955, the answer 
to an '0' level question, 'Compare and contrast an amoeba 
with a single cell of a 8pirogyra was given by a boy as "The 
first one is flat like a poached egg, and the second one's 
cylindrical like a tin of· beans". This infuriated his 
biology master and would have scored nothing at '0' level. 
Now, however. the student maintains, it would have scored at 
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least four points at demonstrating initiative. 
av-1areness of ma·thematical forms, culinary experience and 
knowledge of simile. 1 ' 
The holist.ic rational approach as opposed to a narrower 
empirical one, a difference particularly salient in the 
sociologically orientated chapters, is reflected in an 
important aspect of the French curriculum: its encyclopaedic 
nature. It is the result oi the Cartesian ideal which 
attributes importance to the unity of knowledge. 
facilitating a synthetic perspective. The latter is another 
necessary skill when thinking in holistic, collective terms, 
as opposed to "localized" or "narrow" individualism <Halls 
1965). The English "narrow culture in depth" is unique and 
contrasts with the French idea of cul~ure g~n~rale. It 
betrays the empirical ideal of categorizing and reducing 
everything to small distinct units, amenable to empirical 
study. The French aim, although admirable, means in practice 
that the sheer mass of knowledge to be accumulated 
compromizes the much cherished intellectual skills, and 
reduces learning to melnorization by rote. Critical thinking 
is encouraged, contributing to an originality of thought in 
those bright enough to cope with the work load original 
thinking should be distinguished from the imaginative 
thinking described as typical of empiricism, as it refers to 
the clever manipulation of ideas in new and interesting 
ways, not to creat.ive insight. However, many are reduced to 
extensive note-taking, and submerged under a mass of 
Page 279 
material to be learnt. The style of presentation is of no 
help here, usually relying on "abstraction and symbols" 
CHall s page 138 1965) . There is much to commend the t.rai ni ng 
of the esprit, although it is often the more utilitarian 
approach which is able to tailor its needs to the 
individual. ' "' 
SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TV/0 SYSTEMS AND THEIR 
VALUES 
Nowhere does French intellectual elitism stand out better 
than in the :following statements of educational goals: 
That an 'elite' is necessary it is not :lor democracy to 
deny; that an 'elite' is necessary not only to maintain the 
prestige o:l society, but :for the direction o:l the nation -
on this point, I believe we can come to an agreement. The 
obJect of secondary education is the intellectual training 
of an 'elite' which is destined to become directive and mvst 
be prepared Ior its social role. (Steeg (Secretary General J 
1911 in Kandel page 212 1931) 
Our task, in fact, is constantly to create an 'elite'. I. 
:for my part, feel that keenly. At a time when other :forces, 
1 ess noble, seek to establish themsel ves, the educa t i anal 
system has the glorious privilege o:f maintaining the 
prestige o[ the spirit. the sovereignty and independe11ce o:l 
the idea. It has the duty of courageously teaching 
democracies that no greater danger menaces them than 
misunderstanding o:l the role of the 'elite'. or, in other 
words, the danger o:f leveling downward. Our system by 
examinations and by competitions maintains the most 
justit'iable method of recruiting... Js it not in the 
educati anal system that the republican ideal must be 
realized [irst, and hence spread through the whole state? 
<Herriot (}[inister of Public Instruction) 1927 in Halls 
1965) 
It is t.:tlis intellectual elitism which is responsible :for 
perpetuating rational thinking, and explains why academic 
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education is so highly valued in French society. The 
prestige attributed to exam success - failure being regarded 
as a major disaster for any bourgeois family <Halls 1965) 
testifies to the importance of French education. There is no 
denying that high st.andards of education are available in 
Britain for those who have the money and the inclination to 
study. However, perhaps because there have not been any 
officially recognized privileges attached to it, high 
intellectual training has not acquired the prestige it has 
in France or Germany. Kandel remarks that, whereas the 
Germans at·tach great value to knowledge and the French to 
the possession of a state certificat-e as evidence both o:f 
knowledge and culture, the English have always placed 
character and personality first <Kandel page 386 1931). 
French exam certificates are rightly highly valued, as they 
are obtained within a highly competitive system, which is 
designed to select academical! y brilliant students. On the 
issue of what role competitive examinations will play in the 
new English system, ~agg reports: 
The 
The School Examinations and Assess1nent Council which is 
responsible :lor testing aiJIJS is anxious to stress that tests 
ai.m to help children show what they can do, and diagnose 
weaknesses. However, some politicians, the Prime Ninister 
included, want a more competitive pass/fail system. The 
t'irst approach seems likely to dominate . .. (W'agg page 57 
1989) 
respective statuses of education and of 
intellectualism in general in France and in Britain, can 
be understood in terms of the contrasting political 
histories of the two countries. The meri tocrat.ic French 
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society, which has exist.ed since the absolutist monarchy, 
seems to be at the root of the difference. During the period 
of absolutist development, the King creat.ed a centralized 
state bureaucracy. It acted as a buffer between him and 
heriditary nobility, freeing him of their influence. This 
bureaucracy was - and still is - recruited on the basis of 
educational credentials, :from the middle classes 
bourgeoisie: 
As a consequence 111sti tuti ons of higher education in society 
took on the function of training candidates for state 
service: as a result at' this the status of elite education 
increased to the extent that its possessors came to see it 
as, in Nannhei111's words, 'an honorific substitute for 
nobility of birth'. CHickox page 264 1977) 
or 
Education thus enabled the bourgeoisie to achieve a prestige 
and status equivalent. to tha·t of the traditional nobility, 
by providing access to st.ate offices. Indeed, France had a 
tradition of ennobling its civil servants, creating a host. 
of "noblesses", in contrast to the English single category 
of the Landed Gentry. 1 ''' The relationship between the stat.e 
and the bureaucracy was a symbiotic one in the sense that 
the bureaucrats derived power and prestige from their 
alliance with the state, and the latter 1'reed itsel1' from 
pressures of the hereditary nobility. It housed these 
intellectual bureaucrats in glamorous institutions, where 
they were guaranteed high academic standards through 
rigorous training. This elite and its institutions were thus 
transformed into instruments of state glorification (t.hese 
points have been highlighted in chapters two and three). 
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Today it is the role of ·the prestigious Grancles Ecoles of 
Paris to educate this bureaucracy. Academic qualifications 
have retained their significance, and Bourdieu in 1979 
points out t.hat; 
.. . what academic qualification guarantees is something much 
;-nore than. and different from. the right to occup_Y a 
position and the capacity to perform the corresponding ._1ob. 
In this respect the diploma (~scolaire.> is more like a 
patent of nobility (titre de noblesse) than the title to 
property(t;_i:t.:c.e._ de p.copriete) which strictly technical 
det'tnitions 111ake of it. (Bourdieu page 81 1979) 
In Bri·tain, however, the comparatively haphazard development 
of an intellectual tradition can be linked to the failure to 
evolve a separate middle class education linked to a 
centralized state bureaucracy. This "may ultimately reflect. 
the fact. that Britain did not go through the absolutist. 
phase of nation state development" <Hickox page 265 1977). 
Furthermore, when a state bureaucracy was created in the 
latter half of· the ninet.een.th century, it was a modified 
version of the Continental model, developed in a contrasting 
social context. Thus different. qualities were favoured by 
the competitive examinations for entry into the civil 
service. While appearing to give advantage to academic 
merits. they select.ed for the characteristics produced by 
public schools, in other words, those traditionally 
associated with the English gentleman general, pr-actical 
intelligence, moral integrity and strength of character. 
<Dancy 1963, Kalton 1966). 
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As chapter three indicated, state patronage in France 
created a space where academic research could be conducted 
away from purely utilitarian concerns. This explains the non 
pragmatic approach to knowledge seen in French educational 
notions such as etudes desinteressees. The importance of 
academic intellectualism was captured in Hahn's (1971) 
remark concerning French institutions cited in chapter 
three. and is reiterated by Bourdieu 0979). He underlines 
the importance of academicism and sheds further light on the 
origins of the characteristics of the French approach to 
study: 
Adherence to the values implied in the academic hierarchy o:f 
performances is so strong that individuals can be seen to be 
drawn towards the school careers or competitions most highly 
valued by the educational system, independently or- their 
personal aspiratiOJJS or aptitudes. This is one of the 
t'actors in the otherwise often inexplicable attraction 
exerted by the aggn?gatiQJ). and the grandes ecoles, and more 
generally by abstract disciplines to which great prestige is 
attached. Perhaps it is the same principle that inclines 
French academics and intellectuals in general to assign the 
highest value to works in which the theoretical ambition is 
most manliest. <Bourdieu page 69 1979) 
This is why it is so important for intellect.uals such as 
Lacan i~o get their theories introduced into a university 
setting. The centrality of education to French society led 
to its being incorporated into the very meaning of 
democracy. '"' This legi·timized state control in an area which 
was to be the key to the liberty of French Republicans. An 
example of how state control in France contrasts with its 
absence in England is usefully illustrated by the current 
discussions concerning the national curriculum. Since Henry 
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IV in 1586, the French State has increased its control over 
what is taught in educa-tional institutions. Because of the 
strength of the private sector and public opposition on the 
grounds of academic freedom, state intervention was. un·til 
recently, unthinkable in Britain <Kandel 1931). It was a 
similar si tuat.ion t.o that v-1hich had existed in ni neteent.h 
century English science. Changes are now being implemented, 
but the Ministry of Education in Britain still does not have 
the same powers as its French counterpart. This is due t.o 
the fact. that it must still colli1D.unicate with local 
educational authorities which are responsible for t.he 
recruitment o:f teachers and the financing and 
implementations of policies in schools. 
THE PERVASIVENESS OF RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM IN EDUCATION 
The political structures have produced different educational 
practices, permeated by empiricism and rat.ionalism. Three 
areas have been chosen to illustrate this: educational 
planning, educat.ional thinking, and teacher training. These 
practices mirror the thought styles, in particular the 
rationalist insistence on academic, theoretical 
structuralism and the empirical resistance to theory and 
emphasis on pragmatic "learning from experience". The 
contrasting approaches to educa-tion are usually attributed 
to philosophical dif.ferences. It is, however, essential to 
see them in their socio-poli-U.cal contexts. Here, it is 
clear that educational practices nurture the thought styles 
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which in turn perpetuate the practices. More generally, one 
can conclude that the thought styles are structured by 
specific cultural universes and sustained in appropriate 
inst.it.ut:ional settings. The thought styles then replicate 
these settings, ensuring their continuity and the creation 
of a "tradition of thouQ·ht". 
w 
Although both systems have undergone many changes, 
commentators have consistently remarked on both the 
structure in F'rench education and the lack of it in its 
British counterpart. Schueler (in Moehlmann 1965) refers to 
the lack of pattern in English education, and Miller C1951) 
in "The Pioneers o:f English Education" is visibly proud 
that, :in Britain, the priority has been to provide 
institutions not develop principles. The British approach is 
pragmattc, striving ·to provide enough good schools for every 
child not producing a system which is completely systematic. 
Institutions are valued because they are effective, not 
because they conform to a rationale. Hence the plethora of 
educat.ional establishments to be found in this country 
grammar, private Cpublic) and comprehensive schools, This 
contrasts sharply with the unity which has characterized the 
French syst.em since Napoleon - Jesuit school struct.ure was 
at the root of this policy of centralization. The 
bureaucratic, pyramidal structure of French education is 
often presented in the older literature, as the result of 
the Cartesian mind and its obsession with logical processes 
CHalls 1965, Kneller in Moehlmann 1965). The central control 
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that the Ministry of education exerts over the system is 
responsible for this order and structure. The regulatlons 
which it issues covers all aspects of education: when 
subjects are taught and the number of hours they must be 
taught for, the teaching methods, the prescribed texts and 
exercise books wh.ich are to be used. At the beginning of 
each ·te r·m, parents are supplied with a 1 i st which prescribes 
the number and type of exercise book which are required in 
each subject. The new English national curriculum allows 
teachers to choose their own teaching methods and materials. 
The idea of a rational versus empirical approach to 
education occurs frequently in the literature on educational 
planning. Systematic rationalism replaces one set of 
prethought-out structures by another when the first set has 
proved ineffective, whilst the British rely on gradual 
changes and reluctance to revolt. Hence Miller's (1951> 
reference to English education as "a movement" rather than 
"a system". It is tempting to offer the idea of a gradual 
Darwinian evolutionary approach as opposed to a Lamarckian 
development by successive revolutions. In 1924, Graves 
referred to the "gradual" evolution of British education: 
the French tendency "to cut short the social and educational 
processes and to substitute revolution for evolution" did 
not accord well with the British mentality CGraves page :33 
1924). Forty years later, Halls made similar observations. 
The weakness of French Cartesianism, he claims, is that old 
institutions are destroyed when new ones are created. On the 
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other hand, English empiricism modifies old institutions so 
that there is a danger that their "whole structure may in 
time become so ramshackle as to be ineffective" <Halls page 
18 1965)' We are witnessing the disadvantages of English 
empiricism's "gradual" approach: the chaos which has 
accompanied the implementation of the natj_onal curriculum. 
In Ft~ance. the new structures have the same characteri s·t ic 
formalism CProst 1968). Hahn (1971) makes an interesting 
remark concerning the origins and potential usefulness of 
the Ft-ench commitment to stt-ucture structure not only 
being a feature of the educational community. but also of 
the artistic and scientific ones: 
This penchant for the classical 'values' o[ 
structure ~y be the counterweight necessary 
France's frequent and radical political changes. 
318 1971) 
order and 
to offset 
<Hahn page 
Structure and order is the result of state planning in 
France, and has been avoided in Britain. ',,,. What is 
interest.ing is the way that ·the adjectives "empirical" and 
"Cartesian" are used to describe different approaches to 
education. In fact, the terms convey a tot.ally different 
politics of education which is related to the role education 
has played in the different political societies. Not being 
of such central importance in England, education - secondary 
education at least was dominated by the private sector 
<Graves 1927, Kandel 1931). This is why any attempts at 
reform, made by the government, were slow and gradual. 
Conversely, the considerable state planning in France can be 
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linked to the acceptability of state control in an area too 
important to be left to chance development.. The first "plan" 
was conceived to cover the post-war period, and was designed 
to ensure Lhat edu·~a-tion received its fair share of t.he 
civil budget. 
Another piece of evidence exemplifying the importance of 
education in French life is the early development of an 
academic field concerned with theoretical issues 
Pedagogie. It has a long history (Lapie 1927), further 
culture. evidence of educa t.i on's centrality to French 
Philosophers. throughout the centuries, have preoccupied 
themselves with ideas on how to educate children. 
Intellectualism is characteristic of the theorizing in this 
academic area. which developed separately from psychology. 
Rousseau's philosophy, for example, is at the root of the 
concept of "cycle", an intrinsic part of the national 
system. conveying his idea that education has to be 
structured in distinct stages <Lapie 1927>. However, despite 
certain practical applications, the separate theoretical 
development of the field has meant that it has fallen pray 
to a rationalist trait: indulging in discussions with sister 
academic disciplines instead of influencing praxis. Miller's 
C1951) claim that the English are not a nat.ion of great 
educational thinkers, is seconded by Morris in the 
introduction to this vol urne. Indeed, t.he essays indicate 
that British educational thought has been tied to the 
pragmatics of social reform betraying its strong 
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philanthropic roots - and was not. conceived as an academic 
discipline. Consequently, educational thought has accorded 
priority to practical needs, such as those created by 
expansion, and not to educational theories or plans. Key 
educationalists have included the civil servant Shuttleworth 
and the utilitarian philosopher Bentham. Shuttleworth played 
a central role in the establishment of a national program of 
education which was to rescue the nation's children from 
squalor and disorder. ' 7 The strong link between social and 
educational theory perhaps explains why the British 
educational system has been "forged on the anvi 1 of social 
necessity" <Miller in Judges page 47 1951>, and not planned 
out using first principles as the rationalist approach would 
have it again there are parallels to be drawn with t.he 
development of the scient.ific communi ties dealt with in 
chapter three. A case in point is the creation of the 
comprehensive schools to achieve a soctal and political end, 
as well as an educational one: namely the breaking down of 
class barriers ~Burgess 1983). 
The empirical and rational practices govern teacher training 
an important area because teachers are part of the 
1~chinery responsible for perpetuating the intellectual 
traditions <Bourdieu 1979>. In England. not only is t.he 
training more practical the one year postgraduate course 
is heavily biased towards teaching practice but t.he 
thinking behind its organization is as well. In 1962, three 
objectives were decided upon to improve teaching standards: 
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1) to increase the teaching force 2) to fill the need for a 
i'lexi ble teaching force, adaptable to educa t.i onal 
developments and 3> to produce a high quality teaching force 
(Richmond 1971). The institutional frameworlt and courses 
were organized around these propositions, high quality being 
ensured by a considerable degree of practical experience. In 
France, training is much more theoretically orientated and 
geared towards academic excellence. The teaching profession, 
like other civil service functions, is highly structured. 
I·ts priori ties are to maintain rigorous academic standards 
in its teaching force through competitive examinat.ions 
capes. aggregation - necessary to produce the educators oi' 
the elite. The concours d 'aggregation, governing the 
recruitment of teachers, is an initiation rite during which 
the teachers are transformed into "civic minded stat.e 
missionaries" CDescombes 1980). These future educators 
occupy a more prestigious social position than their English 
counterparts, in keeping with their more important function. 
This again reflects the different statuses given to 
education in the two countries. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter constitutes a fitting end to the thesis. Not 
only does it give an insight into the origins of the thought 
styles and how they are maintained, but it once again 
emphasizes how intimately linked the styles are to their 
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respective cultural milieus. The educational 
communi ties/pl-actices: of the two countries like t.he 
scientific ones -· display features mirroring their t.hought 
styles. A rigidly structured frame..vork, geared towards 
producing a highly cultured intellectual "elite", can be 
contrasted with an unstructured one, based upon empirlcal 
considerations, whose ideal is t.o produce the well balanced 
all rounder. The educational structures, products of 
different socio-political environments, embody the ideals 
and values necessary to produce the characteristically 
English and French thought styles. 
l, Intellectualimm in this context can be defined <~s an overwhelming emphasis on the 
powers of the mind. Its reasoning/thinking powers are valued over learning through 
experience - i ,e, guided discovering - imagination and creativity. As Knellel' (1965) 
points out, in France students are taught to use their language with "polish" and 
"finesse", Moroeve-r, the emphasis has been on rrtoulding the «tind into an "instrument c•f 
precision and brilliance". This has meant that, in theory, French "p~dagogie" has 
emphasized intelligence over knowledge, although in practice "subject rr,at.ter" has become 
an Important thing in itself, (Kneller in Moehlman 1965) 
2, Ourkheim, speaking about French education, says: 
11u lor mal isme grammatical de l'lpLl(/1/e Carol ingitmne, au formalisme dialectique 
de la scholast.ique, succMe maintenant un foraalisme d'un nouveau genre: c 'est 
Je r'orhJalis&e litteraire. (0urkheifll page 38 /9S8.1 
3, That educational systems do differ nationally is humorously cc>lptured by Halls (1965), 
who refers to the English cult of the Gentleman, the German of the Spartan warrior and the 
French of the cultivated citizen, imbued with civic virtues. Halls' (1%5) idea of 
nationalism in education is underlined by Lapie. In r1is book on French l'edagL,gir:, he 
explicitly states: 
La Ptidagogit: fran;aisr:, c 'est Ja pedagogie de Rabelais et. de lfont.aignt:, dt: 
Oerartes, de Port-Royal, de Fenilon, dt: Rousseau, de Ja Revolution, de lfichelet 
et de r}uinet, de Ouney et. de Jules Ferry tLapie page 17 1926.1 
French education, ~ccording to him, is thus deeply rooted in French thought. 
4. Locke, for example displayed the same holistic approach: 
Oue rue being had h1 keep the body in strength and vigour, so that it nay be 
able to obey and execut.e the orders of the Mind, the next. and principlt: business 
is to set the mind right, !'in Boyd page 23 19/lJ 
In France, Condillac emphasized the impol'tance of rational capacities, his reasoning 
being: 
that the farulty of reasoning appears as soon as our senses begin to deve1L1p,' 
and that ~te have the use of our senses at an early age only because we havt: 
reas~1ned at an early age. Un Boyd page :JJ 19/7.1 
5. See the "Observer" colour supplement September 3•·d 1989, 
6, The "Observer" colour supplement page 59 September 3•d 1989. 
7. Arnold believed: 
. , . that education should be, IVe think,. tL, render the afterlife of the pupil most 
useful to societ.v and most happy to hiCJself," the next should be t~, render the 
life L;f the pupil as happy as pL;ssible. (in Kandel page JOB 193!) 
S. Morris, in "The Pionneers of English Education", quotes with pride from the 
Consultative Committee report preceding the 1944 education act: 
The forming and strengthening of character,' the training of the tastes vhich 
wi/1 fil/ and dignify leisure,- the awakening and guiding of the intelligence, 
especia//y on its prutical side, These are the ends ~hi,·n ~e h11d in view.,, 
(/'lew is page 54 I 95 I .I 
9. The "core" sub.Ject!il - English, mathematics a11d science - are to be distinguished frOhi 
the "foundation subjects" - technology and design, history, geography, music, art, 
physical education, plus a modern foreign language. The difference between "core" and 
"foundation" sub.iects is that pupils will spend longer each weel( on core subjects, There 
will be additional time allocated for subjects outside the national curriculum - latin and 
the "technical and vocational initiatives". 
10, These two paragraphs relate my own experience, 
11, The Carthusian page 1 July 1989. 
12, Finally, it is interesting to look at two views of national curricula which convey 
some of the points made above, The 1952 NUT report on the curriculum of secondary schools 
betrays the unfortunate divisions which occur in the English curriculum: 
The CL,ncepti,,n of the curriculum as the sum of many isol11ted parts is an 
unfortunate dt!velopment, espuially as it leads a ttucher to limit his teaching 
to a n11rro1Y "subiect" field, The curriculum should move a11ay from a restrictive 
subiect. treatment and towards integration. It should be "of a piece•, its parts 
niated, its whole having pattern, meaning and purpose, It is for this reiJSM 
that ve prefer to consider the content of the wrriculum in terms ot' areas of 
activit,v rather than in terms ~,r separate sllbiects. Though lYe believe that 
wrriculum 11ay be t~eakened by overcrowding or by the constructi,,n of artit'icial 
subiect barriers, ll't: desire that, within a simplified organiuti''" of the 
curruulum, a pupil ~tay sample as wide a range of difft:rent forh!s of activity as 
possible, in a neli activity, he may find an interest, a talen( an unsuspected 
opportunity for self-t'u/t'iliJent and success, an enthusiasnJ t~hiclltoay lead him h1 
nev fields of worth11/Jile t:ndeavour. (Jn Ricllllond page 16 /911.1 
This can be compared with the much more Cartesian view expressed by Liard <1902), talking 
about the two "cultures" which had come to exist side-by-side: 
There ue two types of wlture, the classical and the sciant.ific, .. Classical 
culture, which in franL·e has been traditi~'nilf since the Henaissunce, and vhich 
has bean one of L7Ur I'IL1nours .. one of ''IJr gh,ries, teaches how tL; understand the 
full meaning of 111ords and their exact relation tCI ideas, t., arrange them 1tith 
beaiJty and cCirrectness, to appreriate the eentiment.s of the soul in their most 
delicate ehades of meaning, to marshal words in varieties of expreesion 
corresponding t,; the infinite variety of s~•nt.iments, h1 appreciate and t.o hiH'e t1 
taste f,,r the most varied forms of fn:auty, to see in every queet.ion that IIIIich 
is general ;md human. finally, it transmits from age to age, through the 
classical texts and the 11orks ot' plulosophers an ,;ld fund of truths, ot' wisdL'41, 
of generosity t~hich are the heritage ~;f centuries thai have gone to new stages 
of thinking .md feeling l?u11ani ty, 
Side b,r side 11ith this culture, there has gradually found a place, wit!? the 
continued progress of the sfiences, scientific wlture in the large sense of the 
word. This too.. rhether it be history, geography, 1/Jathe;;atifs, physics, 
cheNistry, natural hist,1ry, teaches how t., conbine ideas, but in their necessary 
or real relations. Its end is the establishment ,1f facts, the knot~Jedge ,,f the 
lavs which unite the!tJ, in a vord, the pro,,t' ,,[ the truths that result, It is an 
instrument Cit' nethod, ol precis ion, of exactness, ot' discipline,. individual and 
collective,' it reveals his power tL; man and sMws !lim its extent and Jimits,o at 
the same time it is ir1 its 111ay philos,;phy, and if the b,,ld interpretation ot' 
metaphysicians are unknovn f.o it, it teaches that all pheno/lena, even though 
seriously contradictory, are bound together by constant relations and that by 
the net11ork ,,f its lar~s, the r~orld is harmony and unity, (Board ot' EducatiL'n .. 
Special Report on Educational $ubjects page 2(1ti 1911 in flalis 1965) 
13, To give a f~w categories cited in the French encyclopaedia Larousse: al La noblesse de 
cloche, a title acquired on becoming a mayol'; b) La noblesse da robe, in charge of court 
finances; c) La noblesse d'~p~e, hereditary nobility. 
14. Hte baccala1..m#at was conceived to embody the Frenct"1, republican ideal of equality: 
.4s regards philosophy, to sit the baccalaurht consists in , . , on the same day, 
at the salle time, hour and t'or the woe length of time, aJJ candidates are 
required to '''AIIIIit similarly e;,;rded answers to identict~l slleets of paper in 
response - until quite recently - t,, a single question drawn from the :;,"yllabus. 
(0escombes page S 198CIJ 
15, In France, local delegates al'e dil'ectly responsible to Pal'is and t.he Ministry. In 
theory the Minister of education controls all appointments, prescribes syllabuses, 
timetables, examination and teaching methods, Napoleon III's minister is famous fc•r 
boasting that all the children in the land were doing a latin unseen at the same time. In 
England, it has been the responsibility of the head teacher to devise curricula and decide 
on teaching methods, and it is still the function the local authority to sack and appoint 
teachers, Even after the instalment. of t.he national curriculum, t.he En·~lish State will nc•t 
have the same extensiv~ control over education as its French counterpart. This is because 
it still will not have <SlW control •)Ver what is taught i11 the 11umerous privat.e schools, 
and there iHe no plans to abolish the local educational authorities. Furthermore, there 
are differences between the curricula themselves. Although the core and foundation 
subjects are alloted a fixed number of hours, thel'e is tir11e tc• study other subjects 
outside the curriculum. In France, only subjects which form part of the national 
curriculum are provided in schools. Teachers in England will have to teach the prescribed 
subject for the prescribed number of hours to ensure that their pupils will pass the state 
exams. However, "creative" teaching will not be compromized. H1ey can decide what teaching 
skills are appropriate and choose their own teaching materials. In France, tl1ese are 
precribed centrally, This combined with the teacher training - not aimed at developing 
creative teachers, but ones responsible for producing the next gener~tion of intellects -
ensures that teaching methods are relatively uniform. 
16. This planning helps 1) t.o antiopate the propol'tion of the budget necessat·y to 
education and 2) to structure the system in order to increase its economic efficiency, The 
rationale behind this idea of planning, according to Halls, is partly philosophical: 
french rationality J~wes to construct the~.1reticall.v ne~ forms of social 
institutions by first setting up new frarwvorks deduced from first principles. 
This IJJ timate Cartesianism is diametr icall,V opposed h, English Empiric ism, in 
which al 1 institutiMs are in perpetuill evolution and are bt:ing constantly 
mMified by e.vperience. (/falls page S2 !9v"S.I 
17. Shuttlewortt"1 was of the opinion: 
Jf the.v (the working classl are t,,, have A·nowledge, surely it is part of a t~ise 
and virtuous government to d,, all in its po~ter to secure to them useiul 
kn,wledge and to guard against pernicious opinions. (in Judges page 1/1 195/.1 
A sharp contrast to the French ideal of education for equality as expressed by Gal \1956): 
lie terfl ourselves dem,,crat.s, but 11e allow the JJaJ~1rity of our children to be 
deprived of the knot~ledge, methods and qualities t~hich would allo11 them not be 
second-class c iti.zems, a slave to propagandists, or merely indifferent to and 
uncomprehending ,,f the w,,rld 11Mch is being created. Oemoaacy Ifill not exist 
{l/Jthout a genuine ed/Jcation of all its citizens. (6al page 35 !95ti in Halls 
!965.1 
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CONCLUSION 
The most interesting witness of English life, about 1850, is 
Ralph Waldo Emerson. . . Time and again, it will be seen, he 
picks out traits which seem eternally typical of the English 
and which have therefore found their various places in this 
book. There is no better summing up of his arguments than in 
his words. 'The practical col111110n sense of modern society .. . 
is the natural genius of the British mind." "The bias of the 
nation is a passion for utility'. 'The English IDind turns 
every abstraction it can receive into a portable utensil'. 
'The English:man has acute perceptions', but 'shrinks from 
generalizations'. He has a firm 'belief in the existence of 
two sides' and 'a supreme eye to facts'. But the logic of 
Englishmen is a logic that 'brings salt to soup... oar to 
boat. Their 1llind is not dazzled by its own means, but locked 
and bolted to results'. 'They have difficulty bringing their 
reason to act, and on all occasions use their memory first'. 
There is, in 'this all-preserving island', a dreg of inertia 
which resists reform in every shape. 'Every one of the 
islanders is an island himself, safe, tranquil, 
incommunicable'. He is 'never betrayed into any curiosity or 
unbecoming emotion'. 'Inspiration' to him 'is only some 
blowpipe or a fine mechanical aid'. (Pevsner page 202 1954) 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of the thesis, an analogy between thought 
styles and social representations was used. The more 
important points that emerged :from the comparison included 
1) the origins of thought styles in, and specificity to, 
certain socio-cultural environments and 2) the permanence of 
the thought styles through accumulated historical weight. 
One aspect of the social mi 1 ieus which seems to be crucial 
to an explanation of the differences between the rational 
and empirical thought styles is their contrasting political 
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structures. The thought styles outlined in this thesis are 
shaped by socio-political environments, which perpetuat.e 
them. Their continued existence is ensured by embedding them 
in institutions. which embody the necessary values to 
sustain them. These are the values of the social milieu 
generating the thought style in question values which 
produce the rationalist bias towards disinterested knowledge 
and empiricism's pragmatism. Hence the idea of historical 
weight, acquired through this self perpetuating system. The 
historical continuity of the thought styles is also captured 
in the complex sociological phenomenon of a tradition of 
thought, described in chapter one. The suggestion was made 
at the end of the first chapter that certain perspectives 
generated by particular thought styles can be incorporated 
into another tradition of thought. Theorists draw on a set 
of inherited resources to modify t.he perspectives in 
accordance with their national thought style. 
are then often used as form of critique 
These imports 
of national 
practices. In painting, the Impressionists, for example, 
adopted some of Turner ian practices to modify the 
inheritance of Delacroix and David. Yet, they still retained 
some of the basic qualities of their native tradition. 
The idea of thought styles as distilled from thought-
environment complexes helps to explain why, despite the use 
of blanket terms such as empiricism and rationalism, the 
manifestations of the thought styles have been described as 
two clusters of characteristics. The terms attributed to 
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them retain their philosophical meanings. In the case of 
empiricism, this involves adhering to evidence of the 
senses. In the case of rationalism, the emphasis is on the 
use of the mind in reasoning systematically with the help of 
a priori principles. However, the philosophical definitions 
have to be transcended to capture the styles complet.ely. 
Empiricism is associated with features such as pragmatism, 
amateurishness and a love of what appears to be concrete, 
manifested in social theory as individualism <Quinton 1982, 
Harland 1985). Rationalism, on the other hand, is coupled 
with an academic intellectualism, pro:fessionalism and 
collectivism CBourdieu 1979, Quinton 1982>. In fact, the 
thought styles embody the features valued by their 
respective socio-political environments, con:firming the 
importance of the latter in structuring them. The 
inseparability o:f the social and the psychological. implied 
in Bourdieu's (1979) idea of internalizing social structures 
- an idea crucial to the understanding of thought styles -
explains why many o:f the features o:f the thought styles are 
manifested at both levels. This dual manifestation has led 
to references to the "Cartesian" approach to education and 
"rationalist" French society. This choice of terminology is 
designed to capture the omnipresence of "structure" in 
French society - mirroring structured French thought - which 
is often related to the rationalist philosophical bias 
towards planning from first principles <Halls 1965). In the 
education chapter, the structured, Cartesian educational 
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practices were contrasted with an empirical unstructured 
approach, emphasizing the value of pragmatic experience. 
The idea of thought styles, developed in the thesis, makes 
explicit how the reasoning about, and conceptualization of, 
what. would seem to be the same ideas, differs V<lithin the two 
traditions. That thought styles affect conceptualization is 
evident both in the Natural and Human Sciences. The former 
is perhaps more surprising because of the assumption that 
the Natural Sciences transcend cultural barriers. But, as we 
saw, the different traditions of thought precluded agreement 
between the two chemists, Dalton and Berthollet, on how to 
:formulate atomic 
conceptualization 
theory. 
in the 
Examples of differences 
Human Sciences include 
in 
the 
Hobbesian/Spencerian and Comtian/Durkheimian ideas of the 
state and the Rousseauian and Lockean ideas of social 
contract. For Hobbes. the English State was an impermanent 
organism, capable of being dismantled as soon as its 
usefulness had been spent. For Comte, it had a much more 
integral nature, possessing an intrinsic morphology which 
the discipline of sociology was conceived to analyze. The 
crucial factor to Locke's social contract was the agreement 
between individuals. For Rousseau, it was the creation of a 
social entity, a "being", which was separate from the 
individual social agents. These contrasting interpretations 
reflect the underlying differences in the socio-political 
milieus. For instance, the strength of the interventionist 
French State is translated into unity and integrality, 
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whilst in the non-interventionist Anglo-Saxon State, it is 
translated into impermanence. More recent differences exist 
between the concepts of the ego/self outlined by the two 
tradi tion.s. The empirical thought style describes a stable 
entity, of use in articulating individual experience. This 
contrasts with the amorphous rational subject, particularly 
common in twentieth century French writings, and not 
required to serve any empirical purpose. Again, these 
different conceptions reflect different political values, 
notably the strong ideology of individualism of Anglo-Saxon 
countries which, since Locke, have concentrated on the 
individual and his liberties. These contrasting formulations 
of the state and the ego within the two traditions, outlined 
in chapters four and five, serve to emphasize how the 
thought styles give rise to discourses which describe their 
respective cultural environments. It has been argued that 
both social discourse and literary traditions can be seen as 
acting out cultural constraints implicit in language: those 
of specific cultural milieus. 
The concept of thought style encompasses an explanation of 
certain features often cited as characteristic of the 
thinking of the nations in question. Frequent references are 
made to the political nature of French thought generally, as 
The political dimension of French 
where madness is treated as a 
well as to its pessimism. 
anti-psychiatric texts, 
political phenomenon, was contrasted with the moral and 
experiential components of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 
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Morality has traditionally been conceived in individualistic 
terms in Anglo-Saxon social discourse, and is thus 
compatible with the individualistic inclination of Anglo-
Saxon anti-psychiatry. Both properties political nature 
and pessimism are translations into thought of the 
political di fferen.ces outlined in the thesis. The inherent. 
pessimism can be explained by a feeling of submission and of 
powerlessness engendered by 
state, with its emphasis on 
produce. The latter leaves 
a strong state, which a weak 
the individual agent, would not 
the way open for optimism, 
exemplified in an extreme form in 
which became the U.S.A. The more 
the Anglo-Saxon colony 
political character of 
French writings merely reflects the pervasive influence of a 
strong interventionist state in all aspects o~ culture. 
Furthermore, the model of different thought styles explains 
why certain philosophies are more readily adopted in certain 
countries than others. The case of Marxism is particularly 
interesting. Its lesser popularity in Anglo-Saxon countries 
is explained by Geison <1985) in terms of the theory's 
inability to explain the functioning of different political 
structures to the one on which it is based a strong 
Hegelian state on the French and German model. Tonnies 
<1979), on the other hand, offers an explanation in terms of 
similarities between the French and German mentalities. He 
notes that Hegel and Comte were influential in the 
neighbouring countries of Prussia and France at the same 
time. These were countries whose mentality had so much in 
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coiDlnon "it was as though they were differently refracted 
rays of the same 1 ight" CTonnies page 83 1974). An 
explanation in terms of thought styles would argue that 
Geison's idea entails Tennies', following Bourdieu's idea of 
the internalization of social structure. An interesting area 
of investigation following from this, would be a comparison 
of the German and the French rationalist thought style. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The model developed is of predictive value. It offers the 
possibility of predicting and subsequently isolating subtle 
differences in the writings of celebrated figures for 
example, a pair of philosophers such as the American 
pragmatist William James and French metaphysician Bergson. 
These men entertained a lively correspondence, through which 
they became convinced that they shared a very similar view 
of the world. This is not entirely surprising considering 
that James had been partly educated in France and was 
certainly acquainted with French culture and thought style. 
Both philosophies advocated the primacy of experience, or as 
James describes it, the immediate "flux" of life, which 
provides the material for our thoughts. The emphasis on 
immediate experience comes through in a concept central to 
Bergsonian philosophy, intuition. This is opposed to reason 
or scientific thought, which is concerned with analyzing and 
formalizing the material world in order to master it. The 
idea of science as a pragmatic tool is also found in James, 
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who saw it as a "successful satisfaction of an interest". 
The shared focus on experience seems to imply the 
possibility of a shared empirical thought style. However, 
there was a fundamental diff·erence in the nature of the two 
forms of empiricism, best captured by Bergson himself: 
But what true empiricism aims at is to follow as closely as 
possible the original itself, to deepen its life and, by a 
kind of 'spiritual auscultation'. to its soul pulsate. and 
this true empiricism is true metaphysics. (Bergson in 
Kolakowski page 26 1985) 
This was not an experiential empiricism of the same kind as 
James'. but, like Sartre's, a metaphysical one. Metaphysics, 
according to Bergson, was the proper method of analyzing the 
spirit. The metaphysician takes as his starting point the 
intuitive awareness of the spirit in its living reality. 
Intuition is not satisfied with perceiving immediate 
experience, but goes beyond, revealing the direct meaning, 
not perceptual/sensual meaning, but meaning unmediated by 
analytic categories. The difference between the two 
philosophers is highlighted by their discussion of the 
concept of self. Bergson distinguished between the 
"profound" and the "superficial" self. The latter was part 
of the spatial universe, a social manifestation of the 
former, which was indescribable in language. Bergson was not 
hindered by the inadequacy of language, and, in his attempt 
to express the profound self, he equated it with his idea of 
"pure time" or becoming, dur~e, also perceived by intuition: 
the form taken by our successive states of consciousness 
when our ego lets itself live, when it abstains from making 
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a separation between its present and preceding states. 
(Bergson page 100 1910) 
The profound self was important to Bergson's concept of 
freedom as "to act freely. is to regain possession of 
oneself, to get back into pure duration" <Bergson page 20 
1910). James conceived of a similar duality between the 
empirical aggregate of the "Ke" and the core self of the 
"I". equivalent to the Bergsonian profound self. James used 
a wealth of description to capture the Me, whereas the 
difficult concept of the I was treated but briefly, as that 
which perceives the unity in the Me: 
This He is an empirical aggregate of things objectively 
known. The I which knows them cannot be an aggregate: 
neither for psychological purposes need it be an unchanging 
metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the 
transcendental Ego, viewed as 'out of time'. It is a 
thought, at each moment different from that of the last 
moment, by appropriation of the latter, together with all 
that the latter called its own. (James page 216 1910) 
Again the problem is expressing the I in linguistic terms. 
James' definition was more empirical, or experiential, in 
that the I was not equated to some metaphysical entity to be 
perceived by intuition, an aspect of the elan vital or life 
drive. permeating the universe. In the end, James remains 
closer to pure experience by not positing an a priori, 
metaphysical entity to capture what he is describing. 
Despite these differing philosophical perspectives, as Rorty 
C1982) would argue. the two men were trying to express 
similar ideas. That they did so in dissimilar ways makes 
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this another example of rhetorical difference as defined in 
the first chapter. 
Another possible area of research along similar lines, would 
be applying the idea of thought styles to an analysis of 
psychiatric texts. Cultural differences in orthodox 
psychiatric thought were outlined in the introduction, using 
historical examples and instances from the classification 
literature. The influence of culture on psychiatry is the 
theme of the post-Foucau ldian, "Nouvelle Histoire de la 
Psychiatrie" by Postel and Quetel C1985). They link the 
development of national psychiatric schools to political, 
intellectual and ideological factors which have been 
important in shaping them. 1 
FINAL REMARKS 
The aim of the work can best be understood in terms of what 
Moscovici (1985) says about social representations, echoing 
Darnton's remark quoted at the beginning of the thesis. 
Moscovici maintains that one can never be free from cultural 
constraints. but that through them: 
We ~y. with effort, became aware af the conventional aspect 
af reality, and with this, evade same af the constraints 
which it imposes an our perceptions and thoughts. But we 
should nat imagine that we could ever be free of all 
convention, ar could elindnate every prejudice. Rather than 
seeking ta avoid all convention, a better strategy would be 
ta discover and make explicit a single representation. Thus. 
instead af denying representations, conventions and 
prejudices, this strategy would enable us to recognise that 
representations constitute, far us, a type af reality. (page 
8 1985) 
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An awareness of national constraints is crucial to access 
the deep meaning of all aspects of a culture, as Bourdieu 
C1986) points out in connection with art: 
The work of art has meaning and interest only for someone 
who possesses the cultural competence, that is, the words, 
that are available to name visible things, and which are, as 
it were, prograiiJIBes for perception. A work of art has 
meaning and interest only for someone who possesses the 
cultural competence, that is, the code, into which it is 
encoded. The conscious or unconscious implementation of 
explicit or implicit schemes of perception and appreciation 
which constitutes pictorial or musical culture is the hidden 
condition for recognizing the styles characteristic of a 
period, a school or an author, and, more generally, for the 
familiarity with the internal logic of works that aesthetic 
enjoyment presupposes. (Bourdieu page 2 1986) 
Bourdieu's idea is important, although his priority of 
"code" over "style" runs counter to my use of t.he terms. 
Code, as a means of communication or expression, is 
dependent upon the representional "style". Interestingly, 
the et.ymology of the terms would suggest the priority of 
"style" over "code", where the latter is derived from codex 
or tablet, the former from stylus or writing implement. The 
style would thus be the "author" of the "code". This thesis 
has tried to make explicit these cultural codes, or 
constraints on thought and expression, which many take for 
granted, or sometimes simply ignore. Recognition of national 
differences in thought/representations, their origins and 
any prejudices that result from them, becomes even more 
urgent as 1992 approaches. An understanding of national 
thought styles makes Mrs Thatcher's reactions to certain 
European issues at least understandable, and at best, 
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predictable. Her reaction to the proposed European 
bureaucratic unification was that it proved the existence of 
a "socialist" Europe. Her resistance to joining the 
centralized European monetary system was a reaction against 
collectivist ideology. Opposition parties may disagree with 
wing of British politics was not her, yet the left 
particularly European minded until Europe became a weapon to 
use against the government. Moreover, the British left wing 
has not been, and still is, no friend of Continental utopian 
collectivist politics, as sucl1 English reformist movements 
as the Fabians, for example, testify. 
There are several difficulties with the thesis which have to 
be addressed. The greatest problem facing an investigator in 
an area such as this - essentially an analysis of national 
differences is choosing a convenient starting point or 
inroad into the problem. This relates to the artificiality 
of framing the issue in terms of "thought". A weakness of 
the term "thought style" is that it implies thought governed 
practices while the thesis outlines environmental origins, 
without exploring the complicated issue of the priority of 
thought or action. The thesis is content to illustrate how 
the psychological properties are sustained by socio-
political environments. It has, however, led to a picture of 
the thought styles as not sui generi s, but embedded, and 
even reflected, in cultural structures. As it was argued in 
chapter one, they issue from culturally specific thought-
environment complexes, or "life styles", to which they are 
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suited and whose values they embody. The term "thought 
style" was chosen because the thesis focuses on the 
properties of thought and expression of the two traditions. 
Furthermore, in accounting for the difference between the 
two styles, I have only considered one factor responsible 
for generating the contrasting thought styles: the 
contrasting political substructures of Britain and France. 
Nonetheless, this factor has proved to be of crucial 
importance in accounting for the origins and persistence of 
the two styles. Another problem, which perhaps has not been 
accorded sufficient attention, is the link between thought 
and language. The only firm claim that the thesis makes is 
that there exists a consonance between the two: both thought 
style and language embody the same set of culturally 
specific constraints. This, however, supports the 
conclusions of cognitive theorists such as Piaget and 
Vygotsky. These thinkers are often presented as holding 
opposing viewpoints on the issue of priority of thought and 
language. However, they reach very similar conclusions: 
Vygotsky's is that thought and language are interdependent, 
while Piaget's is that they are linked in a genetic circle. 
Although the representation analogy has served the thesis 
well, there is an important difference between thought 
styles and social representations. Representations emphasize 
the cultural constraints on ordinary/commonsense 
thinking/discourse, thought styles are concerned with those 
of rationalized academic/intellectual thinking/discourse 
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the students interviewed belonged to the French and English 
academic communities. They are institutionalized modes of 
conjuctive thinking for particular experiential communities 
(Rayner 1989), imposing their design on art, science and 
political ideologies. 2 
Finally, not only does the nature of the subject allow for 
many different presentations of the problem, but also the 
material ·to be drawn upon to illustrate the points made is 
enormous - an example which Darnton deals with in his book 
is the different forms of humour which exist in the two 
countries. This is why the thesis provides a kaleidescopic, 
as opposed to a comprehensive, picture of a phenomenon that 
I have been aware of from a position between the two 
cultures. There is also the problem of finding truly 
comparable cont.rasts two writers, painters, authors et.c 
always differ in more than thought style. The difficulties 
of presentation and of choice of material stem from the 
attempt to put in a concise, academic, "rationalist" form, a 
complex issue which can only be fully understood through 
"empirical" experience. 
I. Talking about English psychiatry, Postel and Quetel say: 
La decentraiiution du pouvoir allait de pair avec ]'importance auordee a Ja 
liberte individuelle et Ja (relative) toUrt:nce religit:use. La philosophie de 
John Letcke 1'16J2-1104.J consarra un empirisme episte11ologique qui cetntinua a 
recevoir l'agrlment retorique des philosophes et docteurs pendant prt:sque tetute 
la periode qui nous ouupe, Les docteurs appreciaient le pragmatisn~e des 
connaissances, au point de vue de Ia tMrapie, et Jes reputations 
professionnelles dependaient plus des nuances du beau Nonde et d'une clientne 
influente que Ja poursuite rigoureuse d'un nouveau savoir, Le Jaissez-faire 
economique s 'etendit jusqu 'au domaine medical ou il se lraduisit par Ja 
diversite des chemins pedagogiques petssible pour Jes titudiants en medecine et 
]'absence de lois nat.ionales controlants enlierement Ia pretfession medicale 
,want 1838. Les Mpit.aux etaient generalement finances par des contributions 
voluntaires de citoyens aises, qui pouvaient en retour com11ander des voisins 
importants des serviteurs ou des etJployes comNe objects convenables de cette 
charite. ffostel and Quetel page 252 /98S.J 
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This corroborates my preliminary research into ho\IJ Jaissez-faire ideology dominated early 
British practices to~ards the mentally ill, 
2. Rayner's article deals \IJith the philosophy of Mannheim who was also concerned with 
different styles of thinking, Nannheirn's ideas are, however, different from those 
expounded in this thesis. Mannheim's theorizing is firmly located within the neo-Kantian 
tradition. The latter emphasizes the existence of separate cognitive structures for 
scientific and artistic thinking, This thesis has been devoted to showing how national 
"style" is manifested in all cognitive activities, using Moscovici's <1985) idea of social 
representations and Bourdieu's (1979) idea of the internalization of social structures. 
Thus, whilst his work adopts a neo-Kantian orientation, the thesis leans more towards the 
positivist/materialist tradition, and explores the link between the cognitive and the 
social, This is not to say that links between this thesis and Mannheim's ideas could not 
be made, 
I. Talking about English psychiatry, Postel and Quetel say: 
La derentral iution d11 po11voir al 1 ai t de pair avec I' importance auordee .J Ia 
Iibert~ individueJJe et la (relative) tolerence religieuse. La pltilosophie de 
John Locke Oo"32-1104.1 consacra un eo1pirisme epistemologique qui continua .J 
rerevoir 1 'agrement retorique des philosophes et doc teurs pendant presque toute 
Ja periode qui n,,us occupe. Les docteurs appreciaient Je pragmatisme des 
connaissances, au point de vue de Ja tMrapie, el Jes reputations 
professionnel Jes dependaient plus des nuances du beau monde et d'une c Jientele 
inf Juente que Ja poursui te r igoureuse d'vn nouveau sa voir. Le Jaissez-faire 
economique s '~tenrli t iusqu 'au domaine medica I oJ) il se traduisi t par I a 
diversJt~ des cheiJins pedagogiques possible pour Jes etudiants en medicine et 
1 'absence de lois natir.males controlants enti~Jrement Ja profession m~dicale 
avant 1938, Les Mpitaux etaient genlralement financ~s par des contributions 
volvntaires de citoyens aises, qvi pouvaient en retour comllander des voisins 
importants des serviteurs ou des eNplo,rtis colt!Jt? objects convenables de cetta 
charite, (Postel and ~uetel page 252 198S.J 
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This cor1·oborates my preliminary research into how laissn-lair~P ideology dominated early 
British practices towards the mentally ill. 
2. Rayner's article deals with the philosophy of M&nnheirn who was also concerned with 
different styles of thinking, l~annheim's ideas are, however, different from thos~: 
expounded in this thesis. Mannheirn's theorizing is firmly located within the neo-Kantian 
tradition. The latter emphasizes the existence of separate cognitive structures for 
scientific and artistic thinking, This thesis has been devoted to showing how national 
"style" is manifested in all cognitive activities, using Moscovici's (1985) idea of social 
representations and Bourdieu's <1979) idea of the internalization of social structures. 
Thus, whilst his work adopts a neo-Kantian orientation, the thesis Jeans more towards the 
positivist/Diaterialist tradition, and explores the link between the cognitive and the 
social. This is not to say that I in~:s between this thesis and Mannheim' s ideas could not 
be 01ade. 
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